by Zamir Chargynov

Introduction: Central Asia has witnessed two extremely important events in 2005, namely ‘Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan’ and ‘Andijan Upheaval in Uzbekistan’, the consequences of which decisively strengthened the Sino-Russian vector in foreign policies of Central Asian Republics.i On 4th of December 2005 there took place a 3rd major event, the Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan, which will end the year with many implications for the interests of the players of the Great Game over this strategic and oil-rich region of Inner Asia.

However, it has a particular significance for China, since the ‘peaceful re-election of Nazarbaev to the Kazakh Presidency’ consolidates the gains obtained so far as a result of two previous events and ensure the continuation of safe and uninterrupted energy supply as well as the stability in the neighbourhood of China’s restive Xinjiang for the forseeable future.

Moreover, taken together with this years’ enlargement and consolidation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the comfortable re-establishment of Nazarbaev into power marks the final development of a year favouring China’s interests in Central Asia.

Background: Sudden and unforeseen change of power in Kyrgyzstan on 24 March 2005 has put China in a rather uncertain position concerning the new opposition government in the country. China had closed its borders with Kyrgyzstan right after March 24 and evacuated many Chinese businessmen, who were threatened and reported to suffer from the lootings in the aftermath of the revolution, on special charter flights to People’s Republic of China.

Concern over the soonest stabilization of the situation in the country bordering China’s problematic Xinjiang province was clearly noticeable in the official statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; ‘China hopes the situation in Kyrgyzstan turns stable to an early date… As a friendly neighbor of Kyrgyzstan, China is paying a close attention to the development of the situation and wishes social order there restored to a normal state as soon as possible’ (source)

However, the opinion on the future course of the country led by people many of whom widely used anti-Chinese rhetoric in criticizing Akaev’s lands transfer agreement with China in 2002, and who came to power as a result of popular revolt that had taken place in line with the ones in Georgia and Ukraine, was not clearly determined at first.

Many in China feared the rise to power of western-oriented leaders in Kyrgyzstan mearnt an increase of U.S. influence in Central Asia. Thus, Chinese official news agency Xinhua reported ‘US influence in Central Asia to Rise after Change of Kyrgyzstan Government’.iii

These concerns have finally settled, as the new leadership pledged its adherence to the preservation of status-quo in developing post-revolutionary foreign policy. To note, China was the second country after Uzbekistan where official delegation under the Acting Foreign Minister made its visit.

In her meetings with high-ranking Chinese officials, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, Roza Otunbaeva, whom many saw as pro-western, assured Beijing of the commitment of the new Kyrgyz leadership to preserve good and friendly relations with its important friend and economic partner China.

On their turn, the PRC Embassy in Kyrgyzstan sponsored some charity activities in Bishkek, supposedly to improve China’s image in post-revolutionary Kyrgyz public. As an expression of its support to the new government, China has also provided Kyrgyzstan with ‘fireworks’ as a gift on the day of the inauguration of Kyrgyz President and managed to have it announced through all local media.

Overall, the change of power in Kyrgyzstan on 24th of March has not result in the deterioration of Sino-Kyrgyz relations as it was suspected in China. Beijing was able to preserve its close partnership with Bishkek, meaning the continuation of supply of Kyrgyz hydro-electric power to Western China and cooperation in fighting the three evils of extremism, separatism and terrorism as well as to secure its existing influence in Central Asia.

Unlike in the case of Kyrgyzstan, China did not remain in a wait-and-see position regarding the Andijan incident. Far from that ‘China was the only country to have given an outright support to Karimov despite the protests in other parts of the world’ (source).

Only a week after the bloody massacre in the Central Asian city, President Hu Jintao invited the Uzbek President to visit China at the end of that month. In China, where Karimov made his first foreign trip after the Andijan events, he received not just praise, but the expressions of delight at his handling of the uprising (source). China gave him a 21-gun salute as Karimov arrived to Beijing, an expression of the highest respect for any foreign guest.

Although China’s adherence to the principle of non-interference into the internal affairs of another country may constitute one of the reasons why China did not criticize the repressive methods of Karimov, there are certainly other and more important considerations.

Uzbekistan is an important and influential country in Central Asia, a region with significant gas and oil resources. Up until the spring of 2005, perhaps, it was the most pro-American among all four Central Asian Republics in terms of its foreign policy, being the first to allow American troops on its soil. While Uzbekistan was being heavily criticized by the West for the way it put down the Andijan upheaval, China has ‘seized the moment’. By giving an explicit political support and concluding serious economic agreements during Karimov’s visit to Beijing, China tried to demonstrate that ‘a friend in need is a friend indeed’.

