<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!-- generator="wordpress/2.3.2" -->
<rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: No New-Zero-Sum-Great-Game!</title>
	<link>http://www.neweurasia.net/2007/08/30/no-new-zero-sum-great-game/</link>
	<description></description>
	<pubDate>Fri,  4 Jul 2008 04:08:50 +0000</pubDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.3.2</generator>
		<item>
		<title>By: Rambling Intelligence: Week Ending September 2 &#171; Ramblin&#8217; Gal</title>
		<link>http://www.neweurasia.net/2007/08/30/no-new-zero-sum-great-game/#comment-55674</link>
		<dc:creator>Rambling Intelligence: Week Ending September 2 &#171; Ramblin&#8217; Gal</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Sep 2007 17:22:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.neweurasia.net/2007/08/30/no-new-zero-sum-great-game/#comment-55674</guid>
		<description>[...] Paarman looks at possible changes in Central Asia&#8217;s relations to great powers via the tired metaphor of the Great Game.  A great read  for Central Asia watchers. ♦ Get up-to-date on the new problems in the [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] Paarman looks at possible changes in Central Asia&#8217;s relations to great powers via the tired metaphor of the Great Game.  A great read  for Central Asia watchers. ♦ Get up-to-date on the new problems in the [&#8230;]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Arthur</title>
		<link>http://www.neweurasia.net/2007/08/30/no-new-zero-sum-great-game/#comment-55633</link>
		<dc:creator>Arthur</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Sep 2007 08:47:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.neweurasia.net/2007/08/30/no-new-zero-sum-great-game/#comment-55633</guid>
		<description>Good article Ben.  A couple of other points: first, the SCO is really not like NATO.  Does anyone think Russia is really going to rush to China's aid in a major war?  They're almost as likely to be on the other side, and far more likely not to get involved at all (and, of course, the chances of navel-gazing China going to war are much slimmer than saber-rattlers in the West believe).
Also, I disagree with Bonnie's assertion that the us/them demarcation is going to get worse in the US a meaningful sense.  Maybe a little rhetoric on the campaign trail, but after 2008, I think any American president, particularly a Democrat, is going to have a global popularity boost over Bush.
Finally, we have to keep in mind that Putin will (fingers-crossed) be leaving fairly soon.  If his replacement is a reformer like Medvedev, rather than a militarist like Ivanov, the US will have another opening for diplomacy.  All in all, I think Ben gets the issues right: it's about economics, containing drug trafficking and fighting terrorism.  It might get rhetorically contentious at times, but it probably won't spill into military confrontations or "Great Game" style do-or-die politics.  So PINR and Journal of Turkish Weekly should stop hyperventilating.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good article Ben.  A couple of other points: first, the SCO is really not like NATO.  Does anyone think Russia is really going to rush to China&#8217;s aid in a major war?  They&#8217;re almost as likely to be on the other side, and far more likely not to get involved at all (and, of course, the chances of navel-gazing China going to war are much slimmer than saber-rattlers in the West believe).<br />
Also, I disagree with Bonnie&#8217;s assertion that the us/them demarcation is going to get worse in the US a meaningful sense.  Maybe a little rhetoric on the campaign trail, but after 2008, I think any American president, particularly a Democrat, is going to have a global popularity boost over Bush.<br />
Finally, we have to keep in mind that Putin will (fingers-crossed) be leaving fairly soon.  If his replacement is a reformer like Medvedev, rather than a militarist like Ivanov, the US will have another opening for diplomacy.  All in all, I think Ben gets the issues right: it&#8217;s about economics, containing drug trafficking and fighting terrorism.  It might get rhetorically contentious at times, but it probably won&#8217;t spill into military confrontations or &#8220;Great Game&#8221; style do-or-die politics.  So PINR and Journal of Turkish Weekly should stop hyperventilating.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Central Asia &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Central Asia, World: Realist theory and nostalgia</title>
		<link>http://www.neweurasia.net/2007/08/30/no-new-zero-sum-great-game/#comment-55376</link>
		<dc:creator>Central Asia &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Central Asia, World: Realist theory and nostalgia</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Aug 2007 01:31:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.neweurasia.net/2007/08/30/no-new-zero-sum-great-game/#comment-55376</guid>
		<description>[...] Ben Paarman at Neweurasia.net with a great roundup of articles pertaining to Central Asia: &#8220;No-New-Zero-Sum-Great Game!&#8221; 3. An old post at FPA Central Asia on &#8220;The N.G.G. Metaphor&#8220; 4. The IR Theory [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] Ben Paarman at Neweurasia.net with a great roundup of articles pertaining to Central Asia: &#8220;No-New-Zero-Sum-Great Game!&#8221; 3. An old post at FPA Central Asia on &#8220;The N.G.G. Metaphor&#8220; 4. The IR Theory [&#8230;]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Bonnie Boyd</title>
		<link>http://www.neweurasia.net/2007/08/30/no-new-zero-sum-great-game/#comment-55329</link>
		<dc:creator>Bonnie Boyd</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2007 15:08:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.neweurasia.net/2007/08/30/no-new-zero-sum-great-game/#comment-55329</guid>
		<description>Dear Ben,
I too, think that this GG 2.0 stuff is secondary to a host of other considerations.  Most Realist theories won't allow themselves to go second, however, and they have the ability to reduce to nothing many important considerations such as you have mentioned (international crime such as terrorism and narcotrafficking, and international trade). 
 
