Translator’s Note: Translated from Jamil’s post (RUS).

On March 14, 2011, Mukhiddin Khojimuradov suggested to his compatriots Khairulla and Sunatullo Yuldashevs from Chinaz region of Tashkent oblast that they move to Kazakhstan’s city of Turkestan, where they could earn decent money. When the four young men reached the place, the only job they were offered was at the car washing station; their employer refused to pay for their labor, reports the Initiative group of independent rights activists of Uzbekistan (IGIRAU). They never signed contracts and their passports had been taken away; they had effectively become slaves, who were constantly beaten and forced to work each day from 7am to 10pm.

The four men all used to sleep in a small room with only one metal bed on the concrete floor. One month later, Sunnatullo fell ill, but their employer’s son (who had previously been charged for murder and was now in control of the slaves’ work) forced him to pledge that he would send another three Uzbeks in return for his own freedom. With no other option left, Sunnatullo and was released. According to Yuldashevs’ sister Gulnoza, the other three were released three weeks later. The four men have since spoken about dozens of other deceived countrymen from Chinaz, who had been recruited by the above-mentioned Mukhiddin Khojimuradov and were enslaved in Kazakhstan.

In the beginning of May 2011, Gulnoza, a member of the Yuldashev family, asked the Chinaz department of the National Security Council for help. The officer named Sukhrob, gave Gulnoza a dictaphone so she could record all her talks with militia, prosecutor, judges, the region’s local authorities and healthcare workers. She managed to do both audio and video recordings and passed everything to them. IGIRAU reports that Gulnoza appealed to Gen. Shavkat Ismailov of the Chinaz regional militia office, the prosecutor of Chinaz region Gairat Mukhamedov, and local authorities’ representative Davron Teshaboev. However, instead of investigating the issue, they started bullying the young woman. The district militiaman Nurjan Sadirov even threatened to exterminate her family if she dared to spread information about the practice of recruiting and enslaving people in Kazakhstan.

According to Surat Ikramov, the chairman of IGIRAU, it all became clear that every official in Chinaz has their interest or share in the recruiting business. They actually receive monetary dividends, and file such crimes under article 183 of the administrative code of RepUz. By May 2011, Gulnoza had already been threatened by the Investigator of the Department of Internal Affairs of Tashkent Akrom Mirsodykov.

Gulnoza believes that the main executor of the fabricated court case was the judge of the Chinaz rayon Criminal Court, B.D. Miralimov, who had immediately demanded that she withdrew all her appeals. The judge destroyed all the documents in front of her and threw them in her face. Right activist Surat Ikramov remarked:

“Corrupt security forces, judges and local authorities keep supporting illegal recruitment of Chinaz rayon’s citizens abroad. As for the victim Sunnatulla Yuldashev, he had to spend nine months in hospital.”

SIMILAR TOPICS:

neweurasia “Трудовая миграция и детский труд: взгляд из Бухары”

neweurasia “Трудовые мигранты из Узбекистана сообщают о своем рабском положении”

neweurasia “Трудовая миграция: граждане Хорезмской области все чаще обращаются за помощью”

Musta Kemal striking an Ataturk pose in Turkey's Cankaya Library.

I’m knee-deep in exam season at the moment, studying my level один Russian and writing essays, so I haven’t had the chance to look closely at the Kazakh parliamentary elections. From what I’m hearing, preliminary results are giving Nur Otan party 80.7% of the vote, while two other parties — the business-oriented Ak Zhol and the People’s Communist Party — earned slightly more than 7% each, clearing the threshold to enter parliament. Unsurprisingly, Western press has been mostly negative, but what my inner cynic just finds hilarious is this remark from Miklos Haraszti, head of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ observation mission: “This election took place in a tightly controlled environment, with serious restrictions on citizens’ electoral rights.” Well, OSCE, I guess all you can really say is: whoops.

