In the last two to three years Russia has been on a geopolitical offensive in the countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. It has been gradually regaining the ground lost in the aftermath of the American invasion of Afghanistan and the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyz revolutions.

Central Asia

The first major victory for Russia came in Tajikistan in 2004. The country was drifting towards the West following the ouster of the Taliban from neighboring Afghanistan. Moscow worked vigorously to bring the nation back under its sway. The Kremlin repeatedly threatened the Tajik government of Imomali Rakhmonov with the expulsion of one million Tajik workers from Russia, while offering debt relief for the return to Moscow’s orbit. In October of 2004 Russian President Putin and Tajik leader Rakhmonov signed an agreement. Russia agreed to let Tajik laborers remain in Russia and forgave the country $240 million of its $300 million debt. In exchange Moscow established its permanent military presence in Tajikistan, with 5,000 thousand Russian troops deployed in the southern cities of Kulab and Kurgan-Tyube, in close proximity to NATO controlled Afghanistan. The Kremlin also secured a 49-year lease on an anti-Missile warning system at Nurek. In addition, Russian companies have been awarded controlling packages in Tajikistan’s major hydroelectric and gas energy projects, as well as in other sectors of the country’s economy. Surprisingly, at that time, many Western observers and policy makers did not see this as the beginning of Russia’s geopolitical counterattack, nor did they see it posing a major threat to Western interests in Central Asia.

In Kyrgyzstan, after the 2005 Tulip Revolution, the new fragile regime of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was plunged into political infighting and rampant corruption. The government felt threatened by deep public discontent. The killing of an ethnic Russian driver at an American military base at Manas and the worsening of Kyrgyz-American relations (as many suggest, masterminded by Russian security services) scared Bishkek’s new rulers. Russia easily managed to bend Kyrgyzstan back to Moscow’s orbit. The country’s energy infrastructure and communications sector opened to Russian monopolies. In addition, Russia upgraded its military base at Kant (close to the capital, Bishkek) at the same time changing its status to that of a “permanent” base. Moscow is working to expand its military presence in the country and establish another base in southern Kyrgyzstan at Osh. At the same time, the Kremlin pressed Kyrgyz authorities to astronomically increase the annual rent for the US air-base at Manas from $2 million to $150 million. Through the Kyrgyz government Moscow is pushing for the final expulsion of American military forces from the country. The Kremlin is also trying to stomp out all the remnants of pro-Western political forces from Bishkek’s power halls.

After the May 2005 Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan, Moscow swiftly approached Karimov’s isolated and desperate regime. In a few months, Russia signed an “alliance” with Tashkent, consisting of a series of economic, political and military treaties which cemented Russia’s strong influence in the country. In 2006 Uzbekistan entered the Russian dominated Eurasian Economic Community and re-entered another Russian-led military-political block known as the Collective Security Treaty Organization. All of these initiatives have been taking place with the eviction of US military base in Karshi-Khanabad by Karimov as a backdrop. Russian companies started to enjoy almost unrivaled dominance in the country’s rich oil, gas, mining and telecom industries. In December 2006 Russia signed another agreement with Uzbekistan, gaining access to an airfield at Navoi, further shifting military balance in Central Asia in Moscow’s favor. Lately, Karimov has been giving weak signals that he wants the revival of relations with the West. He is also trying to find a new market and transport route to export Uzbek gas to China, without Russian influence. Nevertheless, the country effectively remains under Russian sway.

