The Energy Loss Reduction Project was initially approved in June 2005 and was funded by an International Development Association (IDA) credit and grant of US$ 19 million, and a US$ 8 million grant from the Government of Switzerland’s Secretariat for Economic Cooperation (SECO). The project was restructured in February 2011 to include financing for the assessment studies for the proposed Rogun Hydropower Project.

To date, the project enabled Barki Tajik to install 170,000 electricity meters in Dushanbe. As a result, electricity billed increased by 50 percent in two years, improving efficiency, reducing losses, and helping to put the utility on a sounder financial footing.

“The energy sector is crucial for the growth of Tajikistan’s economy, and more importantly, for the well-being of the Tajik people. We hope that this additional financing will help further the energy security agenda and will inform the Government’s strategic energy development objectives.”

Marsha Olive, World Bank Country Manager for Tajikistan.

The project will scale-up metering and collection efficiency, contributing to further loss reduction in the sector. Furthermore, the additional financing for the project includes several strategic studies to help in achieving improved system reliability and energy security, particularly during the critical winter months, such as for rehabilitation and sedimentation studies for the Nurek Hydropower Plant. In addition, it provides advisory support needed by the Government of Tajikistan for the preparation of electricity export arrangements such as the Central Asia South Asia Regional Electricity Market development initiative (CASA-1000 project).

The additional financing will also support continuation of the international process of the assessment studies for the proposed Rogun Hydropower Project in Tajikistan, as envisaged by earlier project restructuring. The Government of Tajikistan is expected to define a detailed implementation schedule for the assessment studies in line with international standards. It is expected that the draft feasibility studies will be available in about nine months for subsequent review and consultations in Tajikistan and with the riparian countries.

The expected outcome of the additional financing is the increased capacity and ability of the Government to make strategic decisions for the growth and sustainability of the energy sector and the country’s economy. The project is also expected to deepen the impact of the metering program through increased billing and higher collections, which would subsequently lead to improvement in the financial viability of the sector, and build better accountability of energy and revenue flows. The completion of the metering and billing component would provide the customers with satisfaction of fair treatment and assurance that they are paying for what they actually consume, thus supporting the project’s objective of loss reduction in a socially responsible manner.

The World Bank is also currently preparing a power supply options study for Tajikistan. This study will assess the energy supply options available to Tajikistan taking into account power, economic, environmental, social, and water management considerations. The World Bank’s overall engagement in the energy sector supports the Government of Tajikistan’s strategy to ensure reliable supply to consumers, deal with the severe winter energy shortages, reduce electricity system losses and strengthen financial management system to improve the financial condition of the energy sector, and develop a regional trade scheme to achieve sustainable export of summer surplus electricity.

World Bank in Tajikistan

The overall active portfolio of the World Bank in Tajikistan currently consists of 14 projects with net commitment of US$ 192 million covering energy and water (35 percent), agriculture and rural development (31 percent), education, health and social protection (30 percent), and economic policy and public sector (4 percent).

“One of the foremost journalists from Tajikistan, Atovulloev has fearlessly sought to get the news out on his native country, where violence and state authoritarianism have been the norm for years.”

Tajik journalist Dodojon Atovulloev – founder and editor of the Tajik opposition monthly Charogi Ruz (“Daily Light”), was stabbed in the Italian restaurant “Viaggio” in Moscow on January 12th. The attack led Atovulloev to be hospitalized at Moscow’s Sklifosovsky Institute, where he underwent surgery.

On January 14th, on their Facebook page, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty said:

“Police apprehended a man who was found with blood on his hands within hours of the attack but released him after concluding that he was not connected to the attack. There are no other known suspects at this time, police said.”

In their press release on January 13th, in their fight for the journalist’s justice, Reporters Without Borders:

“…calls on the Russian police to do all it can to identify his attacker and those behind the crime.”

“All avenues must be explored, taking account of the professional activities of this noted opposition journalist.”

Atovulloev’s Charogi Ruz, which was founded in 1991, was the first privately-owned newspaper to be recognized after Tajik independence. The journalist was forced out of Tajikistan, for his media work that criticizes President Emomali Rakhmo.

