The West’s interest in Kazakhstan is usually slaked in three ways. First are the sporadic news stories, depicting it as a wicked mixture of oil, autocracy and corruption. Second one is made of picturesque and obviously expensive ads supplements to the leading American newspapers, paid by the Kazakh taxpayers. Reality is totally different there – democracy, growth and prosperity. The third source is represented by publications of the think-tanks and individual researchers. They rarely reach wider audience, but it’s even worse when some of they do.

Ariel Cohen, a well-known expert in Eurasian politics, frequently publishes his opinion articles in the top U.S. newspapers, denouncing autocratic rollback in Russia and Central Asian “Stans”, except Kazakhstan. This country is a Dr. Cohen’s favorite. Speaking about it, he omits critical evaluation of the facts, highlighting only positive things – even if negativity seriously tips the scale – and later broadcasts his vision on behalf of the Heritage Foundation.

There are several things that can be easily traced from one his publication to another – not even much paraphrased: oil-driven economic boom (not a word about threats of “Dutch Disease” and widening wealth gap), 3,000 students being sent abroad each year (whereas domestic universities are looted by corruption and brain-drain) and interethnic tolerance (although failures in ensuring social justice and rule of law already cause ethnic clashes in this historically tolerant society).

Yes, Kazakhstan sent soldiers to Iraq when President Bush needed allies. But Astana remains under severe influence of Kremlin. It is a core member of the anti-U.S. Shanghai Cooperation Organization and wants to diminish the OSCE’s human dimension. Yes, Kazakhstan will have lots of oil soon. But politically it prefers to export it through Russia. The recent constitutional amendments raised many eyebrows, but Dr. Cohen is very positive about them, explaining his optimism in sweet harmony with the Kazakh propaganda.
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Marianna Gurtovnik

What follows are some of my thoughts about the civil society development in the Newly Independent States. I would welcome comments and insights from interested readers, particularly about the role that local corporate philanthropy may play in sustaining the civil society and bridging the gap between the rich and the poor in the region.

Many reputable publications in the West tend to portray current political and economic developments in the Newly Independent States as a decline of democracy and restoration of authoritarianism. With no intention to sound gloomy, one cannot help but wonder if a genuine commitment to democracy was there, to begin with. And has the track record of reforms up-to-date been solid enough to justify the use of the word “decline” when describing the current state of affairs? This article provides a broad overview of the government-civil society relations in the Newly Independent States, and suggests ways to lift the existing tension to the benefit of both parties.

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

With a possible exception of the Baltic States, none of the Newly Independent States has, over the past 15 years, followed steadfastly the path of democratic progress. Several historical circumstances have contributed to these newly emerged nations’ checkered history of democratic achievement. (Martha Brill Olcott has also provided her own assessment of the democracy-building efforts in Central Asia.) At the dawn of the 1990s, anxious to cement their independence and gain international credibility through participation in global economic and military institutions, ruling elites from Ukraine to Uzbekistan hurried to proclaim laws that were to promote transparent governance and fair opportunities for all. Often half-baked and contradictory, these laws mainly served as a window-dressing; tested in critical circumstances, the fragile institutions that they had established failed to uphold citizens’ political rights and economic freedoms. Such systemic dysfunctions were to be expected. After all, for the most of the post-independence period, political power in all of the Newly Independent States (NIS) has been concentrated in the hands of former communist chiefs who regarded democracy as an alien and inconvenient concept. As international pressure to reform grew, the costs of relinquishing some of their immense powers outweighed, in their view, the potential benefits of the rule of law. Nationalistic voices in some ex-Soviet nations, too, have openly resisted calls for reform that, they felt, were imposed on their countries by meddlesome democratic crusaders from the West. Furthermore, several NIS leaders have leveraged their countries’ vast natural resources and geo-strategic advantages to toughen their grip on domestic affairs and brush off western criticism of corruption and abuse of authority.