In approaching Kazakhstan, Putin’s Russia has been careful. Moscow realizes that the country, backed by its abundant gas and oil resources, has greater leverage to conduct more independent economic and foreign policy. Consequently the Kremlin chose a more gradual approach to keep and expand its political-economic influence in the nation rather than sheer aggressiveness and drastic actions. Russia watched (and watches) President Nazarbayev’s balancing policy between Moscow, Washington and Beijing nervously. However, the Kremlin never failed to make its deep dissatisfaction with Kazakhstan’s independent ventures absolutely clear. These include the building of a new Kazakh-Chinese oil pipeline, sending Kazakh oil via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline or the prospects of Kazakhstan’s participation in the new Trans Caspian energy projects, transporting Central Asian gas and oil to the West under the Caspian Sea, bypassing Russia. In his dealings with Moscow, President Nazarbayev has to remember that 30% of the country’s 15 million people are ethnic Russians and can be a very disruptive and destructive force if Moscow decides that Kazakhstan is sharply drifting away from the Kremlin’s orbit. So far Moscow has managed to bend Astana to its will, making the country export the biggest portion of its gas and oil via Russian routes. (Astana also realizes that because of its geographic location, Russia remains the cheapest and most convenient route to transport Kazakh oil to the West). Keeping all this in mind Moscow diligently worked (and works) to bind the Kazakh energy sector even closer to its own and has scored important victories in this direction. In April 2006 Russia and Kazakhstan agreed that it would increase its oil exports via Russia, through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) from 28 million to 67 million tons. In addition, they would jointly develop 3 offshore oil fields known as the Kurmangazy, Khvalynsky and Tsentralnoye fields. Also Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to reduce the lease payments for Russian military test sites and firing ranges by $3 million per year and increased the size of the firing ranges; they now occupy about 10 million hectares. In addition, Russia was granted access to Kazakhstan’s communications and broadcasting satellite Kazsat in the space. In July 2006, Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to start joint programs ranging from uranium mining and enrichment to developing new types of nuclear reactors for domestic use and export.

Moscow’s other great success came on May 12 of this year in Turkmenistan. President Putin, during his week long visit to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, reached an agreement with the Central Asian leaders ensuring Russia’s access to Turkmenistan’s abundant gas resources. According to Mr. Putin’s announcement Turkmen gas will be transported via Kazakhstan and Russia to Europe. In September 2007 all parties will sign a treaty to build a new pipeline. In addition, the old Prikaspiisky pipeline, running on the coast of the Caspian Sea, will be reconstructed. These three states along with Uzbekistan also agreed that two other gas pipelines will be renewed. When all these envisioned pipelines go into operation, Russian natural gas imports from Central Asia will almost double to 90 billion cubic meters per year from the current 50 billion. In other words, these agreements assure Russia’s unequivocal dominance over Central Asia’s gas imports.

The Central Asian summit provides the backdrop for the summit in Krakow, Poland which the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine attended. The Polish summit discussed the prospects of new Trans Caspian energy projects that would transport Turkmen gas and Kazakh oil by new pipelines under the Caspian Sea to Europe, bypassing Russia. Actually the Kazakh President was also scheduled to attend the Krakow summit but Putin’s deliberately long visit to Kazakhstan prevented him from attending.

After the death of erratic Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in December 2006, the European Union and the USA worked intensively to develop the idea of transporting Turkmen gas via a new pipeline under the Caspian Sea, through the Caucasus and Turkey to Europe. This project is also known as the Nabucco project. With this pipeline Europe hopes to reduce its dangerous energy dependence on Russia. But the May 12 agreement between Moscow and Turkmenistan gave a crushing blow to the prospects of a new Trans Caspian energy project and further to Washington and to Brussels. If implemented, the Russian-Turkmen deal can effectively kill the Nabucco project.

During self-isolationist Niyazov’s rule Russia successfully managed to maintain the monopoly over the transportation and purchase of Turkmen natural gas. Niyazov approached Beijing and Washington to find new markets and transport routes to China and South Asia (some say this was just a show to gain more leverage with Russians over the price of gas.) The absence of valid pipelines prevented his country from making a breakthrough, leaving it dependent on Russia. However, he raised the price of gas for the Kremlin from $66 per thousand cubic meters to $100 in September 2006. Nevertheless, through various agreements signed between Moscow and Ashgabat in 2003 and 2006 the Kremlin maintained unimpaired access to cheap Turkmen gas, reselling it in Europe for an almost threefold higher price. The May 12 agreement further cements Russia’s monopoly over Turkmen natural gas resources and its transportation routes.

