By Younghusband

Since independence a number of attempts have been made to build security relationships with and between the countries of Central Asia. From joint defence ministers meetings to the Collective Security Treaty Organization, security ties in Central Asia have resulted in a multilateral alphabet soup with varying levels of failure. Western attempts in the region have also seen little success.

In 1996, the U.S. Department of Defense backed the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in creating a joint peacekeeping/humanitarian aid unit called Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion, or CENTRASBAT. The political goal of this 500 strong tripartite unit was to develop healthy security ties between the newly independent Central Asian states. The military goal of the battalion was to maintain a rapid response capability for humanitarian and disaster relief, while developing interoperability with NATO and other Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations.

The United States supported CENTRASBAT by training its senior officers at war colleges in America as well as providing funding. This funding was used to purchase non-lethal military equipment from the United States at reduced cost. All equipment sales had to be cleared by Congress, and included things such as uniforms, webbing, transport vehicles and NODs (night optical devices).

CENTRASBAT’s inaugural exercise was executed 15-20 September 1997. Organized by U.S. Atlantic Command (Central Asia did not come under CENTCOM jurisdiction until 1 October 1999), involving 40 CENTRASBAT soldiers and 500 troops from the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, exercise CENTRASBAT-97 became the longest-distance airborne operation in military history. Six C-17 transport aircraft left Fort Bragg, North Carolina, flying nearly 19 hours non-stop with two mid-air refuellings over a distance of 12,500km to drop the 540 paratroopers on Chirchik, Uzbekistan in a simulation against “dissident elements”. A triumph for CENTRASBAT, this exercise also served as a message to the Russians and others. As the four-star General John Sheehan (USMC) noted, “There is no nation on the face of the earth where we can’t go.”

A number of other exercises followed involving other countries, but as time went on CENTRASBAT became increasingly viewed as an “American Project.” This is partly due to the fact that the United States did not have a substantive policy, security or otherwise, to guide its relationship with Central Asia. Washington saw the results with CENTRASBAT and threw all its weight behind the battalion, seeming to take over. Furthermore, political relations between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were not necessarily encouraging and CENTRASBAT could not be deployed without the authorisation of all three presidents. Development of the battalion has basically stalled. Though most countries in the region that have been involved with the CENTRASBAT exercises in the past have frittered away their training, Kazakhstan took the experience to heart and created its own peacekeeping force on 31 January 2000 called KAZBAT. Members of this battalion were part of the “Coalition of the Willing” which invaded Iraq. Kazakhstan has suffered one casualty in Iraq, but recently re-committed its 27 man strong force for another 6 months.

Whereas CENTRASBAT seems to have failed, disaster response by IWER has been a success. The International Workshop for Emergency Response conducted under NATO’s Partnership for Peace program put Uzbek emergency responders in contact with the Louisiana State National Guard. Though the US plays an important role in the workshops, the relationship is more diffuse and the Central Asian participants can truly see the benefits in regards to their situation at home. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have also participated in the IWER workshops.

As the nations of Central Asia represent the “heartland” of geopolitics, and play an important role in controlling narcotics and human trafficking in the region, Western countries should increase efforts to develop security ties. Unfortunately, due to the political reality of the region, with its entrenched authoritarian leadership, it may be another decade before large-scale cooperation can be achieved. Yet as veteran war correspondent Robert D. Kaplan argued strongly in his book Imperial Grunts, the best military and security relationships are built on individual relationships between the lowest levels of NCOs. It is well within the means of the West to increase contact between the NCOs of Central Asia and those of NATO countries. Moreover, developing contacts within the context of host nations’ needs can make the difference between success and failure.

Investing in these relationships now will reap beneficial relationships in the future, as the young officer corps of today become the leaders of the defence apparatus of tomorrow. To be successful it is imperative to let these relationships grow naturally, building a balanced foundation shared equally by all stakeholders. This is particularly important for the U.S. presence in Central Asia, as America needs the region more than they need America. But the United States can offer the kind of egalitarian relationship that Russia and China cannot, so the potential for long-lasting, organic security cooperation is there.

Younghusband is a contributor at ComingAnarchy.com and Master’s candidate for War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada.