Since my last post on the topic when the news was just breaking, several experts have written some interesting and informative commentary that readers might be interested in.

First, I would point you in the direction of NonPon’s post on the subject if you haven’t already seen it. They translate part of an interesting article (Rus) in which a Kyrgyz talking head, infected with optimism from the proposed Azerbaijan deal, proposes a Kyrgyzstan-moderated union between the Russian and American bases in the country.

The most recent Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst features several articles on the “Gabala Gambit.” Stephen Blank emphasizes the practical difficulties of military cooperation between the US and Russia:

Several commentators have noted that there are enormous technical and operational difficulties with joint control of the radar. The existing Russian radar has different and lower capability than does the American one and melding the two together would be a considerably difficult affair.

Especially in view of the mutual mistrust of the militaries, which is particularly strong among Russia’s military leadership, it is unlikely that an easy or smooth cooperation between Russia and America, particularly as the Russian military not only regards America as enemy number one, but has made clear on innumerable occasions that it really does not want deep cooperation with the U.S. military.

These factors are of course serious obstacles, but they are also exactly the reason that the Azerbaijan deal could be such a turning point. So what if the equipment is archaic and incompatible? It can be upgraded and made useful to both sides. So what if Russian and American generals aren’t thrilled by the prospect of having to deal with each other? If political leaders force them to work together and solve serious problems, perhaps they will cease regarding each other as the enemy. Citing animosity as a reason not to go forward with this sort of cooperation (which Blank is not doing, but others have) will just perpetuate that animosity.

He also cautions:

There is also reason to believe that a key Russian interest in this proposal is to get technological intelligence from the U.S. and exploit it for Moscow’s own purposes.

Maybe, but this is only a serious concern if Russia is still regarded as an enemy; the US cooperates with its allies and shares technology all the time. A recent, rather Russophobic IHT article takes this logic even further, arguing that the entire deal is basically a Russian ploy to weaken America:

So, what is Putin’s gambit all about? One explanation is that he wants to put American radar where it would be looking out of Russia, rather than in.

Another is that in “ceding” the last piece of Russian military presence in Azerbaijan to the United States, Putin means to shift the onus of a foreign presence to the Americans, and then wait for resentment to well up among the population at large.

Another is that by bringing in the Americans into a joint military installation in Gabala, Russia will have gained a binding legal presence in Azerbaijan for the first time in almost 15 years - at least until the Americans leave (or are asked to leave, as in Uzbekistan).

Another is that this isn’t some sinister plot to restart the Cold War, but rather a genuine attempt by Putin to find some common ground with a country that should be an ally, not an adversary. I’m not saying that Putin is an enlightened altruist, just that he may realize that Russia and America share some common strategic interests. The “Azerbaijan deal as an elaborate set up to screw the Americans” theory seems a bit far-fetched to me.

The last post I wrote on this topic didn’t consider the internal implications of such a deal for Azerbaijan. Several of the aforementioned articles discuss this interesting issue, noting that the main consequence for Azerbaijan - should it agree to the deal as it has indicated it would - would be increased tension with Iran, who is is not thrilled by Russia’s proposal.

Richard Weitz writes:

Many Azerbaijanis hope to leverage the base to gain support in their dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The chairman of the opposition Democratic Party declared that hosting a joint Russian-American military base “could lead to the coordination of Russian and U.S. positions on other Azerbaijan-related issues, for example the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.”

If Iran retaliated by imposing economic sanctions against Azerbaijan, many residents of southern Azerbaijan would suffer from the loss of commerce. The Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, a landlocked Azerbaijani exclave whose borders with Armenia remain sealed, is especially vulnerable since it derives all its electricity and gas from Iran. Azerbaijan is also vulnerable to more violent forms of retaliation from Tehran…

These are serious and fair considerations that should be taken into account by Russian and American officials, especially a shift in the balance of power with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this is probably not in itself a sufficient reason not to go forward with the deal, especially when weighted against the potential benefits for the broader region. Ultimately it is Azerbaijan’s call whether the risks of a Russo-American base on their soil is worth the potential benefit.