Russia had a few setbacks lately in Central Asia. In April of this year Uzbekistan signed an agreement with China to build a pipeline with a capacity of 30 billion cubic meters per year. This amount equals half of Uzbekistan’s annual gas production. Nevertheless, there are several hurdles to be overcome: first, building a new pipeline; second, finding a transit country for landlocked Uzbekistan and last, but not the least Uzbekistan needs to increase its own annual gas production to be able to export 30 billion cubic meters of gas after domestic consumption.

In April of this year Tajikistan announced the collapse of $1 billion deal with Russian aluminum concern OAO Rusal because they failed to build the new hydropower plant known as Rogun Dam. The company also scaled back its efforts to modernize the huge aluminum plant in Tursunzade. Tashkent appears to be turning to Iran for help. However, Iran, in the face of the fierce stand-off with the West over its nuclear proliferation program, seems highly unlikely to challenge Russia’s economic or political influence in any parts of Central Asia, especially, when Tehran badly needs Moscow’s anti-Western voice at UN Security Council to prevent Iran’s full international isolation.

Despite all the minor setbacks Russia is unquestionably enjoying a much greater political, economic and military influence in Central Asia than it did two to three years ago. In the last few years Russia intensively and successfully worked through two regional organizations-The Eurasian Economic Commonwealth (EEC) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)-to tighten Moscow’s political-economic and military grip on Central Asia. The EEC, consisting of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus, focuses on multi-layer economic integration. The CSTO, including the same countries, plus Armenia, deals with regional military-security concerns. Both of these organizations are heavily dominated by the Kremlin.

Moscow actively worked through another regional security organization, called Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The CSO is entirely dominated by Russia and China. It came into existence in 2001 as a vehicle to counter America’s then rising influence in Central Asia. However, it is highly unlikely that Russia will share influence with China in the region. The Kremlin merely used (and quite successfully uses) China’s increasing might to reduce Western influence in Central Asia.

Moscow has repeatedly made clear through its actions and declarations that Russia’s sole goal is to seal off post-Soviet Central Asia from any foreign political, economic and military influence and integrate it into a Moscow dominated new “Eurasian Union”. This indeed is the grand project-idea widely entertained by high ranking Russian geostrategic planners and policy makers.

The South Caucasus

Russia has been equally aggressive on its southern flank in the Caucasus. Moscow managed to further increase its already overwhelming influence in Armenia. It upgraded the Russian military base in Giumry, in the northern part of the country and successfully completed the process of acquiring Armenia’s power distribution network in September 2006. The Russian energy monopoly RAO UES already owns most of Armenian hydroelectric plants and manages the finances of the nuclear power station in Metsamor. In addition, the Kremlin controlled Gasprom is Armenia’s single gas provider. Russian gas generates 40% of Armenia’s electricity, another 40% coming from Russian controlled Metsamor. Gasprom also owns the country’s biggest thermal plant.

In November 2006 the giant Russian mobile phone operator Vimpel-Communications bought 90% of the shares in Armenia’s national telecommunications company, ArmenTel, from the Greek firm OTE.

In April 2007 Moscow announced joint uranium excavation venture of Armenia’s uranium reserves, which is scheduled to begin later in this year. Yerevan also agreed to join the International Uranium Enrichment Center, located in Irkutsk region of Russia.

Some Armenian experts express their deep concern over Moscow’s suffocating influence in all spheres of the country’s life. However, this doesn’t change the overall picture. The nation remains bound to Moscow to such degree that it leaves even President Putin satisfied. During one of his meetings with Armenian President Robert Kocharian (in February 2007, after the Russian takeover of the Armenian power grid) he half happily and half ironically declared that “there is no issue which can not be solved between Armenia and Russia”.