I think the fact that they are being put forward now relates to the militarization of foreign policy, i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq, both with large military duties and with reconstruction budgets that are administered by military personnel.  Au fond, much of miitary thinking is very concrete and a realist theory is helpful to them in military terms but not with the diplomacy they are being asked to do.

The difficulty of including all factors at once in calculations extends also to a leadership that must pay attention to military concerns constantly, or, perhaps, would prefer a more clear demarcation of us/them for the purposes of budgeting (and rhetoric).  It is only going to be worse, where I live at least, for the next year as the U.S. goes into presidential elections.

The rise of realism will cause the same problems in overall thinking in foreign affairs that creates the difficulty for troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, where it's difficult to distinguish friend and foe.  If one must have a reductive theory, then I would say this is it, whether for Tajikistan's infrastructure or a Baghdad neighborhood.  "A friend is a friend so long as you are there." 
 
If you stretch the Realism into structural realism (even more insular and limiting), one could say that Tajikistan is pursuing its own non-aligned movement.  And that theory of non-alignment is the dominant one, not the realist one: a friend is a friend, when it hangs out with you and gives you capabilities.  For states like the UK and the US, Russia and China, they have to decide what capabilities they are willing to foster, and what they are willing to pay to create those capabilities, and what they expect to gain out of them.  An economic approach means you are always there, with your trading partners, increasing by suasion rather than force.  

Under this formulation, Russia's selling arms in Central Asia might not have as much utility as having a border force in the country; their pipeline politics may not have long-term utility; the U.S. aid cuts in Central Asia have no utility; military training for Central Asian republics has little utility but training border patrols in Central Asia has a lot of utility.  

Well, that's a start on a discussion.  Great post!  I love this stuff.

Bonnie</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dear Ben,<br />
I too, think that this GG 2.0 stuff is secondary to a host of other considerations.  Most Realist theories won&#8217;t allow themselves to go second, however, and they have the ability to reduce to nothing many important considerations such as you have mentioned (international crime such as terrorism and narcotrafficking, and international trade). </p>
<p>I think the fact that they are being put forward now relates to the militarization of foreign policy, i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq, both with large military duties and with reconstruction budgets that are administered by military personnel.  Au fond, much of miitary thinking is very concrete and a realist theory is helpful to them in military terms but not with the diplomacy they are being asked to do.</p>
<p>The difficulty of including all factors at once in calculations extends also to a leadership that must pay attention to military concerns constantly, or, perhaps, would prefer a more clear demarcation of us/them for the purposes of budgeting (and rhetoric).  It is only going to be worse, where I live at least, for the next year as the U.S. goes into presidential elections.</p>
<p>The rise of realism will cause the same problems in overall thinking in foreign affairs that creates the difficulty for troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, where it&#8217;s difficult to distinguish friend and foe.  If one must have a reductive theory, then I would say this is it, whether for Tajikistan&#8217;s infrastructure or a Baghdad neighborhood.  &#8220;A friend is a friend so long as you are there.&#8221; </p>
<p>If you stretch the Realism into structural realism (even more insular and limiting), one could say that Tajikistan is pursuing its own non-aligned movement.  And that theory of non-alignment is the dominant one, not the realist one: a friend is a friend, when it hangs out with you and gives you capabilities.  For states like the UK and the US, Russia and China, they have to decide what capabilities they are willing to foster, and what they are willing to pay to create those capabilities, and what they expect to gain out of them.  An economic approach means you are always there, with your trading partners, increasing by suasion rather than force.  </p>
<p>Under this formulation, Russia&#8217;s selling arms in Central Asia might not have as much utility as having a border force in the country; their pipeline politics may not have long-term utility; the U.S. aid cuts in Central Asia have no utility; military training for Central Asian republics has little utility but training border patrols in Central Asia has a lot of utility.  </p>
<p>Well, that&#8217;s a start on a discussion.  Great post!  I love this stuff.</p>
<p>Bonnie</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