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By Vasili Rukhadze

After the November 2003 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, many predicted that the young and inexperienced administration of Georgian president Saakashvili would collapse without actually changing anything in Georgia. However, President Saakashvili’s reforms turned out to be successful and appear to be working well. His overwhelming zeal and passion is felt in every reform and action taken for the strengthening of the Georgian state. But what are those reforms that Mr. Saakashvili did after all, within two and half years of his rule, that obviously started to reshape Georgia, lift it from the hopelessness, lawlessness and corruption and gradually turn it to a modest nation?
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The discourse on Islam in former Soviet republics with predominantly Muslim populations was long dominated by a perception of a ‘regional extremist threat’ often dubbed ‘Wahhabism’. One can not deny that there is a radical, violent fringe that wreaked havoc in the region. Some, spin-offs of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or militant groups from Chechnya, for instance, could do so again.

The question is, however, if that fringe has a strong military-political capacity and a real base and ideological impact among the region’s population. As important: what does and could Islam, both as a religion and a social-normative system, actually mean for the region and its at least nominally Muslim population?

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By Younghusband

Since independence a number of attempts have been made to build security relationships with and between the countries of Central Asia. From joint defence ministers meetings to the Collective Security Treaty Organization, security ties in Central Asia have resulted in a multilateral alphabet soup with varying levels of failure. Western attempts in the region have also seen little success.

In 1996, the U.S. Department of Defense backed the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in creating a joint peacekeeping/humanitarian aid unit called Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion, or CENTRASBAT. The political goal of this 500 strong tripartite unit was to develop healthy security ties between the newly independent Central Asian states. The military goal of the battalion was to maintain a rapid response capability for humanitarian and disaster relief, while developing interoperability with NATO and other Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations.

The United States supported CENTRASBAT by training its senior officers at war colleges in America as well as providing funding. This funding was used to purchase non-lethal military equipment from the United States at reduced cost. All equipment sales had to be cleared by Congress, and included things such as uniforms, webbing, transport vehicles and NODs (night optical devices).

CENTRASBAT’s inaugural exercise was executed 15-20 September 1997. Organized by U.S. Atlantic Command (Central Asia did not come under CENTCOM jurisdiction until 1 October 1999), involving 40 CENTRASBAT soldiers and 500 troops from the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, exercise CENTRASBAT-97 became the longest-distance airborne operation in military history. Six C-17 transport aircraft left Fort Bragg, North Carolina, flying nearly 19 hours non-stop with two mid-air refuellings over a distance of 12,500km to drop the 540 paratroopers on Chirchik, Uzbekistan in a simulation against “dissident elements”. A triumph for CENTRASBAT, this exercise also served as a message to the Russians and others. As the four-star General John Sheehan (USMC) noted, “There is no nation on the face of the earth where we can’t go.”

A number of other exercises followed involving other countries, but as time went on CENTRASBAT became increasingly viewed as an “American Project.” This is partly due to the fact that the United States did not have a substantive policy, security or otherwise, to guide its relationship with Central Asia. Washington saw the results with CENTRASBAT and threw all its weight behind the battalion, seeming to take over. Furthermore, political relations between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were not necessarily encouraging and CENTRASBAT could not be deployed without the authorisation of all three presidents. Development of the battalion has basically stalled. Though most countries in the region that have been involved with the CENTRASBAT exercises in the past have frittered away their training, Kazakhstan took the experience to heart and created its own peacekeeping force on 31 January 2000 called KAZBAT. Members of this battalion were part of the “Coalition of the Willing” which invaded Iraq. Kazakhstan has suffered one casualty in Iraq, but recently re-committed its 27 man strong force for another 6 months.

Whereas CENTRASBAT seems to have failed, disaster response by IWER has been a success. The International Workshop for Emergency Response conducted under NATO’s Partnership for Peace program put Uzbek emergency responders in contact with the Louisiana State National Guard. Though the US plays an important role in the workshops, the relationship is more diffuse and the Central Asian participants can truly see the benefits in regards to their situation at home. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have also participated in the IWER workshops.

