Editor’s Note: What follows is part of a cross-blog survey that explores what Central Eurasia might look like fifteen years from now.

I will be 40 in 2021 – that is the first scary thought crossing my mind writing this. Central Asia will no doubt face more challenges of greater import than the past fifteen years. All scare-mongering aside though, a point in time fifteen years in the future gives ample room for wild speculation. With that in mind, I hereby invite all participants of this survey for a drink some days before Christmas 2021 – drinks are free for whoever came closest to the future reality.

To get some sort of idea of what lies ahead, a look back in time bestows some of the scale future developments might entail (as we did in the last survey). In 1991, Central Asia was newly independent. A friend of mine is writing his Master’s dissertation on the predictive analyses written back then, which were not unlike what I am writing here (which will probably prove equally misguided).

‘Which way forward for Central Asia – Where will it stand in 2006?’. Needless to say, the bulk of regional forecasts proved at least partly obsolete – the fault lines and crises that actually evolved were hardly of the variety observers had predicted.

Illustrating this point, several economists were puzzled as to why Uzbekistan — a slow reformer — could return to its 1990 GDP levels far earlier than the moderniser Kazakhstan. A year or two later Kazakhstan’s growth rebounded and that question was rendered obsolete.

Likewise, the current performance of the five Central Asian countries does not hint at a clear development trajectory over the next 15 years. Uncertanty makes the development of a meaningful future scenario a nearly insurmountable challenge, but one this survey attempts partly for the fun of it.

There are a few broad predictions, however, that I can make with some certainty. Economic factors will prove to be one of the main sources (if not the main source) of progress or regression, stability or conflict. The Central Asian states, however, are not in control of these factors that affect them most. Global growth trends will impact all five nations, especially those that have greater links with the world market.

The US economy, according to many, is destined to slow decline at best, or a or nose-dive at worst, within the foreseeable future. Oil prices, at almost all-time highs, could well plunge and also rid themselves of their speculative component. While it is unlikely that prices will return to their 2000 lows, they might not keep their current levels.

Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are the countries with the largest amounts of hydrocarbons, but mostly Kazakhstan’s population would imminently feel the impact of an oil price decrease. While the macro economy seems guarded against fluctuations of the oil price (thanks to the National Fund), people’s expectations aren’t. Housing prices might collapse, the real estate bubble thus evaporate. Kazakhstan could find its coveted position as regional hegemon challenged as declining oil prices render other factors — such as economic policy or political institutions — more imprtant than natural resources.

A global meltdown resulting from a drop in oil prices would, of course, have other implications. Russia and China would significantly see their growth slow as well. As the wider region’s powerhouses, their performance has an almost immediate impact on Central Asia.

Possible decline in oil prices notwithstanding, Kazakhstan will still probably be the richest of the Central Asian nations, with GDP per capita levels matching or exceeding those of Russia, closing in on the Eastern European EU countries. Regional differences within Kazakhstan will become more accentuated with the usual suspects (Almaty, Astana, the Western provinces, the steel and mining oblasts) gaining most ground while others fall behind. The second place, however, is still up for grabs, with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan being the most likely contenders (the right policies provided).

I don’t feel particularly confident making any political projections. Regime continuity and change, democratisation or consolidation of authoritarian governments – all these aspects are constantly in flux. Opposition does by no means stand for better policies across the board – and the most likely outcome for most Central Asian countries is gradual change from within the existing regimes.

I am confident that in 2021, the situation in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will have changed dramatically (for the better?) – it seems unlikely that the situation can get much worse (short of an all-out civil war, which is unlikely) in either country.

Environmental degradation is one of the most worrying changes because it is not only plausible but very likely. Climate change will by 2021 be felt throughout the region. The glaciers of the Tien Shan will have melted to unprecedented levels, floods will have displaced thousands of people. Agriculture, providing livelihoods for large parts of the population, will undergo vicious fluctuations. Urbanisation, as a response to economic and climatic pressures, is set to increase steadily, Almaty will have reached 3-4 million inhabitants, Bishkek and Dushanbe two million.