The Kremlin kept Yerevan under close watch to make sure that the piping of the new Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline (that opened in March 2007, transporting gas into Armenia) was small in diameter. Thus Moscow prevented Iran and Armenia from exporting gas to other countries and avoided international competition with Russian Gasprom.
In contrast to Armenia, neighboring Azerbaijan drifted away from Russia and closer to the United States and NATO alliance. In 2006 Moscow attacked Azerbaijan, threatening to increase gas prices twofold. Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev defied the Kremlin and on his part threatened to stop the export of gas from Russia to Azerbaijan and the import of oil from Azerbaijan to Russia. In 2005 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline became operational, transporting Azerbaijani oil via Georgia and Turkey to the West. In 2006 the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum pipeline went into operation. It significantly increased the political weight and strategic importance of Azerbaijan, brought it closer to the West and reduced Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, Moscow effectively kept the Karabakh conflict frozen, with a large portion of Baku’s political and diplomatic resources chained to the issue. The Kremlin also succeeded in maintaining its lease on an anti-Missile radar facility in the northern Azerbaijani city of Gabala. Realizing Azerbaijan’s huge importance as an energy rich country, with a highly geostrategic location in Caucasus and in the Caspian basin, the Kremlin doesn’t (and will not) spare its efforts to bring Baku back under Moscow’s influence. So there will be ever increasing pressure applied from Moscow towards Azerbaijan in the coming months or even years, if necessary.

Pro-Western Georgia has been the Kremlin’s main target in southern Caucasus. Russia fully realizes the huge significance of Georgia. If it regains influence over the country Moscow kills two birds with one stone: it gets direct land access to its satellite Armenia and neutralizes increasingly anti-Russian Azerbaijan, which heavily relies on Georgia to transport its abundant gas and oil resources to the West. Moscow has been doing everything it can to bend Georgia and Mikhail Saakashvili’s pro-Western government to its will. Russia heightened tensions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Armenian populated Javakheti region in southern Georgia; sponsored and organized pro-Russian political groups to create social protests and undermine the government; supported anti-government armed revolt of Georgian warlord Emzar Kvitsiani in western Georgia; banned Georgian wines and mineral waters from Russian markets; raised gas price threefold; cut off all air and land connections with the country and deported hundreds of Georgian immigrants from Russia. However, Saakashvili turned out to be a hard stone for Moscow to break. He managed to accelerate significant political, economic and military reforms in the country. He brought Georgia even closer to the West and to its goal of integration in NATO and eventually into the European Union. Saakashvili’s administration, with Western support, succeeded in starting the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia. The Russian Army will leave the country entirely by the end of 2008. The opening of Baku-Batumi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (in 2005) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline (in 2006) strengthened Georgia’s national security and regional and international position. However, besides many successes achieved in the nation-building process in the last several years, Georgia’s future is not entirely certain. Moscow doesn’t seem ready to retreat: it is lobbying hard in European capitals (using its energy clout) against NATO membership for Georgia, simultaneously subjecting the nation to almost daily, heavy political and economic blackmail.

Western Frontline

Russia has been similarly aggressive on its geopolitical frontline in post-Soviet Europe. After the humiliation of the Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections, Moscow worked hard to contain and reverse the Orange Revolution. First, in winter of 2005 Russia heavily hit the country by doubling natural gas prices (gas raw that caused a disruption of gas supplies to Europe). Then, the well-organized and well financed Ukraine’s pro-Russian “Party of Regions” based on Russian speaking voters in the country’s east, gained a vital 33% in Ukraine’s March 2006 parliamentary elections. The formerly disgraced Victor Yanukovich (the leader of the “Party of Regions” and the loser of disputed 2004 presidential elections) was catapulted into the position of Prime-Minister. Since then, he effectively halted the country’s integration process into NATO. Profound disagreements between President Yushenko’s and his pro-Russian Prime-Minister’s policies’ resulted in the dissolution of the Ukrainian parliament in April 2007 and plunged the country into a deep political crisis, that continues to be filled with uncertainty. In addition, by issuing clear threats to the territorial integrity of the Ukraine, Russia’s Ministry of Defense succeeded in maintaining its naval military facilities on the Black Sea coast.

In December 2006 Moscow forced its closest post-Soviet ally Belarus (after a brief and unsuccessful resistance from Minsk) to pay an increased price on Russian gas from $44 per thousand cubic meters to $100. The agreement envisaged further increases in gas price to match European prices by the year 2011. Authoritarian, isolated and highly dependent on Russia Belarus is painlessly managed by the Kremlin. Moscow has kept the country under its grip, regardless of the hike in gas prices.