All the moves of China towards Uzbekistan, including the refusal to support an international investigation of the Andijan events, have been successful in attracting a strategically important country – Uzbekistan, which previously tried not to deepen relations with China - to its side in the Great Game over Central Asia.vi

The Tulip Revolution that forced one of the 5 members of ‘Post-Soviet Central Asian Club of Presidents’ to leave the game made all other leaders wary of U.S. influence in their countries. This, being coupled with heavy Western criticism towards Karimov’s handling of the Andijan Affair (which regional leaders believed to be organized by Islamic fundamentalist groups), found its reflection in a joint anti-US declaration at the Astana Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The Summit marked another gain of China’s Central Asian policy that, besides all other goals, does also incorporate the decrease of U.S. influence in Central Asia. The removal of U.S. military bases from Uzbekistan by January 2006 will, perhaps, amount to the biggest gain of China’s foreign policy in the region so far. The Summit, presided by the Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbaev, also reached the incorporation of India, Iran and Pakistan into SCO as observers. In his opening speech Nursultan Nazarbaev, by mentioning this enlargement, expressed his support to the organization in becoming a powerful and effective regional body representing more than half of the Earth’s population and capable of solving many problems faced by the region.

Implications: December 4, 2005 Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan, seen in light of this year’s developments in the region constitute a third major event with very significant implications for the political stability and economic development of Central Asia as well as to the interests of neighboring China.

Being the second most populated country in Central Asia with increasing life standards, Kazakhstan is an important regional leader. The US, alleged by many to be a contributor to the series of colorful revolutions taken place in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, has clearly weighed in its support for Nazarbaev’s regime as Condoleezza Rice advanced Kazakhstan to the role of a regional model during her recent visit to Central Asia in October.

Nazarbaev’s regime is also at good relations with China, as it pledged to supply the latter with oil via an Atasu-Alashankou pipeline, and Russia, since Kazakhstan has been the influential supporter of Putin’s policy in Eurasia. In other words, there are no sufficient reasons why the players of the Great Game would like to see Nazarbaev replaced. With everyone outside being fine with the continuation of Nazarbaev’s rule, opposition at home being weak and having no sound base to heavily criticize the economic developments of last years and security forces being well-prepared for the mass protests after the March events in Kyrgyzstan, it is not a surprise that the so called ‘Kyrgyz virus’ has passed Kazakhstan untouched.

Preserving peace and stability after the third major event of the year remains top priority at the moment for the leaders in the region as well as for China. Chinese Xinhua has paid much attention to this problem in its reports headlined like ‘Kazakhstan launches security action for presidential elections’. Local Fergana News Agency have reported of several military divisions being pulled nearby the important cities of the country; Astana, Almaty and Shymkent. However, with the announcement of the opposition that it will not organize massive acts of protests, and independent exit polls revealing 70-80% vote for Nazarbaev, there remains no solid grounds to anticipate any scenes of popular unrest.

The re-election of Nazarbaev to his next term with 91% (preliminary CEC results) of votes said many things to other apparatchik-Soviet Central Asian leaders. It seems that they are breathing with ease now, since an example of successful stay in power in a neighboring country gives hope for them.

However, the peaceful ending of elections and continuation of Nazarbaev’s reign for another seven years has a particular importance for China. First, it means stability near troubled Xinjiang province that was hardly bolstered by the two previous events in March and May. Secondly, it will ensure the continuation of support in fighting Uighur separatism, for which Nazarbaev’s regime contributed greatly in the past by extraditing Uighur extremists to China. An equally important implication is that uninterrupted supply of Kazakh energy to People’s Republic will be maintained. Finally, as it is put by SCO Secretary-General Zhan Deguang ‘Kazakhstan’s election has a great meaning for strengthening stability and cooperation … in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.’

Conclusion: The year 2005 in China’s foreign policy towards Central Asia has marked a time of exceptional success. The consequences of two unexpected events that have shaken the region in the spring of the year turned out to be very favorable to Beijing’s interests in Central Asia. Fears over Kyrgyzstan’s new orientation turned out to be groundless, and the West’s ‘critical offense of Uzbekistan’ on its methods of dealing with Andijan riots have made Karimov friendlier towards Beijing, and certainly Moscow. In addition, the year is closing with the re-assurance in the regional stability, economic and political cooperation within the framework of SCO, all promoted by Nazarbaev’s regime in Kazakhstan.

More by the author on Central Asia in 2005:
Chargynov, Zamir et al, ‘The events of 24th of March and 13th of May: New Relocation of Influence in Central Asia?’ Selected Student Papers Published by OSCE 2005