A full day seminar entitled “Regional Cooperation and Integration in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities” was held at the Brookings Institution this past Monday, March 27. It was jointly organized by the UNDP and Brookings, and focused on regional trade opportunities. A transcript of the proceedings should be available on the Brookings website shortly.

The below is a summary of a discussion about political and institutional obstacles to regional integration held by an panel of prominent academics: Fred Starr, Kathleen Collins, Martha Brill Olcott, Eric McGlinchey, and Talaibek Koichumanov.

Fred Starr (Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins, SAIS) opened by emphasizing the importance of Afghanistan to the discussion. He said that even though Afghanistan had not officially been a part of the discussions or the UNDP report, it should be, and the fact that it was nevertheless included in the panel discussions (not surprising given his recent paper arguing that Afghanistan should be considered part of the region).

Trade between Central Asian countries, Starr said, is not and will not be a significant engine of development. Instead, the issue at hand is continental trade. He argued that Central Asia has the potential to be a “new Silk Road” connecting Europe, China, India, and Russia by railroad. Starr said that even though his colleagues would be pointing out the faults of regional government as impediments to the new Silk Road, the external powers themselves are the real problem. While China has been relatively proactive about opening up trade to the region, India has been slow to do so, Europe embarrassingly so, and the United States hardly any better. Opening up trade in Central Asia, according to Starr, requires engagement by outside governments, not NGOs, to set up the requisite infrastructure. He did note that the Asian Development Bank has been a pioneer in this regard.

Kathleen Collins (Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Minnesota and author of upcoming Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia) spoke chiefly about the institutional constraints on regional integration. She argued that there are three principle obstacles: the nation state legacy, security concerns, and the political economy.

Because the Central Asian republics were endowed with a weak sense of national identity by the Soviets, their leaders have been quick to capitalize on differences rather than similarities to build a sense of nationalism. These governments have, however, been successful at staving off ethnic secessionism, and are more stable than they were. Thusly, the nation state legacy should be less of a problem in the future.

Central Asian governments have also been reluctant to cooperate because of regional security issues, namely Afghanistan, the Tajik Civil War, and Islamist extremism. Two of these factors have been improved to a large extent in recent years, although Islamist extremism remains a problem.

Finally, she argued that the nature of the political economy undermined progress. All of the republics are ruled by highly centralized, authoritarian governments who have to a large extent undermined the very interest groups that might have lobbied and pushed for regional trade and integration. Consequently, such reforms depend entirely on their erratic personalities. Furthermore, the corrupt nature of politics in these countries further undermines the prospects for regional integration.

Collins concluded by recommending the reform of the super-presidential system, cracking down on vested interests, improving the civil service, and broad anti-corruption reforms.

Martha Brill Olcott (Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for international Peace and author of the recent Central Asia’s Second Chance) opened by commenting that the issues in question were much to complex to address during her presentation, and that she would instead make rather specific comments. She recommended reading her book for the full picture.

The consequences of the failure to regionally integrate are much greater for some states than others, according to Olcott, a fact that complicates the entire process. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have suffered disproportionately for the lack of economic cooperation.

She was somewhat optimistic, however, stating that the atmosphere for cooperation is much better than it has been for some time. Cooperation will inevitably predicated on a shared understanding of how to allocate water resources.

Olcott said that the stalled trade reforms has sped up the growth of Islamist extremism, especially in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and parts of Kyrgyzstan. She further noted that international actors need to be in sync with the actual pace of reforms in Central Asia.

She concluded by advocating security reform by working closely with the Russians, emphasizing international educational subjects such as the sciences, and focusing on increasing media capacity while ignoring content for the time being. According to Olcott, our policies should engage issues right now, not wait for regime change.

In a final note, she seemed to counter Starr’s argument that a new Silk Road is even possible, saying that she wasn’t sure the great markets really needed Central Asia, and that Central Asia certainly needs the great markets more than the great markets need Central Asia as a transit route.