Moldova came under Russian geopolitical attack also after the Orange and Rose revolutions. The country’s President Vladimir Voronin (a former Communist, who led the Communist Party when he was elected president) joined leaders of the Ukraine, Georgia, Poland and Baltic countries in the “Community of Democratic Choice”. His administration announced a pro-Western foreign policy course. The Kremlin increased gas price for Moldova twofold, to $170 per thousand cubic meters. This was followed by economic sanctions, banning Moldova’s main export products, wine and meat from Russian markets. In November 2006 Moscow lifted sanctions to soften Chisanau’s stance against Russia’s membership in the World Trade Organization.

Moscow, secretly from the USA and European Union, gradually developed a plan which should bring impoverished Moldova back under Russia’s wing. The Kremlin’s plan evolved around Transdniestria (in Russian called Prednestrovia), a tiny piece of land on the eastern bank of river Dniester. The region, after a brief but bloody armed conflict in 1991, with Russia’s direct military and financial help, broke away from Moldova. Ever since, Russian troops maintain their presence there. The region is run by the gang of shady Russian businessmen, KGB officers and military personal. Since secession Transdniestria has turned into Europe’s black hole, engaged in a variety of illegal activities ranging from the smuggling of chicken meat to Ukraine, to arms trade, human and drug trafficking.

Moscow offered the following plan to Moldova: Chisinau should recognize separatist Transdniestria as a legal political entity and its ruling Russian gang as its legitimate government. Both, the Moldovan parliament and Supreme Council of Dransdniestria, should be dissolved. New elections should be called which would grant 19 seats out of 101 to representatives from the breakaway region. Vice-Premier of Moldova and Deputy-Ministers in every Ministry of the country should be from Transdniestria. Russian troops would gradually leave Transdniestria’s territory on the condition that Moldova would permanently maintain its “neutrality” by refusing to enter any Euro-Atlantic organization or alliance. In other words Russia was “giving up” Transdniestria and in return was catapulting the separatist region’s shady ruling gang into Moldova’s mainstream politics.

Needless to say, if this is agreed to, Russia would painlessly extend its influence over Moldova’s entire political system.

This plan was revealed by one Munich based Western political analyst and it shook Washington and Brussels. As some news suggested in the beginning, Moldovan President Voronin seemed supportive of the plan. It appears that sharply negative Western reaction put the plan on hold for now. However, it is unclear how long impoverished Moldova will stand out against the Russian geopolitical assault.

Recent massive unrest in Estonia has been one more clear indication of Moscow’s growing clout. No other NATO and European Union member state had been so heavily destabilized by Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In April of this year the Estonian government relocated a Soviet era World War II memorial from the center of Tallinn to the city’s international military cemetery. The monument was considered a symbol of the Soviet occupation by Estonians (by many called a symbol of the “unknown rapist”). It caused great controversy between local Estonians and ethnic Russians after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Kremlin effectively used the removal of the memorial to activate Estonia’s 300,000 ethnic Russian community (or 25% of Estonia’s whole 1.3million population). Moscow successfully portrayed the relocation of the monument as a blasphemous act, aimed to insult the Russian soldier and Russians in general. Thousands of ethnic Russian protestors smashed and looted stores in the Estonian capital Tallinn (one ethnic Russian was killed, allegedly stabbed by another looter). They attacked the city’s main theater and the Academy of Arts, chanting insulting remarks against Estonia, the country where they live. As it turns out the protests were not spontaneous at all. Estonian security services revealed that Russian community activists periodically met with Russian embassy officials in Tallinn’s various neighborhoods prior to the removal of the monument. Soon Russia cut off all air, land and energy links with Estonia. Pro-Kremlin Russian youth organizations attacked the Estonian embassy in Moscow throwing stones, eggs and paint. They ripped down the flag and threatened to destroy the embassy building. In the days following Estonia experienced an unprecedented cyber attack from thousands of hackers around the world that effectively paralyzed the country’s entire internet system, on which high tech Estonia’s economy and government depends. Estonians, Western observers and NATO’s IT specialists agree that the cyber attack was masterminded by the Kremlin.

