If there is one thing that unites the official candidates for the Turkmen presidential elections that is that they have all stated their commitment to pursuing a continuation of the policies of the country’s late leader Saparmurat Niyazov.
Other than that, the candidates have already been setting forward their own proposals for how to build on Niyazov’s legacy. Interim president, and the only likely winner of the Feb. 11 polls, Kurbanguly Berdymuhammedov, has already been meeting with voters in some Turkmen cities and focused his electoral campaign on education and pension reform. He has also committed to developing an intensive city-building program, including a scheme to build a leisure, and ecological reserve complex in the Balkan velyat in western Turkmenistan.
Among some of the promises covered in Western press were his calls for greater Internet access, which has led some to speculate on whether his future government might augur a new season of relative openness. Given that the country has some of the lowest Internet penetration figures in the world, however, the promise seems neither revolutionary nor problematic to achieve, although Berdymuhammedov has vowed to execute his program on a grand scale, saying that “Internet should be accessible to every one of our citizens.”
These comments cannot but have been intended for international consumption, as the United States begins to make more audible demands about the need for some semblance of democratic transition. Similarly, his own electorate was probably not first in mind when Berdymuhammedov stated that the presidential elections would be “just, honest and open.”
The interim regime is obviously concerned for the right image to be projected to the outside world, although they may not be going about it in the best way possible. As Deutsche Welle has already reported, international journalists will be limited to those countries considered friendly to the former and emerging regimes:

Turkmen authorities have decided not to extend the list of accredited international reporters in the run-up to the elections. Already a number of friendly countries, including China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and a number of Arab states, have been issued the necessary documentation. However, the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs is reportedly not prepared to widen the number of nationalities eligible for journalist visas.
“We are awaiting an order from the interim President Berdymuhammedov, and if we get it, we will carry it out,” a source in the foreign ministry said.
A source in the military services also revealed that some ten journalists will connections to foreign media organizations have been placed under strict surveillance by the special services. Their phones have been disconnected, they have been summoned by the authorities, had their passports confiscated and threatened if they continue to pursue their reporting activities.

Berdymuhammedov also vowed to rid the country of drugs being trafficked into the country from neighbouring Afghanistan, the Associated Press reported on Thursday. The assurance was announced as part of his latest comments on the campaign trail.

“It’s a big problem, and the only lucky thing is that drugs are not produced here, but imported illicitly,” deputy Prime Minister Kurbanguly Berdymuhammedov said in comments broadcast on state television.

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Berdymuhammedov promised to strengthen border protection and toughen legal punishment for drug dealers. He called on the country’s only political party, youth organizations and trade unions to fight drug use “on the spot.”
“In villages, people usually know who uses drugs,” he said in televised remarks.

A second candidate, deputy Minister for Oil and Gas and Mineral Resources Ishankuly Nuriyev has also toured Ashgabat and Turkmenbashi (formerly Krasnovodsk) on his campaign trail. He has opted to place emphasis on the need to further develop the economy and the need to reform the agricultural sector, healthcare, education, and social welfare. While in the Balkan velyat, where Turkmenbashi is situated, he promised to facilitate the development of cattle breeding and to build an agro-industrial complexes in the Magtymguly and Etrek etraps specializing in the growth and processing of subtropical vegetation. Nuriyev also hinted at the need to enhance the tourism potential of the Caspian coastal region and for the building of health facility for children.
The hakim of Abadan etrap in the Ahal velyat, Orazmurat Karajayev, visited the Mary and Ahal provinces in the southeast of the country, two of the politically most crucial areas of Turkmenistan. His electoral program has stressed the importance of scientific progress, education, further development of the energy sector, improvement in the agricultural sector, transport and communications, and private enterprise. He has also been mindful to underscore the importance of pursuing the orderly execution of the course undertaken in Saparmurat Niyazov’s lifetime to modernize the economy.
Governor of the Karabekaul etrap in Lebap velyat, Mukhammednazar Gurbanov, met with voter in Turkmenabat (formerly Chardjou), in northeastern Turkmenistan, where he stated that a priority of government led by him would the development of education and culture, and the furthered cultivation of economic ties with international partners.
Speaking in Ahal, Gurbanov cited the vital importance of attracting foreign investment, reform of the agricultural sector, and the creation of social welfare structures.
The parameter of his efforts in government, Gurbanov said, would be founded on the UN-sponsored ” Strategy of Economic, Political and Cultural Development of Turkmenistan for the Period of Up to 2020.” He also stated that their would be no move to reversing the policy already under way.
The mayor of Turkmenbashi, Ashirniyaz Pomanov, placed particular importance on the regeneration of the spiritual and moral values of the Turkmen people and the creation of conditions that will enable the “harmonious development of the younger generations.”
Pomanov also asserted his belief in the need to protect socially vulnerable categories of the population and promised that he would not overlook the needs of young families, disabled pensioners, war veterans and invalids.
At a meeting with voters in Ahal, Pomanov said that he was committed to paying particular attention to the development of modern communications, namely the improvement of postal and telegraphic services and intensive expansion of wireless networks, particularly in rural areas.”
Agriculture is need of a radical overhaul, Pomanov said, in particular as far as concerns production, processing and livestock breeding.
First deputy Governor of the Dashoguz velyat Amanniyaz Atajikov met with voters in his province’s capital, where he vowed that his domestic and international policies would reflect the course undertaken by Niyazov.
Among his priorities as potential president, he cited the improvement of social welfare among all segments of the population, the development of science and education, and the cultivation of national devotion among young people.
In the sphere of international relations, he stated his determination to maintain the preeminence of neutrality. In agriculture, he spoke of the importance that daikhan (farmers) become “the genuine masters of their own land,” a promise that has been interpreted by observers as a commitment to introduce the concept of private land ownership into the country.
The geography of electoral campaigning will be interesting to note in view of the decision to nominally select candidates from all of the countries five velyats. As ferghana.ru reported some days ago, Turkmen authorities have contrived to place the Mary velyat under the scrutiny of the security services until the election takes place.
The province’s candidate to the election was Berdymuhammedov, who evidently picked himself for the task although he is not even from that region. As ferghana.ru notes, “even in the Khalk Maslahaty Berdymuhammedov represents the Cabinet and not the Mary velyat.”
Moreover, it is believed that “Berdymuhammedov’s self-nomination from the Mary velyat was deliberate because the authorities fear that some other candidate may be nominated from the down-trodden region.” The area poses particular distress to parties determined to pursue continuity against all odds as it is the most populous, culturally developed, and political region in the entire country.
Karajayev and Berdymuhammedov has been the only candidate reported to have visited the region so far, although others may soon follow. What the individuals have to say in these places, granted it is almost certainly from an approved script, may be worth paying close attention to.
On a related issue, the government has passed a decree ensuring that all candidates spend an equal amount of funds on their campaigns, Russian news agency Interfax has reported. The ruling, published on Friday in the official Turkmen press, has responsibility doe overseeing the decree is enforced with the Central Elections Commission. Once again, this can only serve to give an unfair advantage to the interim president, who has benefited from all the free publicity afforded to him by state television broadcasts of his executive decisions.
One such example of free public exposure was the televised ceremony on Friday to plant 16,000 trees in memory of Niyazov, as reported by the Associated Press. This follows on an order from Berdymuhammedov to built yet another gigantic monument to the late president. As the Associated Press reported:

People walked to the Presidential Path of Health, a recreation area in the capital Ashgabat, to plant the fir and cypress trees to “immortalize the grandiose deeds of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi,” television reported.

Not that the interim president has been the only one to resort to riding Niyazov’s coattails. All six candidates jointly visited Niyazov’s grave in Kipchak on Friday, RIA-Novosti reported.
For its own part, the United States has been remarkably restrained in its calls for democratic reforms in the country. For instance, while calling for political change in the country, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher told Voice of America that decisions on reforms will have to be ” made in the end in Turkmenistan.”
This sentiment was an almost verbatim repetition of a remark by State Department spokesman Sean McCormack during a press briefing on Jan. 3, in which he said that the “Turkmenistan Government is going to have to moderate their own political process” in answer to a question about whether the U.S. government would offer support to exiled political activists.
Notably, Boucher was reported McCormack during Wednesday’s State Department press briefing as being “on the road,” possibly in the Central Asian region. McCormack could not confirm which countries Boucher would indeed be visiting over this period.
Meanwhile, as the Associated Press reports, there has been some concern voiced by international nongovernmental organizations, who already signs of renewed despotism in Berdymuhammedov’s governing style

Noting that Berdymukhamedov had hinted at greater openness for the reclusive ex-Soviet state, U.S. democracy rights organization Freedom House, meanwhile, called on the United States and the European Union to push Turkmen leaders toward more democracy.
“The United States and the EU should use this unique moment in history following Niyazov’s death to push for democratic reform while the window is still open,” Executive Director Jennifer Windsor said in a statement. “Otherwise we may be looking at another 15 years of darkness and repression for the people of Turkmenistan.”

Unsurprisingly, Russia is the first international actor to shift its gears into engaging with the new Turkmen elite. Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday conveyed the interim President Kurbanguly Berdymuhammedov his best wishes for the New Year.
According to a Kremlin press release, Putin noted that:

“Russia has always been and will always be friend to your country.”

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“We note with satisfaction that in these days, the people of Turkmenistan are going through this difficult phase with great dignity. The passing of a president who has led his country for so long is a challenging moment for any country.”

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“The merit for this lies undoubtedly with the current leadership of Turkmenistan.”

This fulsome praise will come as welcome relief to the Berdymuhammedov government, which has now come out fighting against the rash of speculative news reports coming out of Russia. In a statement from the Turkmen Foreign Ministry:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan has issued a statement for mass media. It says that “slanderous statements and reports about the so-called military coup in Turkmenistan and on the illegitimate transference of power in the country, contributed by the so-called “political experts”, have appeared in the Russian media.
These insinuations are in fact aimed at drawing a false picture for the world community on the true situation and events in Turkmenistan.

As on other occasions when the international community and media have come out against dubious developments in the former Soviet space, Russia is apparently determined to back a dubious regime. Wanting to adopt a sympathetic line, one could argue that Putin is unwilling to countenance a source of political instability in a country on its Caspian border. While the United States can urge commitment to democratic values to its heart content, it knows it is not position to either set the agenda or make demands. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan and Russia genuinely have shared short- to mid-term interests, which is why Putin’s statements cannot help but come as a relief to Berdymuhammedov’s already discredited government.
More importantly, for those reading the runes on Turkmenistan’s future, Putin’s comments indicate a specific commitment to the current direction taking form in Ashgabat, a nominal continuation of Saparmurat Niyazov’s policies.
These could mean any number of things when it comes to domestic policy, a scene that will become clear in the months to come, but in the diplomatic sphere this inference is more understandable. Engagement with the outside world has been manifested primarily through energy dialogue, which has recently favoured Ashgabat’s intransigent line over gas price discussions. Crucially for Russia, for the medium-term Turkmenistan is content to perform its duty as Gazprom’s reserve fund. The only serious long-term alternative on the cards is supply to China, a plan that requires overwhelming any number of logistical and diplomatic stumbling blocks, as Moscow well knows. In essence, this arrangement is the standard deal that Russia’s vassal states concede to in exchange for political patronage. In Turkmenistan’s case, this has involved turning a blind eye to the Niyazov order’s rampant corruption and despotism.
Yet, looking at the history of Russian-Turkmen relations over the post-independence period raises more questions about what Putin could possibly mean by his ingratiating remarks. The relationship between the two partners has been far from smooth over the last decade and a half. Aside from the ungracious and well-publicised tussle over gas prices, which incidentally have served to undermine Moscow in its threat to cut off Ukraine’s supplies, there was the overtly anti-Russian presidential decree banning dual citizenship in 2003, which effectively forced thousands of Russians to leave the country. The minute ethnic Russian population left behind remains hopeful that a resurgent Kremlin may some day come through in protecting their status. Berdymuhammedov’s need for Moscow’s support may provide some breathing space for the country’s Russian minorities in the near future.
Another concern for the West, which will be concerned to see more of the Central Asia space from its potential sphere of interest, is that Turkmenistan’s much-vaunted neutrality will shift into a anti-Western Eurasian mode. The next year will tell more definitively, as a pro-Kremlin south Central Asian area may coalesce, leaving the West’s presence in Afghanistan more geographically stranded than it has ever been to date. In this distressing scenario, Turkmenistan would profit from becoming a genuinely isolated state, further exacerbating a dynamic initiated by Niyazov. The West’s only way into Turkmenistan, not to speak of Central Asia in general, would thus lie with Turkey, which is learning to cope with being spurned with Europe.
On a less negative note, dialogue in the energy will presumably become more, not less, arbitrary and irrational from this moment forwards. Wherever genuine authority now lies (and there is not shortage of theories on this front), the wild card of Niyazov’s own mercurial character has been removed from the equation. To do full justice to this implication, however, one should put forth some considerations on the possible channels of decision in the past and the future.
The most obvious, but simplistic, explanation for how policy has been formed unequivocally puts Niyazov at the apex of a pyramid of power, in which his word was the be all and end all. A variation of this theme has numerous grey cardinals at his ears; most credibly, head of the presidential guard Akmurad Redjepov and Turkish businessman Ahmet Çalik.
Just to give some idea about the latter figure, who features prominently in the Turkmen section Martha Brill Oclott’s most recent regional study, his company became the second company to take part in the development of the allegedly gigantic Iolotan fields. Meanwhile, the Turkish business community unconvincingly professed serenity about the death of a leader whose country they have plough $10 billion worth of investment into, covering the textiles, energy, food, retail, fertiliser, paper and construction industries.
In one sense, this reading leaves the observer open to the interpretation that Niyazov was really a weak puppet of a corrupt alliance of business and military strength. And if that was ever the case, the future will hold more of the same in the view of RIA-Novosti analyst Andrei Grozin:

“Local power ministers will play a very important role during interregnum. They are backed by real power. There are three power centers – a 60 year-old Defense Minister Agageldy Mamedgeldyyev (the oldest from Niyazov’s entourage, and, hence most likely to head the Halk Maslahaty), who was previously the director of a military health resort, and deputy defence minister for logistics support. Judging by all, the defence minister is acting together with the number one security official – Akhmurad Redjepov, the head of the Presidential Guards.
The Minister of the Interior and Niyazov’s confidant Akmamed Rakhmanov heads the second group, while Security Minister Geldy Ashirmukhamedov is in charge of the third one. The latter is a seasoned security veteran with a Soviet training. He is well connected in the Turkmen army – for several years he was the commander of the ground forces before he was appointed to his current position.
Power ministers have the strongest positions in the Turkmen elites. Civilian politicians can only claim compromise, rubber-stamp positions. Acting President and Deputy Prime Minister in charge of healthcare Kurbangeldy Berdymuhammedov, or Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov may well become the formal leaders of the country, but will not have any real levers of power.
The same is true of the Halk Malakhaty nominees. One of them is deputy head of the Turkmengeologiya State Corporation, and Minister of the Oil and Gas Industry and Mineral Resources Ishankuli Nuryyev.”

This is as detailed an attempt of reading the power struggle as has appeared in English to date. This is not to say it is reliable, as so much Russian commentary (as helpfully suggested by the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs) tends to sensationalism over actual substance. Indeed, the basic premise here is that Berdymuhammedov is a helplessly unqualified civilian out of his depth among military authorities. However, he has an edge over his potential in a marginally greater international visibility. Even the United States would prefer to see a Niyazov stooge come to power than an unknown and militarily inclined quantity, which, on top of Kremlin support, may tell in the long-term.
And while in the bogus political science realm of Turkmenology, there is also the respectable possibility, as the government itself is at pains to stress, that there is some kind of consensus governance operating in the post-Niyazov scenario. Reports of Niyazov-style Cabinet sessions do not make this particularly likely, but it could explain why the oft-predicted power struggle bloodbath has failed to materialise.

Now slightly out of date, but nonethless worth the watch for the fascinating footage if nothing else. This Russian-language report (in two separate videos) on Niyazov is from Gazprom-owned television station NTV:

The final flickers of hope for anybody expecting that Kurbanguly Berdymuhammedov’s interim succession would signal a shift to openness and democracy will be concerned by his latest efforts to install himself in late Saparmurat Niyazov’s place.
David Holley in the Los Angeles Times reports on the amendments the interim has effected already to ensure that he becomes leader:

The country’s supreme legislative body, the 2,507-member People’s Council, or Khalk Maslahty, revised the constitution to allow acting President Kurbanguly Berdymuhammedov to run in the presidential election. Before it was amended, the constitution barred the acting president from being a candidate.

At the same time, other modifications have been made to the constitution. In a change to article 60, if the president is unable to perform his duties, responsibilities will pass to the deputy chairman of the Cabinet, a task performed by Berdymuhammedov until recently. Presidential elections can be held no later than sixty days after the president has relinquished power.
For formality’s sake, six candidates have been named as contenders for the elections, slated for Feb. 11. These include Berdymuhammedov, the deputy Minister for Oil and Gas and Mineral Resources Ishankuly Nuriyev; Abadan mayor Orazmurat Karajayev; Turkmenbashi mayor Ashirniyaz Pommanov; first deputy Governor of Dashoguz province Amanniyaz Atajikov; and the Governor of the Karabekaul district in Lebap province Mukhammednazar Gurbanov.

From left to right: Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, President Kurbanguly Berdymuhammedov, Democratic Party of Turkmenistan chairman Onjik Musayev.

It is worth noting that among these nondescript phantom candidates, none of whom was approved unanimously like Berdymuhammedov, there are no regional leaders from the Mary province, where some observers of Turkmen power dynamics have anticipated potential dissent could come from. There is little available information on these characters, and neither can it be expected that they will gain much exposure in the national media. Berdymuhammedov has de facto identified with the nation’s future leadership in the crucial early period.
For all it is worth, the exiled opposition have also advanced a candidate, former former deputy prime minister and Central Bank chairman Khudaiberdy Orazov. However, not only has Orazov not gained approval from the Khalk Maslahaty, but he is also barred by a rule that requires any prospective president to have lived in Turkmenistan for ten years before standing for president. Orazov lives in Sweden, where he leads the Watan opposition movement.
The United Democratic Opposition of Turkmenistan (UDOT) also advanced a candidate, Nurberdy Nurmuhammedov, chairman of the Agzybirlik democratic movement. UDOT leader Advy Kuliyev told RIA-Novosti that he considers Nurmuhammedov the most credible alternative from the opposition’s ranks.
Meanwhile, there has been the expected speculation about the behind-the-scene struggle for ascendancy, but the facts about this still remain unclear. In a report on Monday, Russian newspaper Vremya Novostei said that a swathe of arrests of around 140 mostly mid- and low-ranking civil servants had taken place. The most senior figure also alleged to have been detained was also Defense Minister Gen. Agageldy Mammetgeldiyev, who had earlier been tipped to head the nominally important Khalk Maslhaty. Either his arrest or his transfer to the Khalk Maslahaty would be significant events in themselves, as they would indicate an effort to neutralise rivals to power from within the so-called power ministries.
However, a televised joint session of the State Security Council and Cabinet on Tuesday, showed Mammetgeldiyev sitting at Berdymuhammedov’s right-hand side, thus putting lie to rumours about his arrest.
Current reporting in the Russian-language press currently points to the conclusion that any power struggle that was to take place is already over. Kommersant writes about a letter appearing in Monday’s edition of Neutralniy Turkmenistan (which can be downloaded here for Russian speakers), written by an admiring correspondent urging Berdymuhammedov to pursue Niyazov’s legacy. That such fulsome praise is already appearing in the official press is surely a sign that the trimmings of power have been quick to install themselves.
Some more instances of craven toadying came courtesy of the chairman of the Central Elections Committee in Ashgabat, Murat Kariyev, who remarked that the polls have been as good as held to all intents and purposes. He also added that the elections would be open to scrutiny by international electoral observers. Given that the winning candidate will probably have only been able to run by perverting the constitution that any respectable monitoring organisation. Countries sponsoring less scrupulous monitors, possibly including Russia, may seize upon this opportunity to provide their moral support to this yet illegitimate government. Kariyev’s remarks may be read as a signal to the international community, Eastern and Western, about the kind of basis dialogue will be based. Either way, nobody should question the abilities of Turkmen electoral monitors Kariyev says:

“Our national observers are far better than international observers, because they work from the heart and they don’t go looking for imperfections.”

Not wanting to be any less in the enthusiasm stakes, the chairman of the state-sponsored successor to the Communist Party, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, Ondjik Musayev suggested that the Khalk Maslahaty should elect Berdymuhammedov as president with immediate effect:

“[Berdymuhammedov] has shown himself to be a worthy successor to Niyazov; an experienced politician that was handed the most challenging tasks of government. Lately, Niyazov has considered him his top subordinate.”

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“Berdymuhammedov has extensive experience in government. In the past, he also worked as a teacher, heading the dentistry faculty. He has exercised the most humane profession of medicine.”

The electoral legitimisation of Berdymuhammedov’s grasp on power, sponsored by the chief of the presidential guard Akmurad Rejepov, will come closer than previously anticipated. According to some speculation, Niyazov’s birth date, Feb. 19, was slated initially, but that option was overlooked for an even earlier date. This leaves little more than five weeks of preparation for the polls, which should safely exclude the likelihood of external interference.
Welcome to the new era of democracy, Turkmenistan-style.

UPDATE: Newsinfo.ru reports (via gazeta.ru) that opposition candidate for the presidency, mentioned above, Nurberdy Nurmuhammedov has gone missing in Ashgabat. According to an ODOT statement, Nurmuhammedov has not been seen since Dec. 23. Nurmuhammedov gave an interview to Radio Free Europe shortly before being reported missing.

Saparmurat Niyazov was buried at a mausoleum on the grounds of Central Asia’s last mosque, the Turkmenbsahi Rukhy, in his hometown on Sunday. Tens of thousands of people turned out to pay their last respects, accompanied by a number of foreign diplomatic delegations, RIA Novosti reported:

As the procession made its way to Kipchak, where Niyazov was born, jets of the country’s air force as well as helicopters flew by.
Before the burial ceremony a general prayer was said by the nation’s leading mullah, while behind him hundreds of attendants prayed on a gigantic white carpet.

The mausoleum is also the burial place of Niyazov’s parents and brothers.
It is probable that, as has happened with other authoritarian leaders in the past, people wanted to check with their own eyes that the president really was dead, a fact that has been questioned by some opposition figures. This they were able to do in Ashgabat, where Niyazov lay in rest.
All shops and offices will be closed in sign of respect.
Around 20 countries sent an official delegation to the funeral. The presidents of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan were expected to be present, as well as various heads of government and parliamentarians. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov also attended. Western countries will be represented by accredited diplomatic staff. The United States sent the Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, who remarked before leaving for Turkmenistan that he hoped for a new era in relations between the United States and Turkmenistan. In Ukraine, President Viktor Yushchenko charged his prime minister, Viktor Yanukovich, to represent his delegation. Kiev will, naturally, be keen to be seen a properly respectful position towards Turkmen officials in view of the crucial role that gas from the Central Asian state has in keeping their energy costs down. The recent partial restoration of amicable terms between Moscow and Kiev will be interesting to observe as foreign governments circle the new emerging order in Turkmenistan in search of points of leverage.
The Azeri delegation, who will also be curious to investigate how the new government may affect the ongoing dispute over Caspian delimitation rights, included Prime Minister Artur Rasizade and the deputy Foreign Minister Halaf Halafov.
In the city, everything seems as normal, reports RIA-Novosti. Shops are open for business and classes are being held as usual in the universities. However, in respect of the seven-day period of mourning, no alcoholic beverages can be sold in shops, bars or restaurants.
As for what will come after the burial of Niyazov, the Turkmen representative at the United Nations in New York, Aksoltan Atayev, has said that the dead leaders’ policy will continued to be pursued.

“He did everything he could for the best of the simple people of his country,” Atayeva said

This may be little more than customary lip service to the recently departed, but it is nonetheless reminiscent of the fact that whatever should happen, rapid change is not and cannot be possible. For all the bogus qualities that Niyazov’s personality cult may have had, it has still left a indelible cultural legacy and an overwhelming physical one. Even an unlikely vehemently anti-Niyazov ascendant would be ill-advised to consider pulling down statues and renaming streets, monuments and cities. Niyazov’s skewed identity politics did in some way perform the function of creating a formal sense of cultural unity, which would be rash to begin unstitching at the seams.
What motivates Kurbanguli Berdymukhammedov, however, may not be the integrity of the country but his own preservation of power. While speaking at the national Security Council, Cabinet and Majlis meetings, Berdymukhammedov recognisably mimicked Niyazov’s conduct and speech patterns, as Batyr Djumaev wrote in an article for Centrasia.ru. One early televised statement to the nation was made in Niyazov’s office, as he sat in front of a portrait of Niyazov. When he spoke at the Majlis, he even addressed the presidium alone and spoke in a fashion that very much resembled Niyazov. As Djumaev notes:

Ministers at the Cabinet meeting recalled the ministers under Niyazov — even to the point of having the same notepads in front of them, which they energetically scribbled in so as not to have to make eye contact with their superior.

Djumaev suggests that these artless tactics may be an intentional deploy to maximise the effectiveness of Berdymukhammedov’s ride to power. A similar techniques of projection onto an iconic predecessor was utilised by Stalin, when he succeeded Lenin as General Secretary of the Communist Party. Hence the slogan, “Stalin — Lenin today”. In that sense, the persistent speculation about the familial link between the acting president and his predecessor may be little more than a contrivance to beguile the country’s captive polity. This is continuity in a very literal sense, which hardly augurs well for the fate of the nation.
As Djumaev also observes, Berdymukhammedov has begun his rule with an arrest, a fact that can only be an omen of further actions in this guise. And yet while Niyazov was already a consolidated leader that would still resort to arbitrary shuffles to ensure his enduring rule, Berdymukhammedov may need to shed several high-placed individuals before he can feel confident in his place. He will be unwilling to give way to any colleague that has been cultivated in the virtually Stalinist mode of governance that has defined post-independence Turkmenistan.
As for Niyazov’s legacy, Adjar Krutov is more forgiving. Without making concessions for his cruelty — Niyazov is in turn compared to Stalin, Peter the Great, and Mao — Krutov is complimentary of the Turkmen leader’s efforts to avoid the de-industrialisation of his country; a unique feat among CIS leaders. Under Niyazov, hundreds of new industrial complexes have been built in numerous sectors of the economy. Also, for all the scorn rightly heaped on Niyazov’s idiosyncratic international negotiation in the energy sector, he did invest significant effort into diversifying the output of Turkmenistan’s natural wealth, building refineries that could boost the export products’ market value.
The competing quantities of legacy and succession will be on partial view Sunday, when the emerging leadership will doubtlessly strive to eulogise their departed leader while making their own bid for legitimacy. Niyazov may be dead, but his lingering influence will still make itself felt on contemporary developments.

In two more developments, Turkmenistan expert and Vremya Novostei correspondent Arkady Dubnov gave a press conference at the RIA-Novosti press agency in which he revealed that according to information in his possession, close Saparmurat Niyazov confindante and treasurer Alexander Zhadan went missing the day before Niyazov’s death.

“According to information I have, on the evening before President Nyyazow’s death, his personal aide-de-camp Alexander Zhadan disappeared from Ashgabat with very important documents,” Dubnov said at a news conference on Friday.

Dubnov claims that Zhadan has control over all Niyazov’s financial dealings. A combination of this and the possible billions salted away in Western bank accounts may mean that Turkmenistan is a considerably poorer country today.
Niyazov and Zhadan were old family friends and the treasurer also held the position of deputy head of the presidential administration, which put him a position of great responsibility.
In a separate development, the initiative to disregard constitutional practice picked up further steam on Friday after interim president Kurbanguly Berdymukhammedov sacked the chairman of the Majlis Ovezgeldy Atayev, the person who is supposed to take the provisional leadership of the country in the event of the president’s death. In a televised dismissal reminescent of Niyazov’s practices, Berdymukhamedov stripped Atayev of his immunity, telling him:

“You have been relieved from the post of parliament speaker.”

This followd the start on Thursday of unspecified criminal investigations into Atayev’s activities. Akdzha Nurberdyeva was named as the new Majlis speaker.
RIA-Novosti also reports that a new Khalk Maslahaty chairman will need to named at the next session, which is to take place on Dec. 26. According to the constitution, the candidate can be no younger than 55, must speak Turkmen, have lived in the country for the last ten years, be a current member of the body, and have occupied a high position in the government. These reuirements inevitably narrow the list, but the Minister of Defense Agageldy Mamedgeldyev has already been tipped to get the necessary two-thirds approval.

Interim President Kurbanguly Berdymukhammedov at last month’s CIS meeting in Minsk

There is an interesting nuance to this prediction in that his neutralisation in this largely ceremonial position would put another high-ranking militarily well-connected figure out of the running for the presidency. Azeri political scientist Rauf Rajabov has suggested that the most likely candidate to emerge on top will be the one with the authority to enforce stability and who can ward off the threat of Islamist fringe groups. Once again, this points in the direction of the chief of the presidential guard General Akmurad Rejepov, who may settle with being the eminence grise to Berdymukhammedov.

Opposition leaders were swift in reacting to the absence of leadership in Turkmenistan and one of the earliest comments was from the chairman of the Watan opposition group and former deputy Prime Minister Khudaiberdy Orazov. He placed the emphasis on consultation, which may indicate that contingency plans among the notoriously fractious and scattered opposition have never been properly formulated. Watan’s own website itself functions as little more than a clearing house for information appearing in other media, although it performs a valuable function in gathering the amount of information that it does. The hours after Saparmurat Nityazov’s death initiated a flurry of postings from Russian and Western press on that site, but not much by way of a blueprint for how the exiled political community intends to seize this historic opportunity.
One concrete attempt at reaching the country, however, has already ended in failure, as Ukrainian web site Korrespondent.ru reported. Batyr Muhammedshin, who describes himself as a representative of the united Turkmen opposition and the shadow Mister of Justice explained how a plane chartered specially for the operation was turned back from Ashgabat:

“The most important issue is the return of the opposition,” he said, noting that the Turkmen authorities had forbidden him from doing this. Many leaders of the opposition live in Western Europe and Scandinavia.
“The new government has closed the border,” Muhammedshin said, adding that the civil aviation service in Ashgabat refused authorisation for the arrival of a chartered plane, flying from Sweden to Turkmenistan via Moscow, filled with opposition activists.
“The airline organising the chartered flight held talks with the aviation service in Ashgabat. But they were told a ban had been imposed on all flights and that any incoming planes would be shot down,” Muhammedshin said.
He also said that opposition leaders are expecting to hold a meeting in a European city and that they are counting on the support of the international community.
“The alternative to our return to Turkmenistan is the continuation of course undertaken by Niyazov,” he said. He also added that he did not genuinely believe that Niyazov was actually dead.

Precisely what kind of legitimate support the international community will be able to give is not so clear. Previous opposition congresses have been lent international support, but have resulted in very little constructive and collaborative results. Leaving aside the vanities of all the varying jostling figures, there are certain issues that have inevitably served to hamstring any galvanised opposition.
The greatest complicating question for the opposition is that many of them are invariably tainted by their erstwhile association with Niyazov’s regime. The best-known historical focal point of the opposition, Boris Shikhmuradov, whose was jailed in 2003 for an alleged assassination conspiracy against Niyazov, vigorously but unconvincingly claimed to have had no part in the regime’s excesses, in spite of his vicinity to the president for many years. Notably, the spurned establishment figure turning against his former allies has become something of a constant in the former Soviet space, and may have something to do with the compromised quality of some of the colour revolutions to have taken place. Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia have all produced anti-system political personalities that have emerged from the establishment itself. While in those countries, these politicians have tried and continue to try to overcome this apparent handicap, Turkmen opposition figures are obviously limited by the absolute embargo that is placed on their ability to appeal to the population directly; this being the second stumbling block for any prospective opposition.
Not only do the wider population not have any concrete understanding of who the alternatives to the Niyazov nomenklatura might be, but perhaps more worryingly, these individuals themselves have lost any real fundamental grasp of the issues that could serve to lead the country out of its current blind alley. The occasional article in the Western press is about as much as concession the opposition seem prepared to offer to matters of popular welfare. Meanwhile, the plight of powerlessness is discussed in the setting of parallel parliaments and shadow governments, where the finer points of a national constitution that has never meant very much to anybody is discussed. It is a profound irony that Turkmenistan should nominally hold its founding charter with such reverence as to have a national holiday in its honour (notably, more readily celebrated by the population as a day dedicated to their national poet, Magtymguly), and yet very first thing that is done on the occasion of the single most important event in Turkmenistan’s post-independence history is to flout it in the most flagrant manner by ignoring its provisions for succession. The point being that a self-appointed body based in Europe to discuss a largely meaningless document seems like a strange way to organise an alternative to arbitrary despotism.
Those who have displayed the startling bravery of staying and resisting in their own small way have paid a tragic price, however, and it is in this area that the international community’s efforts should most immediately be made visible. One useful example is the call from Reporters Without borders for the release of journalists under arrest:

“We demand the release of all jailed journalists and human right workers, currently held in Turkmen prisons in unbearable conditions,” a Reporters Without Frontiers representative said. “Many have been imprisoned simply for cooperating with international media.”

This would come too late for Olguspar Muradova, who died in detention in September this year, but there may still be hope for Annakurban Amanklychev and Sapardurd Hadjiev, who have not been seen or heard from for numerous months. As the journalists’ organisation also notes, not a single one of the 10,000 prisoners released in the amnesty on Oct. 16 was a journalist.

At the same time, some strands of the opposition have urged caution before charging into the country with plans for regime change. Another former prime minister and minister for oil and gas Nazar Suyunov has spoken out against any hastened return to Turkmenistan of exiled individuals, warning that this could create a climate of crisis.

“If the opposition suddenly turn up there, it could all turn out very messy,” he said.

Instead, the opposition should await the announcement of elections, at which point they can return and participate in a proper electoral process, Suzunov argued.
Interim president Kurbanguly Berdymukhammedov raised this very issue on Friday, saying that a date would be called at the next Khalk Maslahaty meeting, to be held two days after Niyazov’s funeral, on Dec. 26. Prospective candidates for the presidency will be named on that day, Berdymukhammedov said, Interfax reported Friday.
This may be an occasion for Berdymukhammedov to put forward the name of head of the presidential guard Akmurad Rejepov, or perhaps to make a symbolic pass at rejecting his own coronation by a pliant Khalk Maslahaty. It should be fascinating to see how this largely symbolic body of public representation performs its duties and what, if any, evidence of opposition will be on show there. For some background on this institutional body, what follows is a translation of an article by Adjar Krutov appearing on a Russian language site specialising in Central Asian affairs some weeks ago:

This institution is recognised under the law as the “highest permanent representative organ of the people’s rule, possessing the highest authority of power of the state and leadership”. Only at first glance it seems that this florid formulation merely hides an organ more commonly known elsewhere as a parliament. However, from a legal point of view the Khalk Maslahaty is not so much a parliament as a synthesis of two other historical phenomena.
First, Khalk Maslahaty, which is roughly equivalent to “national gathering”, is indeed reminiscent of pre-state and primitive pre-state tribe gatherings that distinguished the period of the development of society. Formally, the decisions of these meetings have the highest force and this is an undoubted merit of this type of institution. But everyone knows from history, interested people can learn to manipulate the masses and influence them into adopting pre-defined decisions.
Second, it is quite evident that there is much in common between the Turkmen variant of the Khalk Maslahaty and the Bolshevik Soviets of 1920s and 30s. The similarity lies, first and foremost, in the stipulation by Leninist theory that “workers’ corporations”, soviets, like the Khalk Maslahaty, are based on the opposing concepts about the separation of the systems of power. In both cases, what were nominally described as being in “the same bottle”, were artificially uninted in the region of two separate branches of governance – the legislative and the executive. To study the composition of the Khalk Maslahaty, it might even be possible to argue for a further incorporation of authorities that also takes in the judiciary. The Bolshevik soviets systems also embodied the notion that on a political level, there could be no recognition of pluralism – a fundamental requirement for a modern civilisation. In this monolithic format, political representation is permitted only in the context of the single political party and its auxiliary social organisations.
Finally, there is an explicit procedural similarity: The Khalk Maslahaty, as used to be the case with soviet congresses, is a very infrequent event and last a total of a few days. An obvious fact derives from all these specific features: neither of these organs have had the ability to adequately fulfil the function of representational power.
The adoption of a new law necessitates discussion, the confrontation of opposing ideas, and a prolonged and thoughtful consideration of the essentials of its constituent standards. And this is exactly what does not occur. In the Khalk Maslahaty, as at the soviet congresses, an enormous hall harmoniously applauds preconceived solutions. With the Bolsheviks, the solutions would be prepared in the depths of the communist party apparatus, while in Turkmenistan this function is performed by an apparatus headed by the president. That is to say, congresses and Khalk Maslahaty serve a purely ritual need; a decorative feature.
We will take it as given that it is to this end that the Turkmen Khalk Maslahaty was created, which is composed, in part, of the president, the Mejlis deputies, the chairman of the Supreme Court, members of the government, leaders of the local municipalities, and functionaries of social organisations. Altogether the body counts 2507 members.

A Russian perspective on the role that might be acquitted by the exiled opposition in this key moment has also been put forward by prominent political scientist Sergei Markov, who agrees that they will have a role to perform.
As Markov suggests, although many former state officials have left Turkmenistan, they left allies behind and can therefore still wield some influence.

“When the battle for power gets underway between the various elites groups, then the opposition will want to return to the country. Those groups that have started the struggle will be hoping for their support.
The danger is that as battle begins, various outside political forces could attempt to influence the course of events by supporting one or another group”

The bogeyman for many in Russia is the White House, which expressed its condolences for Niyazov’s death on Thursday and said in a statement that it hoped to consolidate and build on relations between the United States and Turkmenistan.
Once again, with the death of Niyazov and a new leaderhsip in place, the chimerical Trans-Caspian may start to be raised again, but more seriously. Such an arrangement is becoming ever more tempting to the West, which is seeking at all costs to alienate an growingly confident Russia. The pipeline would be the magic bullet that the West has been seeking in both its commercial interests and its geopolitical considerations. The prospect of affordable gas purchased at the expense of the Russians and the Chinese seems too tempting a prospect not to consider.
And the Europeans, for all the talk of value-based relationships, will not be backward in coming forward. Yet more rumours have it that the European Union’s special envoy to Central Asia Pierre Morel, formerly French ambassador to Turkmenistan, has paid a flying visit to Ashgabat since Niyazov’s death, a repeat on his earlier stay on Dec. 18. Likewise, Russian business daily RBK reported, a Gazprom official dropped in to ascertain who exactly was shaping up to be Niyazov’s successor.
Furthermore, much has been made of the German EU presidency and the prominence that Central Asia may adopt on the European foreign affairs agenda at that time. It was more commonly anticipated that Uzbekistan would be subject of the organisation’s rapprochement, although German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier did pay an official visit to Ashgabat earlier this year, but the new scenario means all bets are off.
The near abroad dimension also presents more curious scenarios. If Ashgabat were lured into the Western camp that would leave Iran surrounded on all sides by potential diplomatic antagonists. Iran’s own gas export policy could thrown to the four winds by any similar shift.
To the north, Uzbekistan panicked on hearing the news coming out of Turkmenistan. According to a number of media reports, Uzbekistan not only shut down its southern border, akin to similar reactions at the time of the Kyrgyz revolution, but it also imposed a news blackout on the death for several hours. Karimov soon decided to offer his condolences, but it is likely that he was more concerned that he now sticks out severely as the last remaining Soviet era leader to remain standing. Whatever, the outcome of Turkmen transition, good or bad, Karimov will certainly be disconcerted by yet more evidence that the sacred cow of leadership change is not alien to the region.

As most Central Asia watchers will already have learnt, President Saparmurat Niyazov, father of all the Turkmens, Turkmenbashi, has died at the age of 66. And already theories among opposition groups are abounding about how long he has actually been dead. Retrospectively, it was clear that someone in Ashgabat had been panicking hours before the almost certainly false date of death was announced.
One sign of the panic would have been the farcically inappropriate arrest of environmental activist Andrei Zatoka, as reported by the Associated Press:

Turkmen environmental activist, Andrei Zatoka, was detained on Sunday by authorities for unknown reasons, rights groups said Wednesday, expressing concern that he might be subjected to torture or other ill treatment.

As it happened, he was preparing to fly to Ashgabat and then on to Moscow. It is presumable that there could have been fears that a politically active citizen making a trip outside the country might take some undesired news with him.
And so for all the talk of imminent power struggles and the end of the Turkmenbashi reign, it is immediately obvious that things will remain as they have been for the foreseeable future. The population will not cheer the passing of a despot, but they may come to mourn the passing of a deeply compromised stability.
The colour reports coming from Ashgabat, which will understandably go through some hours and days of great anxiety, have mostly been courtesy of Agence France Presse, who is said to have a dependable stringer in the country. Among the largely stunned testimony gathered from the citizenry of Ashgbat was Murad, a 27-year old businessman:

“I felt awful when I heard on the television. We have suffered a loss. We feel we ourselves have been orphaned,” he said, alluding to Niyazov becoming a orphan in early childhood — much mythologised in his poetic texts.

But one of the earliest commentator to set off the blocks were Kazakh parliamentarians, who urged, as have so many across the world, urged Turkmenistan to seek the path of stability. As Serik Abdrakhmanov, chairman of the committee on international affairs, defence and security in the Kazakh Majlis said:

“This is perhaps the time to wish our brother nation of Turkmenistan peace and tranquillity, and let those that yesterday grovelled before the Rukhnama think more about the people and help them find a stable and peaceful path with the help of the country’s natural wealth.”

And to best implement this path to a smooth future would be to effect a constitutionally respectful and legal transition; something that has already been marred by the arbitrary and immediate ascendancy of Deputy Prime Minister Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, 49. As Reuters notes:

“Under the constitution, Parliament head Ovezgeldy Atayev should have automatically become acting head of state. But, in a sign of political tensions, justice officials immediately opened a criminal probe into his activities, blocking his appointment.”

Although Berdymukhammedov may best be remembered as the minister of health given a customary public dressing down by Niyazov in April 2004 and fined three months wages for failing to resolve the question of wage arrears in the nation’s health service, he is also believed to be a confidante of the highly influential head of the presidential guard, Akmurad Rejepov. This alliance may prove crucial and it is noteworthy that in addition to the having subverted constitutional protocol in naming Berdymukhammedov the interim leader, he was also appointed chairman of the commission overseeing the funeral, which is set to take place on Dec. 26.
Curiously, for people hungry for some background information on Berdymukhammedov’s biography, Reuters provided some interesting, if not intriguing details. In 2001 he assumed the post of deputy Prime Minister, nominally the second most important role in the country, bearing in mind that Niyazov was the Prime Minister as well as the president of his country. He was born in 1957 in a yet unidentified village in Soviet Turkmenistan and pursued a successful and prestigious academic career. As Reuters observes, ” he followed a career in dentistry both as a practitioner and an academic,” a highly exotic and suggestive detail. In 1997, he was named Minister of Health and Medical Industry, as indicated earlier.
Meanwhile, some eyebrows were raised at the recent Nov. 28 CIS meeting in Minsk, where Turkmenistan was the attending country not to send a head of state. Instead, Berdymukhammedov officiated in the role, fulfilling the role with eerie prescience, although he has no connections to the foreign ministry, to which this competence would be more naturally suited.
But surely the most sensational claim to have emerged on this individual to date is the allegation doing the rounds is that Berdymukhammedov is none other than Niyazov’s bastard son. In televised images broadcast on Russian television on the evening of the leader’s declared death, a solitary and ashen-faced Berdymukhammedov spoke in front of a portrait of strikingly similar-looking Niyazov. Such allegations have been heard on Russian radio station Ekho Moskvy on Thursday, but they have previously also appeared in Turkmenskaya Iskra and other opposition websites. This would also account, according to this theory, for Berdymukhammedov’s apparent ability to elude the grisly sentence that has befallen other high-placed figures in Niyazov’s inner circle.
Niyazov’s real family, consisting of an estranged wife and two children, a daughter and a son, are also being spoken of in the maelstrom that may come in the wake of his death.
Interestingly although it is his playboy son, about whom there are varying theories, that most is spoken about, his daughter Irina Niyazova cropped up in a market report compiled on Tuesday by the Moscow branch of Deutsche Bank:

“Niyazov’s death is likely to result in political instability and infighting between various clans. One group is centered on Niyazov’s daughter who, it is thought, oversees the personal finances of the Niyazov family.”

This theory has interesting pedigree and it is notable that only Deutsche Bank should have raised it, bearing in mind that the Global Witness report in 2006 on Niyazov’s gas-related corruption claimed that the president had as much as $2 billion under his own personal control in an account with the very same German lender. The money is sourced from Turkmen gas transactions, and if the speculation were true than this would mean a lump sum of money almost certainly lost to the country.
Other accounts, however, have it that Irina Niyazova lives in France with a Russian former general, where she runs her own bank. In this version of events, she spurned her father after he betrayed her mother with other women; a favour he returned by not using the services of her bank.
Murad Niyazov, as varying speculation has it, is also a serial womaniser, a gambler that once lost $12 million dollars on one night of playing the tables in Madrid in 1997, a former cigarette smuggler, and a bagman for his father’s illicit gas-related dealings. At any rate, it is all high rumour at this stage, although the likelihood of either of these candidates making even minimal impact on the Turkmen political scene seems vastly implausible.

After the ice park and the book-shaped library, President Saparmurat Niyazov has continued with the theme of inaugurating relatively light-hearted centers with the opening last Friday of an amusement park named after himself.
The 88-acre funfair has been called The World of Turkmensbashi Tales, The Associated Press reported:

“It has 54 rides including a Ferris Wheel echoing designs of Turkmen jewelry and a roller coaster swooping over a model of the Caspian Sea, the source of Turkmenistan’s rich oil and gas reserves. The park also features staff dressed as Turkmen folklore characters.”

As Niyazov said during the inauguration ceremony, attended by numerous members of Ashgabat’s diplomatic community, as pictured below, the characters could help children “better understand the world and the history and culture of their people.”

In typical fashion, Niyazov insists on driving himself around; this time in a golf cart.

Niyazov meets his cartoon alter ego.

Niyazov enjoys a joke in front of an assembley of bored diplomats. Note the stern-looking member of the security team in the crowd behind.

Fun is had by all at the The World of Turkmensbashi Tales

It has been a busy week in the Turkmen gas sector over the past week. On Dec. 8, Central Bank head Geldymurad Abilov announced that according to preliminary reports the amount of natural gas to be extracted next year will reach 71 billion cubic metres, Reuters said. As Abilov said in a televised government meeting:

“At the end of 2006, extraction of gas will have exceeded 68 billion cubic metres … while oil extraction will reach 10 million tons.”

As the Reuters report notes, there is nothing unusual about the fact that the announcement should have been made by the head of the Central Bank, whose competencies do not cover the energy sector. On previous occasions, the Minister of Defence has been given the task of releasing data about the cotton harvest.
Abilov also revealed that this year 7 million tons of oil have been refined and 13 billion kilowatt hours of electricity were generated.
At the start of the year, the Turkmen Statistics Service said that in 2005 the country had extracted 63 billion cubic metres of natural gas, 9.9 million tons of oil, and produced 12.8 billion kilowatt hours of electricity.
Next year oil extraction will reach 10.9 billion tons, from which 8 million tons will be refined, and 14 kilowatt hours of electricity will be generated, Abilov said.
However, there are some obvious misgivings about the nature of the information coming out of Turkmenistan, as the Reuters report notes:

“This year, the government stopped publishing statistics in the official press. International organizations have pointed out the lack of transparency of official Turkmen statistics, which complicates the process of assembling independent macroeconomic data.”

It is quite possible, of course, that Oil Minister Gurbanmyrat Atayev is otherwise engaged studying English, as ordered by President Saparmurat Niyazov in his nationally broadcast appointment in Dec. 2005. Either way, disappointing figures will almost certainly lead him to a similar fate to that of his predecessors.

Predictably, the government has only appeared forthcoming with news when it is in some way beneficent to its projected image. The recently discovered Iolotan gas fields in southeastern Turkmenistan, which was discovered recently, according to statements by Niyazov on Nov. 5. The president went to some lengths to explain the scale of the find in comments reported by the Associated Press, although no independent verification of the figures proposed by Niyazov has yet been provided:

“A might fountain [of gas] caught fire … It took us three days to put it out.”

On Sunday, he signed an order allowing Turkey-based Chalyk Energy to participate in the development of the field, the Associated Press reported.

“Chalyk Energy plans to spend $140 million to drill 12 oil wells up to 3,600 metres deep in Iolotan, the presidential press service said in a statement.
Niyazov said in November that the Iolotan fields contained an estimated 7 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, adding to the Central Asian state’s proven commercial reserves of 2.8 trillion cubic meters.”

This follows a similar order signed Nov. 21 endorsing a partnership the state geological exploration company Turkmengeology and China National Petroleum Corp.
Also, deputy head of Russian state gas monopoly Gazprom Valery Golubev held talks with Niyazov on Monday, to discuss plans to jointly explore and develop hydrocarbon fields, Radio Free Europe reported.
Notably, in the same week that further development was made on plans to develop a field ostensibly intended to supply China, they also discussed the possibility of creating a new pipeline along the coast of the Caspian Sea.
On the same day, Niyazov met with Ukraine deputy fuel and energy minister Vadim Chuprun.
The two sides discussed a range of ongoing joint projects in Turkmenistan, including work on a drainage-and-communication tunnel, a compressor station, and a bridge across the Amu-Darya. Again, it is notable that none of these projects are particularly closely related to the Ukrainian minister’s area of responsibility.
Nonetheless, as Chuprun said in a televised statement after the meeting:

“Ukraine has always been and will always be a dependable ally and partner to Turkmenistan, and it is prepared to undertake any measure to further develop our effective relationship.”