About the outspoken journalist, Central Asian News says:

“56-year-old Atovulloev is a leader of “Vatandor” movement, known for sharp criticism of the policies of Tajik President Emomalii Rahmon. A few years ago the journalist emigrated for political reasons and now is permanently between Germany and Russia.”

This Moscow stabbing was certainly not the first dangerous incident of threat and risk brought upon this fearless journalist. Doro Zabehov, Atovulloev’s brother-in-law, told RFE/RL that Atovulloev had been “under constant threats and pressures” for years:

“”Even since he left Tajikistan, he has been persecuted.””

“”We knew there were constant risks to his life, but he would never talk about them. He wouldn’t tell us who his enemies were, so I won’t speculate.”"

WikiLeaks explains the danger Atovulloev has faced for many years:

“In 1992, the paper’s offices were broken into. Following that incident, Atovulloev fled to Moscow where he continued to publish Charogi Ruz in exile. However, the threats against him did not stop. Informed of an assassination plot against him by Tajik authorities in 2006, Atovulloev and his family fled to Germany in May. In July of 2001, Atovulloev was detained in Moscow as he was on his way to visit family in Uzbekistan.”

And for the charges he has faced, WikiLeaks explains:

“The Tajik government wanted to extradite him to face charges of insulting the president and inciting to overthrow the government — both punishable by death under Tajik laws. Under international pressure, Moscow relented, and Atovulloev was allowed to return to Germany.”

Latest public photo of Dodojon Atovulloev taken during interview on January 19, 2012. Photo courtesy Fergananews.com

On January 19th, in Atovulloev’s latest interview with Fergana news agency, he sounds ready to continue his work, and thanks doctors who saved his life, as well as all friends who were with him during those difficult times.

neweurasia joins the international community in raising awareness to Atovulloev’s case and fighting for the health and justice this respected journalist and opposition figure rightfully deserves.

“And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thy own eye?”
Matthew 7:3

Karimov knocks out Rahmon?

Official Uzbek media keep downgrading Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon regime by reprinting online critical articles written by journalists who are, in fact, perfect “Uzbek state enemies.”

Nowadays, apart from finding disadvantages and ‘assisting’ in postponing the construction of the Roghun project in Tajikistan, Uzbek media representatives decided to impose themselves as ready-to-analyze independent online sources on the search for as much information as possible that tells of the Rahmon’s regime’s failures and lies.

One of them, Tashkentskaya Pravda (Tashkent Truth) allowed itself to publish an article from Paruskg.info website, which refers to Wikileaks information, entitled, “Apple Does Not Fall Far From The Tree.”

Shamsullo Gulov, author of the ‘kompromat’ starts with calling Wikileaks a “famous web site” that gives opinions of U.S. State Department employees regarding Rahmon’s family seizing control over main industrial and financial facilities in the counrty. Later on, the author says that the information provided by Wikileaks are “concrete facts.”

Well, first of all, the fact of using Wikileaks as a source of information is something out of reality for Uzbek media since Wikileaks itself, based on American diplomatic cables, called Karimov an “authoritarian leader” and linked his regime with the Uzbek mafia.

Secondly, while condemning the Rahmons social status and its control over main businesses in Tajikistan, the author forgets about one very important detail: Gulnara and Lola Karimov are very much in charge of sharing the same control over businesses in Uzbekistan, which was also rightfully revealed by American diplomats’ cables that were published by Wikileaks. One of the examples is Gulnara’s control over back then one of the most influential and powerful companies, Zeromax.

One by one, with peculiar sarcasm the author ‘discloses’ the facts that “Princess Tahmina,” Rahmon’s daughter, controls companies that are in charge of agricultural equipment import, as well as has her share in construction business.

“All these operations let her renew her motorpool more often than her lingerie collection,” an Uzbek journalist says, with not-well-hidden jealousy.

Here is a perfect moment to recall Gulnara Karimova’s ninth-richest status in the list of the wealthiest individuals of Switzerland.

Tajik No 2 — Rustam Rahmon, President’s son is Macho, President of the Tajik Football Federation and a member of the Asian Olympic Committee. He loves spending his time in brothels and casino’s affected by drugs. To the Uzbek journalist it is absurd to have a President’s child be so irresponsible and public at the same time — Gulnora should speak, right?

