Energy politics is gradually becoming a major element of Central Asian politics. With Tajikistan seeking to become a leading power exporter, energy politics can cause tensions with Uzbekistan.

Central Asia’s Water Disputes

While Central Asia’s oil and gas reserves have not attracted international attention until recently, the region’s abundant water resources have been an important resource – and often a source of conflict– in this arid area throughout its history.

More than 90 percent of the region’s water resources are concentrated in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. These upstream states control the heads of Central Asia’s major rivers. However, most of the region’s water is consumed by the downstream countries of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with the latter consuming more than half of it.

Poorly endowed with oil and gas and facing energy deficit, the two upstream states have always sought recognition of water as a commodity that should be bartered against their neighbors’ coal and gas. But Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan maintain that water flows across boundaries and is thus a shared rather than private good.

In the 1990s, water-related disputes pervaded relations in the region. The source of tension was the downstream states’ growing consumption of water, while the upstream states sought to withhold water in warmer months to generate much of their power needs in autumn and winter. Despite Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s repeated calls to work out a comprehensive water use mechanism involving adequate compensation for the upstream states’ energy losses, their neighbors in the region opted for preserving the status quo.

Solution for Tajikistan

After failing to make Uzbekistan either compensate for seasonal energy losses or barter water for power, Tajikistan decided to go unilateral and revitalize Soviet hydropower projects.

Tajikistan’s rivers possess enormous energy resources. Home to over a half of the Central Asia’ total hydropower potential, Tajikistan still faces acute shortage of electricity and has to cover the shortfall with energy imports from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

Tajik government’s new strategy aims to make Tajikistan a major exporter of hydropower by finishing the stalled Soviet power projects and building newer ones. Over the last several years, Tajikistan has managed to attract foreign investors to its energy sector. In 2004, RUSAL, Russia’s world-class aluminium producer signed a deal under which it will finish the Rogun power station on the Vakhsh River. Later that year, Russia’s company United Energy Systems started constructing Sangtuda-1, while Iran started construction of Sangtuda-2 power station, both downstream the Vakhsh River.

Following the start-off of the ambitious projects, China, Japan, United States, some European states and Kazakhstan expressed their interest in investing in Tajikistan’s energy sector. Several smaller-size power stations are now constructed throughout Tajikistan.

Bringing the power stations currently under construction into operation will allow Tajikistan meeting the domestic demands and exporting the excess electricity to neighboring markets. In February 2006, Tajikistan, Iran and Afghanistan signed a deal under which they will build a power line from Rogun and other power stations on the Vakhsh River to Afghanistan. Iran, Pakistan, India and eventually China are also expected to consume Tajik electricity in the future.

Construction of all projected hydropower plants, as well as economic benefits of exporting the surplus energy and expanding energy-consuming aluminium production – the main source of Tajikistan’s revenues so far – present a unique chance for impoverished Tajikistan to solve its energy and economic problems at a stroke.

Impact on Tajik-Uzbek Relations

Tajikistan’s ambitious energy plans have immediately caused serious tensions with its water-starved neighbor. Uzbek government is equally displeased with the prospects of altered status quo in the region’s water politics and emergence of a stronger in both economic and strategic sense Tajikistan.

Tajikistan’s power projects aim not only to make the country a leading energy exporter, but also to secure a greater say for it in Central Asia’s politics. When finished, Rogun, Sangtuda-1 and Sangtuda-2 power stations, together with the currently operating giant Nurek, Baipaza and several smaller size projected power stations – all on the Vakhsh River – will allow for long-term control and manipulation of the flow of the Vakhsh. This river is a major tributary of the Amu Darya, one of the two great rivers providing Uzbekistan with water.

Currently Tajikistan is seeking to attract investors to an even larger project, the Dashtijum hydropower station on the Panj River – another tributary of the Amu Darya – and refurbish the Kayrakkum power station on the Syr Darya, the second major river flowing to Uzbekistan.

Together with the projected several smaller-size power stations on the Zerafshan – another river flowing into Uzbekistan – these projects produce a nightmare for Tashkent.

With a key to Uzbekistan’s water supply, Tajikistan will gain a significant leverage over the Uzbek economic and domestic affairs. This is something that neither Uzbekistan’s national security agenda, nor Islam Karimov’s authoritarian mentality can tolerate.