However, putting my hypocrisy radar aside for a moment, they’re right. Although I am not so quick to condemn Kazakhstan — as there is usually more than meets the eye to this country, both in good and bad ways — nevertheless, this election definitely was shoddy. My colleague from Ghent University, Dr. Bruno De Cordier has brought to my attention an article in the Washington Times with this telling remark:

“‘Even the government doesn’t hide that they have no intention of copying Western democracies,’ said Lilit Gevorgyan, an analyst and IHS Global Insight in London. ‘I think what they are trying to do is to show that they are responding to social discontent.’”

The article also quotes a taxi driver who refers to most of the so-called opposition parties as “pupils” of the main party. As some of you know, I am currently working on an MPhil at the University of Leuven concerning the phenomenon of managed democracy in Russia and Kazakhstan, so these kind of tidbits are right up my alley.

I’ve heard it often said from Kazakh colleagues that Nazarbayev et al appear to be consciously modelling their strategy after Atatürk. I find this a very intriguing line of thought as there are indeed many striking parallels, and not just because they both happened to be the first leaders of post-imperial Turkic countries. These range from the grand, e.g., erecting new capital cities, to the minute, e.g., changing (“modernizing”) the alphabet — and by the way, after having been to Astana (and getting an earful from Kazakh readers about the CyberChaikhana chapter concerning it) and after reading about how the Soviets played some nasty social engineering games with graphemes (cf. Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia, pp. 76-78), my assessment is that it’s neither good nor bad, it’s just part of the identity-building process.

This election, however, calls to mind some negative parallels, particularly Atatürk’s attempt in Turkey to implement top-down political “pluralization” in the form of the Liberal Republican Party during the Great Drepression. The platform of this “party” was ending state monopolies and curtailing state investment, as well as luring in foreign capital. Atatürk supported this, and soon at least one radical Left-winger was proclaiming that he had discovered a “third way” between capitalism and communism. Now, lots of political leaders have been attributed with or have claimed to find a “third way”, including some very nasty individuals like Gaddafi and Karimov. Nazarbayev strikes me as much humbler in his official rhetoric, often talking about the need to learn from other nations, particularly Russia, but the effect is the same: re-legitimizing an already-established political elite.

Ah, and speaking of legitimacy, Kazakhstan also has a law against criticizing or otherwise defaming the person of the Kazakh President (and some say, by extension, his family) that has a striking resemblance to a notorious 1951 Turkish statute. More and more, I really wonder whether Nazarbayev is consciously envisioning himself as, well, a kind of Atakazakh. Of course, he appears much too prudent to have such a title bequeathed to him at the moment, but the golden imprint of his hand in the Baiterek perhaps says all that needs to be said: he has left an indelible mark upon his country.

There are differences, as well, some of which are positive, e.g., Nazarbayev is not hostile toward religion (recent changes to the law code, of course, being an important exception to my claim here), whereas Atatürk left behind a very difficult ideological legacy of staunch (and military-enforced) laïcité. Overall, history may also judge Nazarbayev’s policy toward ethnic minorities, although not great, nonetheless much better than his Turkish prototype.

Secretive oligachical corruption, however, may prove to tarnish Nazarbayev’s reputation down the line, whereas Atatürk, lavish lifestyle notwithstanding, is frequently valorized for his total devotion to his political cause: in his will, he donated all of his possessions to the Republican People’s Party, and a chunk of the resultant interest was willed to the Turkish Language Association and the Turkish Historical Society. However, I should also note that we need to keep in mind some anthropological context, as Nazarbayev may actually be acting out a Turkic-Soviet tradition of the chieftain/kolkhol president “keeping house” for his tribe/farm (again, cf. Roy, pp. 86-96, 184-189) (the egregious amounts of money attributed to him in the Western press doesn’t contradict my point here; rather, it shows how this tradition can and has been abused).

Anyway, that’s my 2.963 tenge for now…

To review: on 16 December (and you can watch the K+ report above), oil workers stormed a New Year’s/Independence Day celebration that was being set up in the central square of Zhanaozen, where they have been engaging in a sit-in for the past six months demanding higher pay and better working conditions. At some point, parts of the city were set on fire, and the Kazakh military was called in to restore order, resulting in at least 12 dead (numbers on the injured vary wildly). Nazarbayev declared a 20-day state of emergency in the city on Saturday, replete with full shut down of mobile phone and Internet services. Associated Press has a photograph of a riot police officer that seems much more like a swat officer to me:

And then yesterday, apparently there was a kind of support riot northwest of Zhanoazen, in the town of Shetpe. Events there could not be verified independently and three Russian journalists deployed to cover events in Zhanaozen were arrested on Sunday. Protesters blocked the rail, halting a morning passenger train carrying 300 people from Mangyshlak to Aktobe. According to the BBC, most of the protesters dispersed after a warning shot, but a group of 50 allegedly began rioting, setting a freight locomotive on fire.

What are the odds of this becoming a bigger revolt? Until Shetpe, I would have said small; now I think there’s a possibility for the western oblasts to ignite. However, I don’t think it will spread to the rest of the nation (although one would be prudent to keep an eye on Shymkent and Taraz). Certainly, the terrain, both geographic and informational, make a “Kazakh Spring” very unlikely. Adding to that is the general sense of upward movement perceived by the working and middle-classes of Almaty and Astana, no doubt buttressed by the neo-patrimonial system that’s at the core of Kazakh development. It’s also my understanding that the largely ethnic Russian oblasts in the north are keeping their head low for the moment, despite the official downgrading of their language in the official media.

Nevertheless, my friend Rayhan, the BBC’s correspondent in Almaty, reports that this is the deadliest unrest to have hit Kazakhstan since its independence. She writes,

The unrest, which began as Kazakhstan was celebrating the 20th anniversary of its independence from the Soviet Union, is unprecedented.

Many here are finding it difficult to believe that such unrest could be taking place in their country. Comments on pro-government web sites are talking about an evil plot from the West and drawing parallels with recent protests in Russia. After all, some say, we are not Kyrgyzstan — a poor central Asian neighbor which has been through two revolutions in the past six years.

Kazakhstan prides itself as the regional leader, the most successful and stable country in Central Asia. But the recent violence underlines deep-rooted problems in Kazakh society: lack of democracy, lack of free media, and lack of governmental accountability. Very few media outlets in Kazakhstan have been following the strike in Zhanaozen, the country’s longest running industrial dispute.

I would say that in a very general way, I’m an optimist about Kazakhstan’s future. Nevertheless, Rayhan points out some of the key problems that continue to consternate me; alongside these I would add the fracturing that appears to exist beneath the surface between different parts of government and society (as revealed in the plight of the Peace Corps), the unknown fate of the country’s huge ethnic Russian minority, and the (probably unresolvable) debate between concerning material progress versus spiritual progress that is often overlooked in the media but is very real and multifaceted on the ground between everyday people.

Our man for Kazakhstan, Asqat Yerkimbay, has been keeping tabs on the situation. For those of you who can read Kazakh, I suggest you check him out. And I’ll be keeping an eye on the situation, as well, even if it means having to skip an exam like I had to back when Kyrgyzstan exploded in 2010…

Update, 19/12/2011: Simon Ostrovsky reports via his Twitter account:

“Shetpe and #Zhanaozen rammed with riot police, locals nowhere to be seen. Hundreds on main square in Aktau facing down as many police.”

Update, 20/12/2011: RFE/RL has a photo-essay of the police occupation in Zhanaozen. Interestingly, one of the protest banners reads, “Kazakhs wake up!”

Meanwhile, a small debate is going on over at the Registan in the comments sections of Joshua Foust’s post on the crisis. Two readers are claiming that, in fact, the oil workers are quite highly paid relative to the rest of the population. I’ve no idea whether that’s true or even whether that’s relevant (or moreover, whether what we’re seeing is a “revolt of rising expectations”), much less who these readers really are (their English is really good, although it does have some slight Russianisms), but their points are perhaps worth taking into consideration.

“The water that serveth all that country is drawn by ditches out of the River Oxus, into the great destruction of the said river, for which it cause it falleth not into the Caspian Sea as it hath done in times past, and in short time all that land is like to be destroyed, and to become a wilderness for want of water, when the river of Oxus shall fail.”

Anthony Jenkinson, 1558

Sometimes I think that people of Uzbekistan with a 28 million population know less about one of the greatest catastrophe in their own country than people worldwide. One of the reasons of it is the governmental propaganda of the successes in the policies towards its citizens. Another one is that the tragedy is being considered as not only the one of Uzbekistan but also of Kazakhstan, neighboring country rich of oil, and, considered as a main responsible side.

I found out about the Aral Sea ecological disaster when I became a freshman in my undergraduate studies. We had an introduction of our class and my then-future fellows introduced themselves. As myself, majority of students were from the capital city of Tashkent. The distribution among provinces represented the wealth and accessibility of the education in the most prestigious university of Uzbekistan: Tashkent, ancient cities of Bukhara and Samarkand were in top three in representation. All of them were telling their mostly enthusiastic live stories and what inspired them to study at the University. Except for one 17 year old guy who looked much older for us: skin on his face was flabby; he had a permanent cough and was breathing very hard; he was so thin and tall that for the rest of our five year education he had been called a “Skeleton”; the manner of speaking was slow but the way of thinking was critical and, as I understood later, more realistic than ours.

The words he used to introduce himself were “Unlike many of you I’m a child of an ecological disaster. Fortunately for me I’m here, in Tashkent, given an opportunity to study and benefit to the development of my country.” First idea about him was that he was a child of war, as I am a child of war, running away from the scourges of ethnic cleansings. I thought he was a refugee and felt sorry for him; and found him as lucky as me to come to a safer Uzbekistan to build a new life. His words about benefitting “to the development of my country” were considered by me as our common goal.

Both of my thoughts were a mistake. As it came out he was from Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic, a north-western part of Uzbekistan, constituting almost 36% of the whole country (160,000 square km) with a population of more than 1,5 million people (which is less than 6% of the whole population of Uzbekistan). The tragedy of his motherland was and nowadays is the ongoing shrinking of the Aral Sea. Its surface area drastically changed for over the last 50 years. His health condition illustrated the level of the diseases spread because the sea began to dry up and left behind salts, other minerals and toxins in the soil. Thousands of children didn’t see the adultery; hundreds of men and women have been suffered such diseases as cancer, respiratory problems, etc. the situation remains until today.

People of Karakalpakstan are so desperate that they don’t call anything else a home but the land of Karakalpaks. That was his message: to help his people fight huge difficulties they face because of the actions done by the policy-makers in order to develop agricultural sector of then-Uzbek SSR and nature’s irrevocability processes.

During my undergrad I wrote few papers on the Aral Sea problem, some of them were considered as a threat to the “national security” of Uzbekistan and I had been called and questioned by my dean who explained to me that my “thoughts about Aral Sea are contradicting with the reality and efforts taken by our democratic government.” To mention, one of my papers was graded with an ‘F’; my coursemate who ‘opened our eyes’ on that problem also had a conversation with Dean, who later was assigned as a Vice-rector on cultural and spiritual affairs (responsible for the brainwashing of students).

University official’s position was to convince the coursemate that ordinary people like him from Karakalpakstan have full access to whatever other citizen of Uzbekistan have, including education in the most prestigious universities like ours. In the end he was called a dramatizer and not a lucky survivor. That’s how the propaganda machine works in my country.

Evaporation of the Aral Sea (2000 – 2011). Photo courtesy NASA Earth Observatory.

Steve Jobs, by Walter Isaacson, is Amazon’s top grossing book of the year – in both “print and Kindle editions combined” said The News. The book went on sale on October 24th, less than 3 weeks after Jobs’ death, and Business Press Network said that “In less than 2 months on the market, the book had become the online retailer’s best selling title of 2011.”

About this biography being sold in Kazakhstan, on December 15th, Central Asian News said:

“About 40 copies of the publication were sold out for the first few hours of sales. The applications for purchasing of the book come every 20 minutes. Bestseller is available as in the online store as in the non-virtual boutique in Astana, which was opened in September 2011.”

Tengerinews.kz said: “Amazon did not release exact sales figures for the titles [top listed books of the year]”. Since the book is now available in Kazakhstan – here’s to wondering how much of a dent the Jobs biographies purchased in this Central Asian state put in the over all sum of books sold and profits made, in 2011.

Beyond the biography, but still on topic of this Apple talk – one can’t help but wonder how many Kazakhstanis are currently using Jobs’ iPhones and iPads? And what the late computer genius would think of technology in Kazakhstan today and what is to be anticipated for 2012 – Internet penetration, censorship and circumvention, available apps, number of downloaded songs and socially networked Kazakh techies?

Here’s to hoping that the selling of Isaacson’s book in Kazakhstan, and the reading of its pages, inspires tech savvy Kazakhs and the nation’s entrepreneurs. And also that hopefully neighboring Central Asian countries – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan – will soon have the book for sale, if they don’t already.

Corruption in Post-Soviet Central Asia is something very familiar to people living in the region. Without bribing, one is destined to see their case be delayed for a long time, very often beyond time limits defined by laws.

Be it application for a new passport, or registration at a new place of living, or even finding a day care for your kid — bribing is the easiest way to get it all done faster and without a hassle.

Transparency International (TI) has released its annual Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 (CPI) that ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. According to TI, it is a composite index, a combination of polls, drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The CPI reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working in the countries/territories evaluated.

This year Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have proved that they can also have stablility in something — if not positive and progressive, then at least something not really desirable by leaders of developed countries. That something is the abuse of public power.

These two countries are the ousiders of the index, sharing almost the same position with Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, North Korea and Somalia. Basically, President Karimov and President Bardimuhammedov totally failed to show progress in their declarative measures to fight corruption in their countries. Being in the same group of countries, or even worse than some of them, is the best indicator of how promises of a happy life and sustainable development by those two dictators are nothing more than just a lie.

It should be mentioned that both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are getting worse year after year:

The best position out of all five Central Asian republics belongs to Kazakhstan, which is closer to the highest point (on a scale of 0-10), and somewhere inbetween of Iran and Mongolia. Tajikistan is ranked the 152th; Kyrgyzstan is between Guinea and Yemen (164th).

Leaders of the index are New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and
Singapore with 9.5, 9.4, 9.4, 9.3 and 9.2 respectively.

By the way, CPI is also used by travellers to help them make a right choice. Thus, republics’ efforts to increase the number of tourists are in serious jeopardy.

Read impressions of travellers by TravelPod:

For crowdywendy‘s trip to Uzbekistan follow here.

For ricka‘s story on her voyage from Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan to Baku, Azerbaijan’s capital.

For markwilliams84‘s corruption story on Kazakhstan follow here.

For crowdywendy‘s corruption story on Kyrgyzstan follow here.

For jtroussier‘s corruption story on Tajikistan follow here.

ABOUT CPI:

A country/territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption there on a scale of 0 – 10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean.

The data sources used to compile the index include questions relating to the abuse of public power and focus on: bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and on questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in the public sector. As such, it covers both the administrative and political aspects of corruption. In producing the index, the scores of countries/territories for the specific corruption-related questions in the data sources are combined to calculate a single score for each country.

The document explores problems of censorship and control of the internet and other new media in Central Asia. It focuses on the situation in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where the authorities closely monitor and restrict the use of the internet and other communications technologies, filter and block access to undesirable online content, and intimidate and put pressure on websites and internet users who publish or share information that is critical of official policies.

According to the research, the authorities of the three Central Asian countries have sought to justify their repressive approach to the internet and other new media with the fight against ”extremism”, ”destructive” forces and other vaguely defined threats to national “security” and ”stability”. However in reality this fight is used as a pretext for implementing measures to stifle free speech and help preserve the governments’ grip on power. Broad and vague restrictions on access to and use of the internet and other communications technologies are in serious violation of international human rights law, which only allows for limitations on the right to freedom of expression in exceptional circumstances and in compliance with certain strict requirements.

Recently several initiatives have been made at the regional level in the former Soviet Union to regulate the use of the internet as part of the struggle against “extremism” and other purported threats to national security. Among others, an ambiguously worded draft “code of conduct” on “information security” has been drafted, and efforts are under way to create a joint mechanism to control social networks. These initiatives give rise to concern about enhanced regional cooperation undermining freedom of expression in the internet.

In spite of its proclaimed commitment to promoting IT, the government of Kazakhstan has created different mechanisms to monitor and filter online material. Access is regularly blocked to web sites that contain information that shows those in power in a bad light. As of October 2011, more than 100 web sites had been blocked for allegedly containing “extremist” propaganda, among them the popular blog community Live Journal. The online video portal stan.tv, which has provided independent coverage of the oil worker strike that is currently under way in the country, has been sued by authorities for allegedly violating health and safety regulations. Its journalists have reported intimidation and two of them were brutally attacked last month. The online news outlet guljan.org, which reports on corruption and other misconduct involving official figures, has been subject to invasive cyber attacks and one of its reporters was recently convicted on criminal defamation charges.

Turkmenistan is one of the world’s most hostile countries for internet users, with its monopoly state-run provider offering only a highly censored version of the internet. All online activities in internet cafes are recorded, while rates for private internet connections remain excessively high. New repressive measures have followed the July 2011 explosions at an ammunition depot, whose destructive impact the authorities wanted to hide. Security services have tried to track down internet and cell phone users suspected of reporting on the accident to the outside world; the website of Austria-based Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights was hacked after it published a set of stories about the explosions; and a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent who blogged about the events was imprisoned on trumped-up charges (even if later amnestied). A campaign has also been re-launched to dismantle private satellite dishes, one of the few remaining means for obtaining independent information in the country.

Aside from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan is the most repressive country for internet users in the former Soviet Union. It is characterized by a pervasive regime of online control and censorship: material that does not please authorities is systematically filtered and blocked. Email and cell phone correspondence by “suspicious” individuals is subject to surveillance, and participants in online discussions on politically charged issues risk facing harassment, as did a number of arbuz.com forum users, who were arrested in early 2011. The recent launch of a new social networking site by the state telecom monopoly has raised concerns about growing control in this area of the internet. Internet users who openly speak up on social problems are highly vulnerable to intimidation and harassment. Recent victims include two women human rights defenders who published online articles about shortcomings in waste management, the care of old people, as well as the implementation of a reform to promote non-cash transactions, the paper says.

“On stage, the leader of the nation treks into a nighttime magical forest and begins talking to the trees, which turn into his opponents.” (Associated Press)

On November 24th, a new play proud of autonomy and self-government premiered at Astana’s Palace of Peace, in Kazakhstan. Associated Press describes the play as “…the latest example of the mythologization of the man…”.

“Teren Tamyrlar” (“Deep roots”), written by Playwrite Erkin Juasbek and directed by Nurlan Jumaniyazov, is the new feature presentation that tells the story of 71-year-old Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Through theatrics, the story of how — for the past two decades — the leader has risen and developed a nationalized Kazakhstan independent from the former Soviet Union, is told. This is the first time that the Kazakh head of state has appeared in a theater play as a character.

A press release by the National Ministry of Culture, about the play, says:

“Our goal is to communicate to the audience the role of the head of state in the development of Kazakhstan’s independence”.

Kazakhstan Today explains the purpose of the play:

“… to convey to the viewer’s head of state role in the making and strengthen the independence of Kazakhstan.”

Ferghana Information Agency explains the plot of the story:

“… an old forester cherishes trees in a forest near Astana, treating each plant as a “human being”. Concerned with the conditions of forestry in the country, president Nazarbaev visits him and engages in a conversation. Then forester suggests that the president should come and visit the forest during the night, and Nazarbaev agrees.”

This November premier is not the first cinematic-type performance to portray and recollect the leader’s life. In April 2011, Director Rustem Abdrashov’s movie “The Sky of My Childhood” about the childhood of President Nazarbayev, premiered in Almaty.

This is also not the first time “Deep Roots” has been brought to the public. On July 2nd 2011, the play was premiered at Astana’s Bayseitova Opera and Ballet Theatre. In June, Eurasianet.org explained what was to be anticipated from the play:

“…promises to offer a whimsical view of the life of Nazarbayev, who rose from a poor rural background and an early career as a steelworker to become the strongman president of Kazakhstan, which incidentally marks its 20th anniversary of independence this year.”