Shamsullo Gulov emphasizes that this situation happens in a country that has a 2.7 billion external debt and where 63% of the population (75% in reality, the author claims) is living below the poverty line with an average salary of $100. Probably Mr. Gulov forgot about the 5 billion external debt of Uzbekistan, and the $70-120 salary for average Uzbeks.

The author resumes his ‘masterpiece’ with a claim that while 1.5 million Tajik migrant workers work abroad to keep the population alive, their leader and his family live a posh life. By the way, the statistics are taken from Freedom House, another organization that was kicked out of Uzbekistan after the tragic events in Andijan, and whose reports on Uzbekistan are very critical of the human rights situation and, thus, are always very negatively commented on by the dictatorship regime.

To mention, according to official statistics from Russia’s Interfax Financial Market edition, among 10 million foreigners who migrated to Russia since January 2011, citizens of Uzbekistan make up to 14% of them (1.4 million).

To this I have nothing else to add but: “Why do you look at the speck that is in your brother’s eye, but do not notice the log that is in your own eye?” Actually, Karimov and Rahmon are not ‘brothers’ anymore. Not in this Presidential life.

Below: “Apple Does Not Fall Far From The Tree” by Tashkentskaya Pravda, January 18, 2012.

To remind, the bill that bans minors from attending religious places of worship, was initiated by the President in December, 2010. It become effective right after it had been published by state media.

Article 8, one of the most contradictory points of the bill, lists parents’ responsibilities, who:

“must not allow children’s particiption in religious organizations’ activities, excluding children officially studying in religious establishments.”

I talked to a few Tajik friends of mine. Here are their opinions:

Mahmud

“I personally haven’t seen or heard about detains of the underage in mosques by either mullas or law-enforcement bodies’ representatives. As far as I know Organization of Islamic Cooperation expressed their concerns regarding this particular Article 8 of the law.

I agree with some experts that the law goes against international human rights idea and concept. Prohibiting something for minors does not mean fixing a greater problem. Authorities better keep their enthusiasm to solve real problems instead.”

Sokhbat

“I’ve been watching minors coming to our mosques for three weeks and haven’t noticed that the number decreased. Especially during religous holiday of Eid ul-Fitr, which was after the adoption of the law.

I think that this law has been adopted in order to use it against Islamic Revival Prty of Tajikistan. Authorities do not want them to get more followers, especially out of the younger generation. They want to control the situation and make sure that religion is not going out of a worship place.

There are still law-enforcement agents in plain clothing in mosque crowds. Outside of mosques there are always police officers in their uniforms. Crowds always scare power-holders.”

As neweurasia reported in August, new law brought to negative reactions toward Tajikistan.

Khoji Akbar Turajonzoda, moderate religious leader and politician, former MP, said:

“Nowadays Muslims [of Tajikistan] are put against the choice, and they should indicate if they obey God’s will or this law that is against God and Islam.”

At the same time, Mavlono Said Jaloliddin Umari, Chairman of the Islamic Society of India, condemned the bill, and called it an “unjust, illogical and anti-religious” document.

“Tajikistan had already witnessed circumstances of the anti-religious policy of Soviet Union. Despite, the government of Tajikistan has gone against the will of its people by passing the bill [...] that alienates children from mosques and religion.”

International organizations, including human rights-oriented ones, expressed their concernes about a ban on mosque attendance among young people. Organization of Islamic Conference has put the matter before the Tajik authorities and is waiting for clarification.

One of the most influential spiritual leaders of Iran, Ayatollah Luftullo Sophie Gulpoygoni condemned the adoption of the law, and demanded that the Tajik authorities to officially apologize to the Muslims of his country and the world.

Religious figure also condemned the actions of the Tajik authorities, which do not allow women wearing the hijab to school in high schools, and promote their citizens not to give their children Islamic names, in particular, the prophets.

“[...]the actions of the Tajik authorities are aimed at destroying the Islamic identity of one Islamic nation.”