As the nations of Central Asia represent the “heartland” of geopolitics, and play an important role in controlling narcotics and human trafficking in the region, Western countries should increase efforts to develop security ties. Unfortunately, due to the political reality of the region, with its entrenched authoritarian leadership, it may be another decade before large-scale cooperation can be achieved. Yet as veteran war correspondent Robert D. Kaplan argued strongly in his book Imperial Grunts, the best military and security relationships are built on individual relationships between the lowest levels of NCOs. It is well within the means of the West to increase contact between the NCOs of Central Asia and those of NATO countries. Moreover, developing contacts within the context of host nations’ needs can make the difference between success and failure.

Investing in these relationships now will reap beneficial relationships in the future, as the young officer corps of today become the leaders of the defence apparatus of tomorrow. To be successful it is imperative to let these relationships grow naturally, building a balanced foundation shared equally by all stakeholders. This is particularly important for the U.S. presence in Central Asia, as America needs the region more than they need America. But the United States can offer the kind of egalitarian relationship that Russia and China cannot, so the potential for long-lasting, organic security cooperation is there.

Younghusband is a contributor at ComingAnarchy.com and Master’s candidate for War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada.

By Claire Wilkinson

Exasperation is a feeling that accompanies me on a daily basis here in Kyrgyzstan, whether informally chatting to people, conducting interviews or simply reading whatever newspapers I’ve managed to find. No doubt many people reading that first sentence will be thinking “here we go, another rich foreigner complaining at the relative lack of her creature comforts”, but that is to miss my point. I’m referring to the paradoxical mix of justifications, excuses and false logic so often used to explain the current state of Kyrgyzstan that somehow shifts both the blame and the responsibility from the speaker. Everyone has a theory of who is to blame - most commonly former President Akaev, as though those that are in power now never had any dealings with him. And what is to be done - Reopen factories! Immediate constitutional reform! Get more foreign investment! Protest!

Yet somewhere in all these charged discussions, connections are lost between benefits and cost, cause and effect, conditionality and accountability, the here-and-now and the long-term future of Kyrgyzstan. Whilst the craving for quick and painless answers is entirely understandable, it is not the way of an increasingly interconnected world. As the proverb says, you can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs. If you want foreign investment, one must accept that much of any profit will go abroad, for example.

It is time for Kyrgyzstan’s leaders and people to accept this reality, rather than continually seeking refuge in blame-shifting, references to local tradition, culture and mentality, and the catch-all phrase “when we’re a developed country, then…”.

The recent debate surrounding the proposal that Kyrgyzstan join the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme to gain debt relief is a case in point. Whilst a few commentators felt that the conditions of the programme make it unattractive, suggesting that the government should pursue other negotiations to get at least some of Kyrgyzstan’s debts written off, these have been in the minority. Far more column inches have been dedicated to emotional arguments about how joining the HIPC will ruin Kyrgyzstan’s international reputation, make it unattractive to investors, and reduce it to the level of an African country.

The comparison may not be a pleasant one, but, if one looks at events and trends over the last year, in all honesty it does not seem inappropriate: an uprising leading to the ousting of an increasingly unpopular and weak leader followed by land seizures, assassinations, local and national protests, fears of civil war and the increasing criminalisation of the government, rising rates of violent crime. I could go on.

Kyrgyzstan’s international reputation has already been considerably damaged and much investment has been lost. The level of concern among international commentators was evident at the end of October when Akmatbaev first brought his supporters to protest outside the Jogorku Kenesh, with a U.S. Embassy official describing the situation as ’scandalous’. Then, in December, the term ‘faltering state’ appeared in an ICG report on the situation in the republic. The mood in Kyrgyzstan remained one of stubborn - or desperate - optimism, even as the newly reformed opposition started new rumblings of discontent. Until the attack on Edil Baisalov a few weeks ago, only the HIPC programme had broken through this blindly defensive hope and pride to suggest the true state of things here and how desperately change is needed to prevent Kyrgyzstan sliding from ‘faltering’ to ‘failing’.

