Image by neweurasia's Schwartz (CC-usage).

You hear a lot these days about the “return of Islam” in Central Asia, as though the ghost of bin Laden is haunting the streets of Astana and Tashkent scaring children.  But “Islamic fundamentalism”, “Islamism”, “political Islam”, or whatever you want to call it, is a very multifaceted phenomenon.  In the global network of Islamic radicalism, al-Qaeda and its various offshoots are the oddballs, wannabe Marxist universalists among a huge crowd of parochial localists.  So, how can we understand the “return of Islam” as it’s really happening in Central Asia?

Central Asian “fundamentalism”, such as it exists — and with Turkic and Farsic cultures as influenced by Buddhism, Sufism, and Marxism as the five ‘Stans, I think “fundamentalism” as normally thought of in the West won’t happen here beyond a few ultra-extremists — is emerging from a confluence of disgruntled agrarian and ex-proletariat elements, opportunists seeking to exploit traditional beliefs for personal gain, and interests groups from the outside who wish to exact leverage on the region for their own benefit (yep, I’m thinking of both Pakistan and the Taliban).  But there’s something deeper going on here, with roots further back in time.

I believe the “return of Islam” is ultimately the result of the abortion of Jadidism‘s aim to establish a homegrown and legitimate separation of mosque and state in the early Twentieth Century by the military coercion of Soviet forces.  Under Communism, secularism as commonly understood in an American or liberalist sense was really a misnomer.*  Instead, it was more extreme laïcité, with a profane ideology taking the place of religion, and the state, although officially atheist, nonetheless acting like a theocracy: Allah and Christ replaced with Marx, the priests and ulema replaced by Party technocrats cum dialecticians.  In other words, it’s the J-curve at work: Islamic revival in Central Asia isn’t just because of  the ideological vacuum left behind in Marxism’s fall; instead, it’s one of history’s greatest delayed reactions.

The real question is if it can be properly controlled and even channeled. So far, I’m not impressed by the policies of the various ‘Stans.  Kazakhstan seems to think it can just buy off Muslims with prosperity, Kyrgyzstan just seems to ignore the problem entirely, while Turkmenistan thinks it can fantasize it away and Uzbekistan thinks it can gun it down.  Only Tajikistan seems to have its head on straight: give the Muslims a voice in society in the form of political and social associations — and then politely steal their votes during elections. ;-)  But in all seriousness folks, the “return of Islam” doesn’t have to be a problem, and I mean it when I say that Tajikistan is sort of doing the right thing insofar as it allows Muslims some kind of voice in society.  Ironically, Rahmon et al may be presenting the best version of Jadidism’s dream today.

* Although I’m a critic of American “secularism”, too.  I’ve written about it here.