Development of energy sector will also have an enormous positive impact on Tajikistan’s economy. The sector will create many jobs and provide cheap electricity for the domestic industries. The country will no longer need to import power from neighbor states and will secure a stable flow of revenues from exporting the surplus power to other markets. Cheap hydropower and increasing revenues will allow expanding aluminium and cement production. As part of its two billion US dollar investment package, RUSAL plans to open new production units at Tajikistan’s huge Tursunzade aluminium plant, modernize the plant and build a new plant at Shaartuz in southern Tajikistan. Add to this Tajikistan’s intentions to use the reservoirs created by Tajikistan’s dams to irrigate vast areas of land, and the economic benefits to Tajikistan are obvious.

Having an economically strong nation on its borders is another thing Uzbekistan hates to allow and tries to prevent. It was not until RUSAL announced its plans to modernize the Tursunzade plant and build a new one that Uzbekistan – not previously noted as an advocate of environment – launched a massive media campaign accusing Tajik aluminium industry of causing damage to the region’s environment.

Moreover, Tajikistan’s expected economic boom is perceived as humiliation by president Islam Karimov, known to have tense personal relationships with president Emomali Rakhmonov.

Dushanbe’s hydropower plans have thus created potentially volatile water security environment in the region. Aware of Uzbekistan’s sensitivity towards even minor curbs of trans-boundary rivers, experts suggest that water in Tajik-Uzbek relations has been elevated from a political dispute to a potential cause of conflict.

It is certain that Tashkent will now take steps to hinder implementation of Tajikistan’s projects or at least seriously curb their benefits.

These steps have already been taken with generally deteriorating Tajik-Uzbek relations and a growing flow of accusations and counter-accusations serving as the background.

Many experts and observers suggest that Tajikistan’s ongoing disagreement with RUSAL over the height and type of Rogun dam has been caused by Tashkent’s interference. In particular, RUSAL suggested building a 280-meter-high dam instead of the projected 335-meter-high one immediately after its head Oleg Deripaska’s meeting with Islam Karimov, following Tashkent’s geopolitical shift towards closer relations with Russia.

Other measures will certainly follow. However, Tashkent will not use threat of force against Tajikistan, as it did in the 1990s. Russia, China, United States and other external powers interested in the stable development of the broader region will not allow it doing so. Moreover, aggravating tensions will only add to Tajikistan’s firm resolve to secure strategic advantages over its unfriendly neighbor.

In this situation Tashkent will have to admit that the only rational avenue for it to follow is cooperation and compromise in managing and sharing the region’s transnational water resources. This approach will be more than welcomed by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, advocates for collective water management, and Kazakhstan, determined to foster closer cooperation in the region.

The fundamental issue of water – once a major source of tension in Tajik-Uzbek relations – can thus lead to an open region-wide dialogue, capable of managing other deep-seated political differences. A mechanism for such dialogue can be found in a durable but unsuccessful so far idea of Central Asia’s Water and Energy Consortium.

You can see the larger image here.

Here is how Rahmon discribes the water in Dushanbe, which comes out of the faucet.

The water in the capital of Tajikistan which comes to the apartments from the Varzob water reservoir looks more like a coffee with milk mixed with sand and microorganisms. The reason is that the water supply system is still not fixed. The spent millions of dollars did not help. Even this muddy water comes only in the morning and in the evening for a couple of hours.

On the Russian-language Tajik blog Rahmon reported on HIV/AIDS problem in Tajikistan. He says that previously the organizations that were dealing with this problem did not show the true picture but to his surprise recently, when he was collecting an information for his article in one of the local journals these organization were very open and shared some interesting statistics with him.

He says that there are a lot of organizations that work in this sphere and they try to make aware the population about the dangers of HIV/AIDS but he thinks that it is not enough. There is a law which protects the rights of the infected people but they are still discriminated by the society in which they live because all the laws and edicts which exist do not work properly, the mechanisms of enforcement are weak.

According to the data provided by Open Society Institute and the official statistics provided by the Ministry of Health in September 2006, the total number of registered HIV-positives constituted 544 people, 115 of them are in places of detention. It is the official data but in reality the number of the HIV-positives much bigger, because not all of them want to show their status.

The most vulnerable part of the population are prisoners, commercial sex workers, labour migrants and drug-addicts. The last category of people are the most vulnerable because they use the single use syringes several times and share with other drug-addicts. They also infect their close relatives and friends, wives and girlfriends.

Rahmon also says that the labor migrants are considered to be in the group of high risk. They don’t even realize that they have a great risk to be infected. In one of the famous NGOs in Dushanbe which work in the sphere of HIV/AIDS, Rahmon was told a story about one labor migrant who when to Russia to earn money for his wedding. He came back from Russia as an HIV-positive and after the wedding he found out that both he and his 16 year old wife are infected. Fortunately they got some antiretroviral therapy and now they have a healthy child.

Recently I read an article about the labor migrants where I found a horrible statistics.

2% Out of 600 thousand Tajik citizens who officially went abroad as labor migrants are HIV-positive, reports the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The result of survey conducted by IOM show that 22 out of 1,000 labor migrants from Tajikistan are HIV positive.

It is only the official data and the survey considered only those who officially went abroad! As you know most of the migrants go abroad illegally.

Speaking to journalists yesterday, prosecutor general Bobojon Bobokhonov said corruption has permeated all levels of the executive power in Tajikistan.

“I do not want to accuse anyone particular of corruption,” he said. “But corruption has permeated the entire government, all government ministries and agencies”.

Prosecutor general suggested that law-enforcement agencies are among the most corrupt bodies of executive power in the country.

Bobojon Bobokhonov’s statement comes amid the government’s vigorous efforts to address endemic corruption in the country. In his first appearance after being nominated for the next term, incumbent president Emomali Rakhmonov announced that the war of corruption would be the main focus of his third term in office.

In early October, Tajik Parliament ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Although seen by many as a major new tool in the fight against corruption, the convention does not envisage any follow-up monitoring programme. Therefore, Tajikistan’s ratification of the document might be nothing more than just another expression of intentions.

International corruption watchdogs say Tajikistan is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Transparency International’s most recent Corruption Perception Index ranked Tajikistan as the 5th most corrupt nation out of the 159 surveyed.

Corruption, which has widely permeated the public and private sectors, has a range of negative effects on Tajikistan’s development. Corruption inhibits economic growth, aggravates poverty, and undermines the rule of law and the effectiveness of international assistance.

Many analysts suggest that corruption also furthers the gap between the very rich and the very poor. The growing social disparity makes the impoverished Tajikistan prone to social unrest.

Not only does corruption lead the country into greater poverty and desperation, but it also makes Tajikistan one of the least attractive countries in the world for investors. An official in the Asian Development Bank, speaking on conditions of anonymity, said corruption blocks international donors’ efforts in Tajikistan and produces a “nightmare” for foreign investors.

“Those who had risked investing in Tajikistan saw their money pocketed by ministries and agencies. I am afraid they will never come back to Tajikistan,” he said.

Feeling constant pressure from donors and international organizations, Tajik government has promised to take tough measures to combat corruption. Unable to effectively fight the causes of the phenomenon, the government has focused on fighting corrupt individuals and agencies.

In April 2006, Emomali Rakhmonov publicly accused government ministries of turning into “mafia clans” and threatened to confiscate what he called their “illegal property”. He also demanded that all civil servants declare their income to the tax authorities of the country.

However, “tough measures” were applied only to several employees of the education and health sectors, who had been found guilty of taking bribes.

These measures have caused the widespread doubt about their effectiveness, while experts and analysts argued that anti-corruption efforts should aim at a different direction.

“Corruption is deeply rooted in the administration and organization of power in the centre and the regions,” says Junaid Ibodov, legal analyst. “Leave alone the teachers. Judiciary and law-enforcement agencies should be targeted first as the most corrupt bodies”.

Uncovering of corruption is split between a number of law enforcement agencies, with often overlapping jurisdictions and limited inter-agency co-operation. To ensure better coordination between the various agencies, a special anti-corruption department was recently established within the prosecutor general’s office. However, the measure will have little effect as long as the prosecutor general’s office remains one of the most corrupt agencies in Tajikistan.

An official in the United Nations Coordination Unit in Tajikistan, who requested anonymity, said, “They have put the prosecutor general’s office on top of the entire network of anti-corruption agencies. It is similar to charging a fox with guarding a henhouse”.

The yesterday’s statement by prosecutor general indicates that the government at least recognizes that agencies charged with fighting corruption are also corrupt.

Tajikistan’s Ministry of Communications lifted the ban on several websites blocked in early October “in the interests of information security”.

Speaking to the radio “Ozodi” on October 11, Davron Olimov, an official in the information regulation agency, said the Ministry of Communications had to revise its decision because it had drawn many complaints.

“The Ministry of Communications received many complaints from non-governmental organizations and international organizations,” Davron Olimov said. “Minister then summoned our director and then they reopened several websites”.

Immediately after the official announcement, all ISPs in Tajikistan unblocked three websites, www.centrasia.ru, www.arianastorm.ru and www.ferghana.ru. The two remaining websites –
www.charogiruz.ru and www.tajikistantimes.ru – run by well-known dissident Dodojon Atovulloev, have not yet been unblocked.

The five Russian-language websites were blocked in early October. Ministry of Communications demanded that Tajikistan’s 12 Internet service Providers (ISPs) “filter and block access to websites on the Internet that aim to undermine the state’s policies in the sphere of information”.

Many observers and political experts quickly viewed the move in the context of the upcoming presidential ballot. They argued that the government was shutting down alternative sources of information ahead of the election. Their arguments were further supported by the government’s demand that the printing of the Adolat, official newspaper of the Democratic Party, be suspended.

Pressure exerted by both local and international organizations made the authorities reverse their decision. The move was also prompted by the arrival of international observers to monitor the upcoming ballot. OSCE’s Organization for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed its observation mission in Tajikistan last week. Aware of the initial reaction to the cutoff on the part of international watchdogs, Tajik authorities decided to unblock access to “harmful” websites, at least until the end of the election process.

By reversing their decision, Tajik authorities sent an important message to the international community. In particular, they reconfirmed that the incumbent Emomali Rakhmonov is determined to be re-elected for another term through the procedure of free and fair election with its legitimacy unquestioned by international observers. Besides, the reversal showed the authorities’ resolve to avoid confrontation with the international community when possible.

Tajik Government has finally understood that strict censorship of print media and total control over television and radio outlets is not enough to completely stifle the freedom of speech in the country. Last week, the Communications Ministry launched an unexpected attack against a number of Web sites, the last bastions of freedom of speech for Tajik independent journalists and readers.

Tajikistan’s information regulation agency, a part of the Communications Ministry, sent a letter to Tajik Internet Service Providers (ISPs) demanding that they “filter and block access to websites on the Internet that aim to undermine the state’s policies in the sphere of information”. As the letter suggests, this decision has been taken “in compliance with the national concept of information security developed in year 2003” (Biznes i Politika, Page 3, October 5).

The letter did not specify which Web sites the Ministry wanted to block. Deutsche Welle has quoted Maruf Muhammedov, head of the ISP Eastera as saying that they had been demanded to block access to www.charogiruz.ru, www.arianastorm.ru, www.ferghana.ru, www.tajikistantimes.ru и www.centrasia.org. These Web sites are known for their frequent criticism of Emomali Rakhmonov and his policies.

On Saturday, October 7, the users of major ISPs in Tajikistan, including Telecom Technology and Eastera, could not open the mentioned websites, while Babilon users continued to browse the sites even on Monday.

Internet censorship is not a new phenomenon, especially in countries with authoritarian regimes. Analysts have observed an inverse correlation between the level of Internet development in a given country and the degree of control the government of that country tries to exert over society. However, most governments usually deny their attempts to censor Internet. The Tajik Government’s open demand that ISPs block Web sites “harmful to state security” is thus especially worrying.

Freedom of media watchdogs and human rights groups have accused Rakhmonov of stifling media freedom ahead of the presidential election. Earlier this year, Tajikistan banned BBC’s broadcasting for alleged violation of legislation on foreign mass media. Last week, the Ministry of Culture suspended printing of Adolat (Justice) newspaper by the Democratic Party.

Nuriddin Karshibaev, head of the National Association of Independent Mass Media said, “We consider the blocking of Websites by the information regulation agency as an attempt to limit the Tajik citizens’ freedom of information. This step taken ahead of the presidential election will have a negative impact on Tajikistan’s international image”.

Independent Tajik journalist, who had frequently written for www.centrasia.ru, said on terms on anonymity,

Only about 3 percent of Tajikistan’s population has access to Internet. These are mostly intellectuals, who will not find it difficult to operate proxy programs. Once people have Internet access, they are often able to get around the blocking measures, although the blocking does make their access to information more difficult.

The Government’s decision to block the “harmful” Web sites will not thus seriously hinder access to them of independent journalists. However, the step itself is indicative of the Government’s resolve to exert total control over the Tajik society. It means that Emomali Rakhmonov’s announced determination to continue democratic developments in the country may remain only on paper.

Tajikistan has been a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) since February 1992. Membership to the organization was a great asset for the young Central Asian country struggling to stand the test of independence and preserve internal unity. On the other hand, OSCE’s close attention made the government at least care about its international commitments. In particular, it had to tolerate OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) observers during all presidential and parliamentary elections in the country.

These observers were usually not very supportive of Tajikistan’s approach to elections. Moreover, ODIHR reported that all elections in the country fell short of OSCE commitments and international elections standards.

With the upcoming presidential election scheduled for November 6, things can change. Tajikistan has a chance to run the election that will be appraised by the ODIHR as free and fair.

However, prior to the election, the report issued by ODIHR’s needs assessment mission suggested that little has hanged since the last election.

The report warns of the “increasing consolidation of power by President Emomali Rahmonov” and the People’s Democratic Party. The other seven parties registered in the country “appear to have limited capacities, and some are struggling with internal divisions”.

Analyzing legislative framework for the conduct of election, the report indicates that the election law still needs to be improved in order to satisfy OSCE commitments and other international election standards. “The legal framework does not establish an election administration that is pluralistic, inclusive, free from the control of government authorities, and genuinely independent,” report notes. Shortcomings in the law also allow local authorities to interfere in the election process.

Assessing the media situation in the country, the report observes that the state-controlled media, particularly television, does not provide access or coverage to opposition parties. Besides, the authorities tend to use the revocation of licenses and closure of printing houses “as a frequent tool to ensure self-censorship and lack of critical journalism”.

In addition, report suggests that the legislation does not allow domestic non-partisan individuals and organizations to observe the election.

These shortcomings will not necessarily hinder conduct of free and fair election. Political will is what ensures conducting very democratic and transparent elections in the most undemocratic conditions. The upcoming presidential election will thus confirm whether or not this political will on the part of the government of Emomali Rakhmonov exists.

Our poll is still open as of yet (English, на русском), but we will close it on the same day as the actual elections – November 6th. At the time of this posting the current president – Emomali Rakhmonov – was still had a clear plurality of the vote at 42%, with the next highest being the Islamic Renaissance Party and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan tied at 18%. Given that anyone with an internet connection can vote in this poll, and parties unwilling or unable to field candidates in the real election are viable options here, those numbers are a bit surprising.

The reality is a bit different than our poll. Here is an update and breakdown:

The Parties

Here is a shocking headline from the 23rd of September: “Rakhmonov nominated presidential candidate for November election.” So at least that silences the widespread speculation that someone else would be selected to head the People’s Democratic Party.

Currently, there will be five parties running beside Rakhmonov’s party (the People’s Democratic Party): the Agrarian Reform party, Economic Reform party, Socialists, Communist, and a splinter of the Democratic party.

The Socialists, Agrarian, Economic Reform parties were not options in ’s poll (although, to be fair, they probably should have been). Alexander Sadikov writes in an excellent post:

These parties have never had independent capacity. However, similarly to Uzbek parties, they claim to represent the interests of farmers and entrepreneurs. Neither opposition parties, nor political analysts have ever doubted governmental affiliation of the both parties.

So if on the off chance you would have voted for any of the three in our poll, just vote for Rakhmonov’s PDP party.

The Communist candidate is, like Rakhmonov, from Kulyob, and therefore unlikely to contest the presidency. Instead, the Communists are generally not seen as an opposition party, but instead as constituents rewarded for their loyalty with seats in parliament.

The situation with the “Vatan” breakaway arm of the Democratic party is a bit more complicated, but Alexander Sadikov has an excellent explanation of it in his post (also see IWPR). Basically, the Tajikistani government decided to register as head of that party someone friendly to the regime, effectively dividing and emasculating the party.

The leader of the rest of the Democratic party is in prison, and his supporters are boycotting the election entirely. The Social Democrats are taking a similar stance to the Democrats, both arguing that the election laws as established in 2004 are unconstitutional, and that a fair election is therefore impossible.

The only other viable opposition party is taking a less combative stance, but is still ultimately boycotting the election. If you recall, the beloved leader of the Islamic Renaissance party, Said Abdullo Nuri, passed away in August of this year. Into his place stepped Muhiddin Kabiri, a younger leader of a different mold, schooled at university instead of Islamic schools. Because of the difference between members of the IRP like Kabiri and older more traditional members, along with the fact that they elected not to field a candidate, there is speculation that this party might split as well.

RFE/RL has an interview where Kabiri discusses why his party chose not to field a candidate:

“First, Tajik society is not ready for a person with a spiritual background to become head of government — to be president,” Turajonzoda said. “Second, the region is not ready to have an Islamist become president [in Tajikistan, and will not be] in the near future. Third, in Europe and Western countries — Russia in particular — they wouldn’t allow or agree to [an Islamist head of state]. And ultimately, when a person, an Islamist, is trying to become head of state — or even run [as a candidate] in elections — this could aggravate the situation within the country. That’s in the interests of neither the people nor the state.”

This comes as an interesting change after this earlier RFE/RL article where the IRP came off as much more poised for a fight:

“A presidential election will take place this year, and as one of the country’s independent and powerful parties, we will field a candidate,” Husainzoda says. “It is still our party’s secret. But we will reveal our candidate before the election.”

Obviously, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir will not be running as they are not a registered party (or even legal for that matter). Nevertheless, the HuT manages to take up much of the government’s energies, and authorities are more convinced than ever of a connection with the terrorist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan group. According to a recent IWPR article, Tajik authorities are confident that they can prevent a violent HuT revolution.

The law enforcement agencies are focusing much of their attention on Hizb-ut-Tahrir, with frequent arrests of members, often for handing out leaflets rather than any intent to perpetrate violence.

“We can do anything. We can restore security at short notice,” said the force’s Captain Alexei Balashov.

For further detailed background on the elections, definitely check out Alexander Sadikov’s two earlier posts here and here.

The Election

According to the Central Election Committee, there will be a drastic increase of election observers – 12,000, up from 300 at the 1999 presidential poll. However, IWPR questions the quality of these observers, as only two “tame” NGOs will be allowed to monitor them – the Youth Union and the Federation of Independent Trade Unions.

These two groups are the successors of Soviet organisations, the Komsomol youth movement and the Trade Union Council, respectively. The Youth Union’s chairman is appointed by the Tajik head of state, and on September 24 the group reciprocated by nominating President Imomali Rahmonov as its favoured candidate in the election. The trade union federation is also expected to name Rahmonov as its favourite when it holds its congress on October 3.

250 of the observers will also come from the CIS, a group whose objectivity was questioned during the Kazakhstan elections.

Beyond these developments, there are wide ranging complaints of control of the media and electioneering on the party of Rakhmonov. Jamestown reports that fifteen different media organizations were denied legal registration.

Emomali Rakhmonov was born on 5 October, 1952, in Dangarinsky district of Tajikistan. In the early 1970-s the future President served as a marine in the Pacific Fleet of the Soviet Army. After that he worked as an electrician in a creamery, a seller, he was involved in trade union activities and occupied a position of a Secretary of the Communist Party Committee. In the early 1980-s he externally graduated from the Economy Faculty of the Tajik State University named after Lenin. In 1990 as a director of a collective farm Mr. Rakhmonov was elected as a deputy of the Superior Council of Tajikistan and later as its Chairman. Mr. Rakhmonov was twice elected President of Tajikistan – in 1994 and 1999. He is married and has nine children.

On September 29, Ministry of Justice registered Masud Sobirov as chairman of the Democratic Party (DPT), thus adding another page to the Tajik government’s record of marginalizing the opposition.

The story began in April 2006, when Masud Sobirov established “Vatan” (“Motherland”) faction within DPT. Although seen by the DPT mainstream as an illegitimate splinter, Masud Sobirov explained his efforts as an attempt to rebuild the party’s influence.

One of the oldest parties in the country, DPT has been in deep crisis since early 2005, when its leader and main sponsor Mahmadruzi Iskandarov was sentenced to 23 years in prison on various charges, including terrorism and embezzlement.

Since Iskandarov’s arrest, DPT’s aging leadership has concentrated its efforts on attempts to release him. Meanwhile, the party’s political influenced declined rapidly. During the February 2005 parliamentary election, DPT failed to make it past the 5 percent threshold needed for representation in the parliament. Growing dissatisfaction with the DPT’s low performance that emerged from inside was actively fueled by the government.

The consequent split within the party in April 2006 was thus to be expected. Unexpected though was the newborn faction’s focus on contesting the DPT mainstream.

On August 27, Sobirov’s wing held what they called an “extraordinary congress” of the party. Announced illegitimate by the DPT presidium and conflicting with the party’s constituent documents, the “congress” named Masud Sobirov the chairman of Democratic Party.

Decisions of the “congress”, with their legitimacy questioned by experts and lawyers, sparked intensive debate in Tajikistan. The shocked democrats were quieted by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), which announced that the only chairman of DPT recognized by the state was its jailed leader Mahmadruzi Iskandarov.

An official in the ministry was quoted as saying:

Current situation around the Democratic Party of Tajikistan is an internal problem of its members. Ministry of Justice is not in a position to resolve this problem (Asia Plus, September 1, 2006)

MoJ’s decision of September 29 to register Sobirov as the chairman therefore filled the mainstream democrats with indignation.

DPT Presidium accused the ministry of illegal interference in the party’s internal affairs. The party’s deputy chairman Rahmatullo Valiev suggested that the MoJ’s decision was prompted by DPT’s intention to boycott the upcoming presidential election:

Someone “on the top” did not like out decision to boycott the election. This “someone” decided to debar us from political struggle and make Masud Sobirov chairman of the Democratic Party.

Just a week before the controversial decision, DPT Presidium announced that they would not field a candidate in the upcoming election. They criticized the government for election manipulation and suggested that the upcoming ballot would be “illegitimate and unconstitutional”. Masud Sobirov, on the contrary, suggested that “his Democratic Party” would actively participate in the vote.

While some experts argue that MoJ’s verdict is a punishment for democrats’ unwillingness to take part in the election, this action was perhaps only modest part of Emomaly Rakhmonov’s wider strategy aimed at marginalizing opposition parties in the country.

President Rakhmonov, who has been consolidating his power since the end of the civil war, is very sensitive towards any attempt to ease his grip on power. Opposition parties were always perceived by him as a threat. However, close attention of foreign donors and international watchdogs made him tolerate the presence of opposition and maintain a vision of democratic institutions in place.

This policy has recently begun to change. Confronted with the need to tolerate multiparty system, Emomali Rakhmonov realized that the authoritarian regime of his Uzbek neighbor Islam Karimov has much to learn from.

International observers describe Uzbekistan as one of the most authoritarian post-Soviet states. Uzbek government is known for absolute intolerance of any sort of opposition. Yet Islam Karimov tries to maintain the visibility of multiparty democracy by having five state-funded political parties competing for representation in the parliament. The only problem here is that all five are so called “pocket” parties controlled by Karimov, while truly independent political parties have never been able to register.

Uzbekistan’s approach to multiparty system represented by “pocket” parties must have had a great appeal for Emomali Rakhmonov and approved for realization in Tajikistan. In autumn 2005, just months ahead of parliamentary elections, the Ministry of Justice registered two parties –Agrarian Party and the Party of Economic Reforms. These parties have never had independent capacity. However, similarly to Uzbek parties, they claim to represent the interests of farmers and entrepreneurs. Neither opposition parties, nor political analysts have ever doubted governmental affiliation of the both parties.

Rakhmonov’s new policy aims not only to create new parties, but also to transform the older ones. In June 2004, government’s awkward interference led by advisor to the president Qurbon Vosiev fueled schism in the Socialist Party (SPT). Qurbon Vosiev and Abduhalim Ghafforov, public servants expelled from SPT in 2000, summoned an “extraordinary congress” of the party, which dismissed SPT’s then-chairman Mirhuseyn Narziev and appointed Abduhalim Ghafforov instead. Officially registered by MoJ, Ghafforov’s Socialist Party joined the club of organizations loyal to the regime.

The club also includes the president’s People’s Democratic Party and Communist Party, whose loyalty is rewarded with minor representation in the parliament. The new DPT will soon join the club, thus bringing its membership to six of the eight registered parties in the country.

The only remaining opposition parties – Islamic Revival Party (IRP) and Social-Democratic Party (SDP) – will not be able to contend Rakhmonov’s grip of power. But their presence will be appreciated by Rakhmonov, who needs them to complete the picture of multiparty Tajikistan for international consumption.

There is another party that Rakhmonov will never be able to control– the ill-famous Khizb ut-Tahrir. Though its members are still few and its impact on Tajikistan’s politics minor, this can change soon, not least due to the regime’s policy. Emomali Rakhmonov will repeat Islam Karimov’s mistake unless he understands that in the country where the political opposition is not allowed to operate freely, radical Islamic groups remain the only outlet for public discontent.