Eric McGlinchey (Assistant Professor of Politics and Government, George Mason University – publications) opened by laying out three challenges to regional cooperation, three inducements to cooperation, and two suggestions.

He argued that three challenges are executive instability, decentralization at the local level, and post-Soviet identity, and that these challenges also represent the potential inducements to regional cooperation.

Executive instability poses a challenge for obvious reasons; if revolution is a potential danger, regional integration will be the last think on a ruler’s mind, and might not have the power to implement it. However, the nature of the executives in the region also might serve as an inducement to regional cooperation. In the case where the countries have nationalistic parliaments, the executive may be able to push through unpopular reforms. McGlinchey cited an example where former Kyrgyz president Akaev delimitated the border with China even though the move was unpopular with nearly everyone in the country. Also, the instability is in some cases bringing regional rulers together for mutual security (as seen recently with Nazarbayev’s visit to Uzbekistan), which can lead to increased cooperation.

While the executive is the absolute dictator of policy, outside the capitols the implementation of that policy is increasingly becoming the prerogative of regional elite (the Andijon incident provides an example of the central government cracking down on this trend). This decentralization of power both advances and hinders regional integration. In the case of Kokand in 2004, the government tried to implement protectionist measures that would have negatively impacted the population at large. After extensive protests, the regional elites ultimately took the side of the protestors, and refused to implement central policy. On the other hand, Andijan’s ruler before the insurrection and massacre, Kobiljon Obidov, was able to use his power to protect his son, who is notorious as one of the region’s biggest drug traders. The regional elite’s ability to provide protection to those outside the law is an impediment to integration.

Much has been made of all of the various identities in Central Asia, both imagined and otherwise. McGlinchey mentioned another group not as oft discussed: a transnational democratic mobilization connected by technology. He said that this group is increasingly international; he mentioned that one of his friends was formerly an Uzbek dissident, but after being kicked out simply relocated to Kyrgyzstan to continue his work. Utilizing cell phones and the internet, these groups are able to mobilize across national boundaries and keep in very close touch. They represent a destabilizing force potentially disruptive to integration in the short run, but also as a potential engine for regime change that could benefit integration in the long run. Either way, said McGlinchey, they deserve support.

McGlinchey concluded with two recommendations. He suggested a stance in between what he termed the “Murray” and “Akiner” stances, the Murray stance being that these countries should be completely forsaken and not dealt with until there is some sort of regime change, and the Akiner stance that the regimes do not deserver intense criticism. Instead, he advocated a policy of engagement while simultaneously supporting reform groups in the country. He noted that Uzbekistan has turned into even more of a tragedy since the United States chose to disengage. Later on, someone from the audience pointed out that the United States is in fact still engaging fairly actively, and McGlinchey clarified that he was referring more to the conceptual debate than the policy as of yet.

His second recommendation was to dispose of the notion of a “Great Game” — it does not exist. Neither Russia nor China are willing to sacrifice their relationships with the US for the sake of a geopolitical struggle in the region, and outside powers really share a lot of the same priorities and goals.

As a last remark McGlinchey said that while he is somewhat unoptimistic about the prospects for regional trade, as a George Mason professor, concede that anything is possible after GMU made the Final Four.

Talaibek Koichumanov (Visiting Scholar at the Central Asia-Caucus Institute at Johns Hopkins, SAIS and former Minister of Finance of Kyrgyzstan) outlined the different approaches to integration by the various regional powers.

According to Koichumanov, Kyrgyzstan has always been very open to integration, and is a member of the WTO. Tajikistan may have been, but was disrupted by the civil war. Turkmenistan sees itself as entirely self-sufficient.

He also said that corruption is such a problem in the region that bribes often account for 16-40% of an item’s cost. By eliminating trade barriers, he said, exports could be increased by 2.5%.

During questions, an audience member asked Koichumanov if he ever witnessed corruption in the Akaev regime, and if Koichumanov himself had to pay a bribe for his post. At this point Starr intervened and said that the question was valid, but not appropriate for the seminar.