I am looking into Kazakhstan’s centre-periphery relations for my Master’s thesis, and I am currently sighting the available literature. Essentially, the question is: How are centre-periphery relations shaping the implementation of development strategies taking into account both economic decentralisation and growing oil windfalls. A couple of interesting tidbits (comments on any of these aspects most welcome):

Over the last years, Kazakhstan has seen a gradual economic decentralisation coming from below. Although a de jure unitary state, the regions have been able to act more independently and the central state reacts by either ‘legitimising’ what is already occuring in practice or ignores what’s going on in order to avoid the appearance of ‘weakness’.

This economic decentralisation can be found in the fiscal, administrative and regulatory hemispheres. With regards to fiscal decentralisation, it is important to see in how far the oblasts’ administrations have a say over how much of the collected tax payments remain in their budgets and do not get remitted to Astana. Jones Loung (2002) shows that for five regions, higher tax shares than officially designated remain in the local budgets.

In terms of administrative decentralisation it is interesting to see that the oblasts are officially charged with the provision of social services. Cummings (2000) demonstrates that with the 1998 amendments to the constitution, the centre got legally absolved of the responsibility of welfare provision, which means that the provincial administrations are responsible for education, local law enforcement, medical assistance, social support, etc.

Regulatory decentralisation would pertain to the degree with which local authorities enforce national legislation and regulations. Jones Loung finds that local administrations would consistenly prioritise local over national regulations. Also corruption plays a big role here, i.e. that national regulations can be ‘overlooked’ in return for the payment of a bribe.

All in all, there seem to be quite a few potential divergences between central and peripheral administrative structures. While the president is still in charge of nominating regional akims, there is more a more delicate degree of power-brokering unfolding under closer scrutiny. My focus with this dissertation will lie in the implications the oil-boom of the last five years has had on these centre-periphery relations and in how far the centre’s development strategies can be successfully implemented at this stage of de facto decentralisation.

Taking into account that the two studies cited here are largely drawn upon research that took place in 1999/2000, I am interested to see if new legislation has legally changed the division of power between centre and periphery (if anyone out there knows of some good publications post 2003 on this topic, I’d be happy for some hints) since then. Again, any input most appreciated.

Cummings, S.: ‘Kazakhstan: ‘Centre-Periphery Relations’, Brookings Institution and Royal Institute, 2000
Jones, P.L.: ‘Economic Decentralisation in Kazakhstan: Causes and Consequences’, in Institutional change and political continuity in post-Soviet Central Asia : power, perceptions, and pacts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002