By these actions Russia achieved several goals: first, it activated and mobilized Estonia’s 300,000 ethnic Russians. Second, it drew them closer to Moscow, creating a formidable pro-Moscow force almost in the form of a fifth column within a NATO member-nation. Third, it sent a powerful message to all post-Communist and Russian weary states of Eastern Europe that no country is safe from Russia’s geopolitical onslaughts regardless of their membership in NATO and the European Union.

Conclusion

Russia lost a great deal of influence in 1990’s and then in the first years of the new millennia, following the American invasion of Afghanistan and Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions in countries of the former Soviet Union. However, Putin’s Russia never gave up its hegemonic aspirations. But Moscow also realized that economically week Russia, with a disastrous war still going in Chechnya, couldn’t afford an ambitious foreign policy. Putin’s Russia rose quietly and gradually. After the September 11 attacks, Putin agreed to let Americans establish military bases in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In fact Russia could do very little to stop Washington at that time. However, in exchange Russia got a free hand in Chechnya. By 2004-2005 Moscow basically crushed the Chechen rebellion killing the main Chechen field commanders. At the same time the Kremlin consolidated Russia’s entire energy sector in the state’s hands, sending disobedient oligarchs to jails or exile. Moscow gradually acquired about 30%-40% of Europe’s energy markets and unfolded a large scale geopolitical counter-offensive in the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Russia’s tactics were basically the same against post-Soviet states: Moscow allies with semi-authoritarian, corrupt, stagnant and isolated regimes (Uzbekistan, Belarus, Tajikistan) guaranteeing their survival in exchange for their obedience to Moscow. Under the banner of keeping stability in a country and in a wider region Russia poses as a policeman, supporting regimes militarily in case of domestic turbulence. Then Russia establishes (or expands already existing) military presence in a country, tightly chaining a nation’s military complex to its own (Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). Simultaneously Russian state monopolies move in on a country, establishing their dominance on a nation’s energy resources (Turkmenistan), energy infrastructure (Armenia, Tajikistan) and their transportation routes (Kazakhstan). In the beginning, the Kremlin backed Russian companies promise many investments, not only in energy sector but also in other sectors of economy, such as telecom, tourism, transportation. However, Moscow never invests enough (or any) capital to make meaningful change. It merely chains local economies to its own, guarantees its dominance, prevents international economic competition and leaves local societies frustrated and impoverished (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Armenia).

Against pro-Western post-Soviet countries Russia deploys various tactics: supports shady separatist regimes (against Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan); cuts off gas supplies and astronomically raises prices (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan); applies economic sanctions (Moldova, Georgia); manipulates elections in cooperation with local corrupt and criminal elites (Ukraine); detonates local pro-Russian or Russian forces (Georgia, Ukraine, Estonia).

Today Russia is not the world’s strongest country, but it definitely is the strongest power in the former Soviet Union. It had some setbacks and failures in the last few years but overall Moscow is in a much stronger position than it was 4-5 years ago. The Kremlin’s geopolitical successes were contributed to by the instability in the Middle East, high energy prices, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and not enough activity from the European Union in the nations of the former Soviet Union.

Today Russia represents the single biggest threat to the national sovereignty and security of post-Soviet states. Moscow’s goal is not a mere dominance in the region. Russian strategic planners and policy makers have made it amply clear that the Kremlin wants to bring the whole former Soviet landmass under the Russian dominated “Eurasian Union”. Moscow’s new KGB run regime has political will, determination and aggressiveness to do just that. As long as America continues to be bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and Europe shows timidity in confronting new Russian neo-imperialism, the Kremlin will find it less and less difficult to achieve its goals. Undoubtedly, there are very hard days ahead of those former Soviet countries which really care for their freedom and future.

Vasili Rukhadze is New York based political analyst. He holds Masters Degree in Political Science from the City University of New York. He is the author of multiple articles, with the focus on Caucasus, Central Asia, Eastern Europe and Russia. Currently he is a Visiting Scholar at Columbia University, working on the project: “The Role of Caucasus and Ukraine in the West’s Energy Security”. Contact: vr2200@columbia.edu