“I found these paintings, rolled up under the beds of old widows, buried in family trash.
These were forbidden works by artists who stayed true to their vision, at a terrible cost.”
– “The Desert of Forbidden Art”

A piece of documentary art, about forbidden art, has come to Central Asia – again.

The 80-minute long documentary of Amanda Pope and Tchavdar Georgiev (writers, producers and directors), “The Desert of Forbidden Art”, was screened on Friday December 9th, 2011 at 6:00 p.m. at the BACTRIA Cultural Center (ak. Rajabovih 15 Street) in Tajikistan’s capital city Dusanbe.

“The Desert of Forbidden Art”, a documentary that “takes us on a dramatic journey of sacrifice for the sake of creative freedom”, narrates how Russian artist Igor Savitsky– the virtuoso man of paint, archeology and collection, particularly of avant-garde art – rescued the forbidden work of fellow artists. Savitsky founded the State Art Museum of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, an art museum based in Nukus, Uzbekistan (capital city of the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, in northwest Uzbekistan). The museum opened in 1966 and hosts 82,000 items – comprising the world’s second largest Russian avant-garde collection (after the Russian Museum in St. Petersburg).

In their invitation to the Tajik screening event, Silk Road Media explaines the documentary to be:

“…about a museum in the parched hinterland of Central Asia that contained the world’s largest collection of Russian avant-garde art during the time of the Soviet Union.”

Silk Road Media continues:

“The idea of the film is to show the story of how a person’s life turned out to be the preservation of a whole epoch of art, which would otherwise have been lost for evermore because of Soviet repression.”

Karakalpak Museum of Arts: Home of the Savitsky Collection explains the “Forbidden” nature of the museum’s art:

“…the Museum’s collection of Russian avant garde is the only one that was initially condemned officially by the Soviet Union and, at the same time, financed partly by it, albeit unwittingly. Evidently, Nukus’ status as a ‘closed’ city and, especially, Savitsky’s good relations with the Karakalpak regional authorities enabled this to happen.”

This December 2011 Tajik screening of “The Desert of Forbidden Art” is not the first time for the documentary to be seen in the region. On November 18th, 2011 the film came to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan’s University of Central Asia (138 Toktogul Street). The university shares a synopsis of the film:

“The incredible story of how a treasure trove of banned Soviet art worth millions of dollars is stashed in a far-off desert in Uzbekistan that develops into a larger exploration of how art survives in times of oppression…”

In August 2010, EurasiaNet.org reported on the documentary hitting the silver screen – making mention of how Savitsky challenged authority and refused to let censored art lay in shadows, hidden from the world:

“Thanks to Nukus’ remoteness from Moscow politics and local officials’ ignorance of art, Savitsky collected some 40,000 paintings by Soviet artists banned for ideological reasons, artists who refused to paint propaganda in a social realist style.”

First screened in 2010, “The Desert of Forbidden Art” received various awards, and media publicity via Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Variety, Le Figaro, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and more.

In covering the story of this museum, The New York Times journalist Stephen Kinzer said in the documentary’s trailer:

“It didn’t take me more than a few minutes of walking around this museum for my jaw to drop. I realized that this was going to be an exciting story – there were going to be a lot of people chocking on their English muffins over breakfast on Sunday when they read this one.”

And, indeed, Kinzer’s predictions of this brilliant museum and these resilient pieces leaving an exciting impression – were right.

Here’s what some prominent publications have to say about the documentary “The Desert of Forbidden Art” - a work of art, that’s prominently about once-censored works of art:

“A must see…” – San Francisco Weekly

“…enlightening film.” – Chicago Sun-Times

“Reveals one of the greatest secrets of modern art. A gem.” – The Vancouver Sun

“A dramatic examination of the power of art against forces of repressive tyranny.” – Film Threat

Last week I gave a lecture at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven on whether or not an “Arab Spring”-style revolution could happen in Eurasia and more specifically in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. My answer was: probably not in the immediate term (say, before five to seven years from now) and not as part of a “chain reaction” from the current Arab Spring. In the long term, some of the regimes will bite the dust, however. The reason for the both likelihoods is actually the same: a combination of youth bulge, social mobility and delayed/stunted social change, modern ICT penetration, and rigidifying first-family regimes. These factors are creating the conditions that keep a revolt at bay for now but could also eventually make an explosion or a coup of some sort inevitable.

A key element of my presentation concerned comparing/contrasting the Arab and Eurasian states. Ultimately, if one lesson from the Arab Spring (and Kyrgyzstan) applies to Eurasia, then it is this: that things at some point can go unexpectedly fast, and that internal dynamics, both within the regimes and within the wider society, are much more important than whatever geopolitical designs or “Great Game powers’ desire for stability” can actually control.

I think the lecture was received well. There were some good questions, particularly from one Russian student who seemed to know Tajikistan’s dynamics fairly well. Another student came up with the somewhat bizarre question regarding the extent to which the Arab Spring was part of a strategy to eliminate regimes that might side with Iran in case of an attack. That seems too far-fetched and highly improbable to me.

Schwartz was on hand to add some pros and cons, as well as to expand the frame of the discussion to the other Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Turkmenistan, as always, remains the mystery country although under the surface, more could be going there on than meets the eye). He invited me to make my presentation available via NewEurasia because I’ve got original and recent data regarding demographics, labor and telecommunications, defense spending, and a point-by-point comparison/contrast between the Arab and Central Asian regimes.

Click here to download it: English PDF

Corruption in Post-Soviet Central Asia is something very familiar to people living in the region. Without bribing, one is destined to see their case be delayed for a long time, very often beyond time limits defined by laws.

Be it application for a new passport, or registration at a new place of living, or even finding a day care for your kid — bribing is the easiest way to get it all done faster and without a hassle.

Transparency International (TI) has released its annual Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 (CPI) that ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. According to TI, it is a composite index, a combination of polls, drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The CPI reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working in the countries/territories evaluated.

This year Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have proved that they can also have stablility in something — if not positive and progressive, then at least something not really desirable by leaders of developed countries. That something is the abuse of public power.

These two countries are the ousiders of the index, sharing almost the same position with Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, North Korea and Somalia. Basically, President Karimov and President Bardimuhammedov totally failed to show progress in their declarative measures to fight corruption in their countries. Being in the same group of countries, or even worse than some of them, is the best indicator of how promises of a happy life and sustainable development by those two dictators are nothing more than just a lie.

It should be mentioned that both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are getting worse year after year:

The best position out of all five Central Asian republics belongs to Kazakhstan, which is closer to the highest point (on a scale of 0-10), and somewhere inbetween of Iran and Mongolia. Tajikistan is ranked the 152th; Kyrgyzstan is between Guinea and Yemen (164th).

Leaders of the index are New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and
Singapore with 9.5, 9.4, 9.4, 9.3 and 9.2 respectively.

By the way, CPI is also used by travellers to help them make a right choice. Thus, republics’ efforts to increase the number of tourists are in serious jeopardy.

Read impressions of travellers by TravelPod:

For crowdywendy‘s trip to Uzbekistan follow here.

For ricka‘s story on her voyage from Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan to Baku, Azerbaijan’s capital.

For markwilliams84‘s corruption story on Kazakhstan follow here.

For crowdywendy‘s corruption story on Kyrgyzstan follow here.

For jtroussier‘s corruption story on Tajikistan follow here.

ABOUT CPI:

A country/territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption there on a scale of 0 – 10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean.

The data sources used to compile the index include questions relating to the abuse of public power and focus on: bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and on questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in the public sector. As such, it covers both the administrative and political aspects of corruption. In producing the index, the scores of countries/territories for the specific corruption-related questions in the data sources are combined to calculate a single score for each country.

A lengthy row between Russia and Tajikistan over the imprisonment of a Russian pilot, Vladimir Sadovnichy, has finally come to an end with the pilot’s release on Nov 24. Yet, and in spite of various officials claims that there was nothing political about the whole episode, there are many reasons to believe that political considerations, or geopolitical considerations to be more precise, were behind the Russian government’s so called “asymmetric response”; that is, mass deportation of Tajik nationals on the bases of legal and public safety concerns.

Tajikistan is a small country located in “the geophysical center of the Asian landmass”. Bordered to the south by Afghanistan, to the east by China, and to the west and north by Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan, Tajikistan lies at the interstices of several cultures, languages, religions, and zones of commerce. At the first glance, it ought to be confessed, it is difficult to understand the geopolitical importance of Tajikistan to Russia since they neither share a common border nor a similar culture. In fact, Tajikistan is culturally far removed from Russia. The predominant native language there is Tajik, a variant of Farsi, and it has more cultural ties to the Middle East and West Asia than to Russia. In addition, Tajikistan is of no significant commercial value to Russia. The country has virtually no oil or gas production. It is rich in metal mineral resources and has a vast hydroelectric potential, but mineral resources are plentiful in Russia and Tajikistan’s hydroelectric energy is “too far away to transport cost-effectively”. Lastly, Tajikistan’s largest commodity export, aluminum, “competes with Russian domestic enterprises” rather than offering “complementary” commercial possibilities.

So what are the ties that actually bind Russia and Tajikistan? Read further here.

Photograph of the two Russian pilots in question provided by a friend (CC-usage).

Editor’s note: Two Russian pilots have been incarcerated in Tajikistan, prompting a huge backlash from Russia’s political class, and all but drowning out Tajik views on the matter. Alpharabius gives his two somoni, including a little research about the pilots’ mysterious employers.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is demanding an “explanation” from the Tajik government over the imprisonment of two Russian pilots in Tajikistan on the charges of smuggling, illegal border crossing, and violation of international aviation regulations by the provincial court of the Khatlon region of southern Tajikistan, which borders Afghanistan. In a televised meeting with Russian bloggers on November 8th, Medvedev remarked:

“The decision on this case raises many questions not only about the nature of the crime committed, but also the process that took place… Yesterday itself, I instructed all government agencies — the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, law enforcement agencies — to engage in this. They need to contact their respective counterparts in Tajikistan… We will wait for an official response from the authorities of the country, with whom we have alliances, and only then make a decision. But, these solutions, depending on the response, could be symmetrical or asymmetrical.”

Russia’s Foreign Ministry also called the decision “extremely severe” as well as “politically motivated”, and warned that the ruling could have a negative impact on relations between Moscow and Dushanbe.

These remarks out of the Russian executive branch echo sentiments made by Russian politicians and media after the verdict of the Tajik court. The Russian parliament’s upper house speaker, Valentina Matviyenko, remarked,

“We did not find any legal evidence of the pilots’ fault; the guilty verdict is based on speculations and ungrounded suggestions.”

She also did not discount sanctions against Tajikistan, noting,

“If our voice is not heard, Russia reserves the right to take appropriate measures.”

While speaking to journalists in St. Petersburg, Matviyenko emphasized that “everyone” in Russia was outraged over the Tajik court’s ruling. I must say, my impression is that this isn’t far from the truth: from the extreme right to the extreme left, virtually the entire political spectrum of Russia has responded passionately:

- Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the chairman of Liberal Democratic Party as well as the vice-speaker of the parliament, has called for severe retribution for Tajikistan.

- The head of Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of Russia, Valeri Shyankin, has demanded an immediate, i.e., “from tomorrow on”, introduction of a visa regime between Tajikistan and Russia.

- Dmitry Rogozin, another Russian politician, paralleled this incident to the recent conviction of Viktor Bout, the international arms dealer, in the United States, but — in what I feel is a rather telling remark — pointed out that Russia can do absolutely nothing against Washington, a superpower. Does tiny and poor Tajikistan stand a chance in humiliating Russia? Not a bit, and so he’s called for vengeance. Wow.

The Verdict

Ok, wait a second, let’s review the situation: two pilots — Vladimir Sadovnichy, a Russian citizen, and Aleksei Rudenko, an ethnic Russian fromEstonia, were arrested after landing two An-72 cargo planes at the Qurghonteppa airport while en route to Russia from Afghanistan in March. The Tajik authorities claim that they had not given any clearance to land, but the pilots maintain that they wanted to avert a crash-landing and urgently needed to refuel. Still, the landing was unscheduled and the pilots refused to reveal to the Tajik authorities their intended destination in Russia, which made them seem suspicious.

A spare engine was found on one of the planes, which led to the pilots being accused of smuggling. Documents surfaced that indicated the aircraft were the property of a company named Rolkan Investments Ltd., registered in an offshore zone of the Virgin Islands but whose owner remained unknown. It also emerged that they had been initially registered in Georgia, but in 2008 Tblisi had not only recalled their registration but also rejected their re-registration. Consequently, the Tajik authorities decided to confiscate the planes on the grounds that they were not legal in any country. The Russian Embassy in Dushanbe actually accepted this decision, in my impression, probably expecting the release of the pilots.

Who are Rolkan Investments, Ltd.?

Now, here’s something interesting: I decided to do a simple Google query for “Rolkan Investments” and discovered the URL http://www.kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/view_preview.php?link=26376106522884785990947&words=, ruling by one Judge Fred Ochieng, for a 2006 lawsuit in Kenya, Astral Aviation Limited vs. Rolkan Investments Ltd.:

The conflict between the two companies also involved an An-72, apparently some kind of bungled lease agreement between them; Ochieng ruled in favor of Rolkan, since Astral could not seem to produce the agreement in print. There may be some more tidbits about Rolkan floating around the Internet…

Let’s play “Guess The Geopolitcal Motivation”!

Is the Tajik court acting purely out of a sense of law and order here or not? Some experts, like Alexei Grozin of the CIS Institute in Moscow who has written in EurasiaNet, are of the opinion that perhaps the pilots are being used by Dushanbe as hostages to bargain with the Kremlin.

Grozin believes that the trial is directly related to the extension of the military agreement between the countries on prolonging the Russian military presence in Tajikistan for another 49 years via the accord that is to be signed next year (which I first blogged about, yikes, over a year ago).

The 49-year extension was declared by Medvedev during his visit to Tajikistan in September, about which Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has not made any mention ever since. At the press conference, it was clear on his face that he was certainly not happy about the statement. Indeed, the Tajik media has taken an extremely negatively view to the idea that Tajikistan will allow Russian troops to stay in the country for another half a century, tainting its independence.

Also consider: while the unscheduled landing of the two cargo planes in the Tajik territory looks nothing less than suspicious, a few years ago, it was normal for Russian aircraft to enter and exit the Tajik space without any prior scheduling. Moreover, Russia has been planning to position its military planes at the Ayni base, recently reconstructed and renovated by India, joining its military bases in Dushanbe, Qurghonteppa and Kulob.

It would, of course, be really valuable to know where these two planes were heading, especially since they must have known they would need to land in Tajikistan — after all, it’s very difficult to get to Russia from Afghanistan without refuelling along the way. If the pilots were telling the truth that they would have crashed, then I wonder whether Uzbekistan was their original refuelling location. If so, it would be prudent to note that Tajikistan is now very envious of the currently warming Russo-Uzbek relationship.

Here’s another view: exiled Tajik opposition leader Dodojon Atovulloev suggests in recent piece in Izvestia that the son of Tajikistan’s railroad minister, Amonullo Hukumov, a relative and close friend of Rahmon, was arrested and sentenced to prison in Moscow for alleged drug smuggling. Atovulloev believes that the pilots will be quietly exchanged for the “friend’s son”. That could be a bit of a stretch, since the pilots are otherwise nobodies — unless wherever they were going would prove to be political explosive.

Overall, the “pilots’ scandal” is occurring during a remarkable time: Russia is about to have its parliamentary elections and every party and candidate will use this case as to enhance their nationalistic credentials. Tajiks are also very nervous about our country’s future relations with Russia — keep in mind that there are approximately two million of our sons working up there, who are increasingly the subject of xenophobic violence, as last night’s episode on The Stream discussed.

Meanwhile, Russia’s support of Uzbekistan in the ongoing Roghun debacle, its unwillingness to help our economy, or even pay rent for the military bases, all bodes ill for our two countries’ relationships. I was especially shocked when the Russian Ambassador recently complained that there is a planned anti-Russia campaign going on in Tajikistan, apparently at the bidding of Washington which, if Rogozin is to be believed, is encouraging Central Asian countries “to spit at Russia’s face”.