The opposition’s response has been to demand, among other things, immediate constitutional reform, economic development, stronger efforts to fight organised crime and corruption. Nobody would disagree that all these things are vital. But what is also needed from everyone in Kyrgyzstan is a willingness to look critically at themselves and their actions, and consider the consequences in the medium and long-term perspective.

This is especially true of protests, which have over the last year become an increasingly popular way for groups to express their discontent and demands in a supposedly ‘democratic’ way. Yet protests do not make a democracy any more than elections do. Indeed, it could be argued that the continuing protests are now preventing the very things the protestors demand, namely ‘real reforms’. How can the government develop well thought through policies for reform when it is constantly being called upon to address the demands of a particular group immediately, even if it is to the detriment of society at large? If the opposition is determined to accuse the government of inaction, then it must recognise the point at which it becomes part of the problem by keeping the government in crisis mode, preventing normal working processes from happening.

The peaceful protest held in Bishkek on April 8 against organised crime sent an important message to the government about the need for change. And, if statements and reports are to be believed, words are beginning to transform into actions with corruption being more strongly targeted and efforts to catch criminal groups intensified. Yet the opposition has seemed bent on holding further rallies in Bishkek, which has put it in danger of crossing the fine line from democracy to protestocracy. Threats to create a ‘Kyrgyz Maidan’ and stay until their demands are met are not to be welcomed, even before the possibility that certain groups could try and take advantage of the situation is considered. All that can be achieved this way is a continuation of the government’s crisis management approach to politics, which precludes any real, sustained reform.

Kyrgyzstan needs now, more than ever, to look beyond the here and now and consider the longer-term consequences. Are people are content to accept that more protests will continue to create an impression of instability both at home and abroad to the detriment of economic development? Are people ready to see a link between becoming a developed country and their personal actions? To accept that foreign investment will not be to the exclusive benefit of Kyrgyzstan, but will directly and indirectly benefit Kyrgyzstanis? The current evidence is not encouraging. It seems a few more unpleasant home truths will be required to make people think in a sustained way about the future of their country, rather than resorting to reckless actions and arguments that only serve to undermine the possibility of building a better future for Kyrgyzstan.

Editor: Marianna posted this on the Azerbaijan blog. Due to the post’s regional significance, it is also posted here.
By Marianna Gurtovnik

BACKGROUND

Over the past decade, US policymakers have been questioning the effectiveness of America’s multi-billion foreign aid programs. In some cases, these programs created dependency on aid in developing nations or allowed for funds’ mismanagement by corrupt governments. To address these concerns, George W. Bush launched the “Millennium Challenge Account� (MCA), an initiative that makes good governance a precondition for America’s assistance to poor countries. In January 2004, after the initiative had received bipartisan endorsement in the Congress, President Bush established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to pioneer the policy.

US foreign aid has been instrumental in promoting American interests worldwide, and South Caucasus is a case in point. Since the mid–1990s, United States have been among the largest donors of humanitarian and developmental projects serving refugees and other under-privileged groups in the South Caucasus. With time, the US have also reaped substantial geostrategic pay-offs in the region. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia aspire to join NATO and have participated in the bloc’s military training program. They’ve also deployed peacekeeping battalions in either Iraq or Afghanistan, or both. After years of sticky negotiations, Russia has promised to withdraw all troops from its military bases in Georgia by 2008. Russia has already closed down two of its four bases in Georgia. And last May, the British Petroleum-led oil consortium launched a long-delayed pipeline to pump Azerbaijan’s “black gold� over to the US and European markets. Financial feasibility of the $3.7 billion pipeline was questioned even by western economists. However, its route through Georgia and Turkey made sense to western diplomats because it circumvented volatile and unpredictable Russia.

Eager to expand the cooperation, the US have insisted that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia improve their record on just governance and economic freedom. Vote-rigging, corrupt courts, muzzling of political dissenters, and pervasive red-tape have bred public discontent and stifled private sector’s growth in all three countries. Last November, US officials chided Armenia and Azerbaijan for falsifying the results of the referendum and parliamentary elections, respectively. The new Georgian government that emerged after the ‘Rose Revolution’ of November 2003 enjoys a clear support of the Bush Administration, although it, too, is plagued by human rights violations.

One may now wonder if each of the South Caucasus countries’ governance practices have been reflected in MCC’s recent funding decisions. The answer is not a clear “yes�.

All three countries have a per-capita income of up to $1,435—low enough to be considered poor, under MCC rules. But the agency does not base its decisions on income alone. To qualify for MCC funding, a country must score above the median on the corruption indicator. It must also score above the median on at least half of indicators in three categories: rule of law, investment in people, and economic freedom.

Georgia: Long Way Cut Short

In September 2005, MCC signed a 295.3 million Compact (agreement) with Georgia—the second largest grant the corporation has signed so far. Secretary of State and MCC Board Chair, Condoleezza Rice, who attended the signing ceremony in New York, praised the Georgian Government’s “commitment to political and economic reform�.

Unlike traditional foreign aid where a donor country sets the priorities, MCC encourages governments to identify projects and prepare grant proposals themselves. MCC’s key principle is to “reduce poverty through economic growth�. Georgians will use the Compact money to repair a gas pipeline and prop up small rural businesses. MCC’s additional grant of $4.1 million will finance road rehabilitation in Samtskhe–Javakheti province, home to Georgia’s largely impoverished Armenian community. It is hoped that better roads will halt economic isolation of Armenian farmers by facilitating the delivery of their produce to Georgian markets.

The Compact was signed despite the fact that Georgian government has failed the tests on corruption, rule of law, and the quality of economic regulatory policies. Georgia’s ranking on primary education spending relative to other candidate countries (8%) is also way lower than that of Armenia (50%) and Azerbaijan (60%). Many rural schools in Georgia lack funds to upgrade their dilapidated facilities and infrastructure. Education for ages 6 to 16 is officially free but the US State Department’s human rights report for 2004 points to “endemic bribery� in Georgian public schools where parents are charged informal fees to cover maintenance costs, school supplies, and even teachers’ delayed salaries. “In some cases, students were forced to drop out due to an inability or unwillingness to pay�, the report notes.

In 2005, Transparency International ranked Georgia 130th out of 158 countries surveyed for its “Corruption Perception Index�—a progress by 0.3 points compared to Georgia’s standing in 2004. Georgian parliament took steps to combat corruption by adopting amendments to the Criminal Code in February 2004, and passing the Code of Conduct in October 2004. New criminal legislation has expanded the Prosecutor Office’s authority to charge officials with bribery, eliminated immunity for law enforcement officials, and allowed in-absentia trials for officials who failed to report to court. The Code of Conduct has established ethical norms for parliamentarians.

Armenia: A Semblance of Scrutiny?

The $235.65 million Compact with Armenia for irrigation and rural road rehabilitation was approved in December 2005. Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) reports that Armenian government will match MCC funds to rebuild over 1/3 of the Lifeline Road Network—a route through which Armenia hopes to link to Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian–dominated Nagorno-Karabakh province broke away from Azerbaijan in 1988 but hasn’t been internationally recognized as a legal entity.

According to MCC, Armenia has made a strong showing on economic policies where its percentage rankings, relative to other candidate countries, vary from 83 to 99. It has scored below median on political rights and health and education spending.

Rated 88th out of 158 nations on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Armenia can boast a healthier standing on the control of corruption than Azerbaijan and Georgia. But whether it fully satisfies MCC criteria remains a moot point. International observers have criticized Armenian government for the “inflation of turnout numbers, ballot stuffing, and intimidation of observers� in the November 27 referendum on constitutional amendments. MCC’s CEO, John Danilovich, held off the award and issued a warning to Armenian President, Robert Kocharian. Danilovich expressed concern about the “lack of transparency� in the referendum and stressed that MCC would monitor Armenia’s performance throughout the five-year Compact. Armenia’s Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian has acknowledged the wrongdoings and pledged in his letter that the government will work hard to fix them. On January 18, Danilovich responded that Oskanian’s explanations had provided “sufficient reasons� for him to proceed with signing the Compact.

Representatives of Armenian NGOs have criticized MCC for a “vague discontent� with the status-quo, adding that the exchange of letters won’t generate a genuine commitment to reforms in the government. They’ve also called for a “more consistent approach� to country assessment—one that would continuously monitor local trends and developments. This comment echoes the Center for Global Development’s recommendation for a more comprehensive monitoring in Georgia to determine the government’s “commitment to strong policies and institutions� over a “sufficient period of time.�

“MCA Compact Countries are required to maintain performance on the selection criteria even after they have received a compact,� said Sherri Kraham, MCC’s Development Policy Director in Washington, DC. She added that MCC’s policy envisages circumstances, under which the agency might suspend or terminate assistance to countries.

Azerbaijan: Is There a Hope?

Azerbaijan’s failing on all six indicators in the “ruling justly� category has essentially disqualified it both from Compact funding and so-called “threshold� funding. MCC’s Threshold Program provides policy advice to governments that have demonstrated commitment to reforms but need to further improve their policies to become fully eligible.

While Azerbaijan’s role as the US’s economic and political partner in the region becomes increasingly important, the pressure on Azerbaijani government to democratize appears to grow as well. Most recently, international observers have criticized Azerbaijan’s presidential and parliamentary elections of 2003 and 2005, respectively, as unjust and non-transparent. Ranked 137th out of 158 countries, Azerbaijan also lags behind its two South Caucasian neighbors on the Transparency International’s corruption scale.

Last October, President Ilham Aliyev heeded to the Council of Europe’s recommendations and signed a decree enforcing public officials’ accountability for procedural violations in the conduct of elections. He also approved the inking of voters’ fingertips to prevent multiple voting. However, observers dismissed these measures, which Aliyev introduced two weeks before the parliamentary ballot, as “too little, too late.� Results in several election districts have been cancelled, with repeat elections scheduled for May 2006.

“Azerbaijan has been a candidate country for each of the past three years�, said MCC’s Sherri Kraham. “We expect that it will be a candidate, and will be reviewed, again for fiscal year 2007�, she noted.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite some legislative advances, Georgian Government still needs to reign in the corruption and improve its economic policies. “Apparently, the MCC Board wanted to support Georgia’s political transition and newly elected president, Mikhail Saakashvili. While this goal is certainly justifiable from a US foreign policy prospective, it is not an appropriate use of MCA funds � note Sarah Lucas and Steve Radelet of the Center for Global Development (CGD), a Washington, DC–based think tank that monitors MCC activities.

The fact that Armenia was approved for funding despite its checkered record has spurred speculations. Some suggest that, as in Georgia’s case, the Bush Administration wanted to reward a strategic ally. Others talk about the pressure on MCC to “get money out of the door� to prove the agency’s utility to Congress. The $2.5 billion MCC left unspent in 2004–2005 may, in part, explain why the Congress has chopped the agency’s request for 2006 funds from $3 billion to $1.7 billion. Commenting on MCC’s slow start-up, Congressman Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, observed: “Combined with the prospect for billions more coming on line in 2007, it seems we have more funding than program. I would prefer that Congress catch up and fund success, than need to justify funding for a potential one.�

According to CGD’s Sheila Herrling, MCC reviews candidate countries’ performance annually, while adding new countries and taking out others.

In theory, this leaves a window of opportunity for Azerbaijani Government but just how much time it might need to sufficiently improve its record is anyone’s guess. However, one should not rule out the possibility of foreign policy agenda overshadowing the US Government’s developmental concerns for yet another time.

Opinions expressed in this article do not represent the views of any organization or institution.