Eurasianet.org continued with a great explanation of “Deep Roots”:

“The president goes there ["a forest near Astana – the new capital that is Nazarbayev’s brainchild"] to admire the view and meets Zhaynak, an elderly man of the forest. Zhaynak, who “believes that ‘a forest is also like a man,’ and to learn its secrets you have to be in the forest at night,” urges Nazarbayev to return after dark, which – of course – he does.”

“Intriguingly, there he meets members of the opposition (which he rarely does in real life) and “new Kazakhs from modern-day society,” Zhuasbek explained, leaving us guessing until the premiere whether they’ll include figures such as murdered opposition leader Altynbek Sarsenbayev, Nazarbayev’s estranged former son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev, or London-based oligarch Mukhtar Ablyazov.”

If you’re in Astana, and have a chance to check out “Deep Roots” – share your reviews with neweurasia! And if you are elsewhere in the world, and have a chance to check out the YouTube video of the performance – let neweurasia know your thoughts of this portrayal of President Nazarbayev’s story.

[M]any of us have been attacked and assaulted — according to our Country Director, Kazakhstan has earned the highest rate of any country in Peace Corps – and they know exactly what pressures have begun emanating from oblast- and national-level governments. Volunteers will never be privy to all of the information, but we have enough of a patchwork network that we can piece together a picture of what serving in Kazakhstan is like. KNB agents sitting in classrooms. Upper-level ministers all but booting volunteers from numerous oblasts. Questions of espionage and revolutionary tactics. The shooting in Taraz, which saw eight Kazakhstanis die, taking place only a block from two volunteers’ houses. Brass knuckles, attempted break-ins, bizarre opium plant-and-frisks — to say nothing of the near-daily harassment, and worse, for the female volunteers — all added up to a setting those DC-based officials deemed far too dire to pursue.

It’s pretty chilling in my opinion. Read the rest of it by clicking here.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) introduces the situation:

“A criminal case against Surganov was launched on July 20 after the deputy chief of the Pavlodar Oblast financial police, Sanzhar Aliyev, sued him for libel.”

The journalist’s article, “The Knights of the Financial Police,” accused Aliyev of not only promiscuity, but alluded to sexual violence, accusing him of having had raped a local woman – a story that was said to be referenced from a former colleague of the Aliyev’s. But Aliyev used his influential position in society to avoid prosecution. Aliyev very obviously denied these allegations – after all, who would actually admit to such a shameful crime? And so now, rather than the bad guy being punished, it’s the journalist who is being unjustly reprimanded.

In a joint statement, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), informed that on November 7th, 2011:

“…the Medeu District Court in Kazakhstan’s economic capital, Almaty, convicted Surganov of defaming Sandzhar Aliyev, a Pavlodar region financial police officer, in a July article…”

What came of this order? Surganov’s freedoms are to be restricted for a period of 18 months, said the press release. In response to his “unacceptable” article about Aliyev, the Guljan.org journalist is also to “publish a retraction” – to apologize to his society and publish another article that fits the authorities’ approval, probably that this time will tell the false “truth”. But not only apologies are being required from Surganov, money is too. Surganov is said to have to pay 100,000 Tenge, equivalent to $675, to his opponent Aliyev.

CPJ and IFEX report what the Almaty-based press freedom group Adil Soz said, in addition to the above charges:

“… the terms of Surganov’s “restriction of freedom” include a ban on leaving Almaty without obtaining police consent; a 9 p.m. daily curfew; and a ban on visiting places of public recreation, such as bars, restaurants, and night clubs.”

Overall, all these unfair verdicts have clearly lead the Guljan.org writer in the direction of appeal. Guljan.org’s Chief Editor Gulzhan Ergalieva told RFE/RL the allegations against the journalist “are absolutely baseless.”

CPJ’s Europe and Central Asia Program Coordinator, Nina Ognianova, said:

“We are alarmed by the sentence handed to Valery Surganov, and urge Kazakh authorities to remove the restrictions on his freedom on appeal. Kazakhstan must fulfill its pledge to decriminalize defamation and leave similar disputes to the civil courts.”