Carleton College Professor Adeeb Khalid presented a his research on November 15th titled “Understanding Soviet Islam: Religion, Nationality and Citizenship in Soviet Central Asia” at George Mason University. His lecture was based on extensive research for a book coming out in January that will be the only narrative history of Islam in Central Asia during the entire Soviet period.

Khalid’s principle argument was that the Soviet Union had a profound impact on Central Asian Islam and made the region unique in the Muslim world. This point may seem intuitive, but was presented as a counterargument to an outdated understanding of Soviet Islam that argues: (1) the Soviets were fundamentally unsuccessful in their project of transforming Muslim consciousness; (2) Islam remained a force of opposition to Soviet ideology; (3) Soviet Central Asians were either Sovietized atheists or traditional Muslims outside the system.

Khalid began the lecture by dispelling several common myths about Soviet Islam. First, he said that Islam used as a label so totalizing as to be almost useless as a term; there are infinite possibilities of interpretation and practice. Radically opposed ideologies can be equally rooted in legitimate Islamic sources. He noted that this is also true of any other religion, and in fact, because Islam has no formal church or clergy, diversified opinions and practices are even more common.

Secondly, it is commonly believed that Soviet Central Asia was completely isolated from the outside world. According to Khalid, this is fundamentally untrue. Many Muslims from neighboring countries studied in Central Asian cities such as Tashkent, though it should be noted that they were carefully selected by the Soviets and were predominantly studying science and engineering.

He began the main part of his lecture by positing that the Soviet experiment was actually far more successful than many give it credit for. His narrative was divided into three main periods.

1927-1938

This was the most violent period of Soviet history, and the end result was the destruction of cultural and religious establishments in Central Asia. The brutality stemmed from an extreme ideology rooted in Enlightenment radicalism (which originated in Europe, not Russia) taken to its logical conclusion. Mosques were destroyed, religious leaders emigrated or were exiled (often to Xinjiang), and communist ideology was forcefully imposed on the population.

With few exceptions, this reign of destruction was unique in the Muslim world, though it was the norm for all religions in the USSR. Khalid noted that the Soviets waged a war on Orthodox Christianity long before they felt strong enough to attack religion in Central Asia.

Nevertheless, Central Asians did not stop thinking of themselves as Muslims. What changed dramatically was the meaning of the term “Muslim.” Khalid argued that in Central Asia the term began to be used to distinguish between Central Asians and outsiders. The opposite of being a Muslim was being a “European,” which came to refer not only to, for example, the French, but Russians, Koreans and Jews. Tatars, however, presented something of a dilemma to Central Asians, however, and one that they could not entirely reconcile.

This was also the period when notions of national identity crystallized. Khalid said that it was shocking that so many authors still write that Stalin engaged in a policy of “divide and conquer,” as this is simply not what happened (Ben has a series describing in some detail how the delimitation actually took place). He argued that if anything, it was “consolidate and conquer.” Notions of identity were present among elites long before the Soviets came into power; these conceptions of national identity happened to be in perfect confluence both with the Soviet understanding of national identity and with their geo-political objectives.

1938 – 1960

In 1938, the slate was essentially wiped clean. The worst of Stalin’s purge took place, and virtually every elite and intellectual was killed (including those mentioned above, who explored issues of national identity). This led to a new type of party elite that some scholars have termed “the class of ’38.” For these new elites, survival was the only objective; they would remain in power until the early Brezhnev period.

The importance of World War II was extremely important to the formation of Soviet identity, according to Khalid, though he noted that it was something of a gendered phenomenon. Central Asian males were conscripted to fight in the war, and began to see themselves as Soviet citizens and take pride in this status.

In the 1950s, most Central Asians remember life becoming better. Khalid referenced the work of scholar Marianne Kamp, who is researching the oral history of collectivization in Central Asia. During this decade there was a revolution of sorts, especially in the countryside where a new type of elites came into power, consisting primarily of doctors, teachers, and other low-level professionals.

1960 – 1989

After the war, the overarching goal of Soviet policy was stability. In the ‘60s and ‘70s socialism was considered to have been achieved, and the Soviet Union could just “cruise” on to communism. Basically, so long as the Central Asian SSRs delivered on their specified economic targets, they were more or less left alone by the center.

During this period the SSRs were allowed to celebrate in their national identity. Oftentimes the traditions they celebrated were also Islamic in nature. In this manner, historic Islamic heritage was re-appropriated for national purposes and came to represent the heritage of the newly consolidated ethnicities, not a religious group.

In a sense, Khalid argued, this was not unusual. Historically, religion was experienced through communal ritual and tradition almost exclusively. It is only in the modern period that personal belief takes prominence. Khalid was careful to emphasize that he was not arguing Central Asian Islam had returned to a historical state of being; this new conceptualization of Islam was distinct from the past and inherently Soviet. But the way people came to experience Islam was reminiscent of the more distant past.

1989 – Present

While Khalid’s research is on the Soviet period, he did touch briefly on Central Asia since the fall of the USSR. Khalid argued that a common misconception that the Islamic revival began after the collapse, when in fact it began under Gorbachev. In fact, he argued that the most intense part of the revival took place approximately from 1989 – 1992. After that there was actually a regression characterized by religious repression that continues to the present day. Ultimately, there was no radical intellectual, political, or institutional rupture with the Soviet past.