Berdimuhammedov riding an Ahal-Teke breed. Photograph found on a Turkmen social network.

Editor’s note: Is Turkmenistan’s upcoming presidential election really just a totalitarian ploy for false legitimacy, or is it something much more… pitiful? neweurasia’s Annasoltan gives her thoughts.

Speaking as a Turkmen, this upcoming presidential election makes no sense. Really, it doesn’t. I’ve been trying to think: maybe Berdimuhammedov wants to project an image of “modernization” to both international and domestic audiences? The Registan’s Joshua Foust has written:

The only real question [is]: By what margin will tyrant Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov rig the vote? [...] Inexplicably, Berdimuhamedov seems determined to proceed with the trappings of a normal election no one will acknowledge as such. At this point, the only question is what percentage of the vote he will choose to accept. Other Central Asian dictators have not shied away from impossible margins, such as Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan (95 percent) and Islom Karimov in Uzbekistan (88 percent). Will Berdimuhamedov meet or beat his 89 percent from 2007? Will he go higher, to lend the appearance of inevitability to his oppressive regime? Or will he go lower, to try to create the false sense of political dynamism?

Foust’s a sharp thinker, and earlier in January, I also had the same logic as him, but now I’m not so certain. That’s because — and it’s hard to describe why — there’s something crazy about this election.

My countrymen may have almost no understanding of democracy, but they aren’t fooled, and a lot of them are thinking that this is just a waste of time. And yeah, one could think in really scary totalitarian terms. It could be as Foust says, that this is all just a way of squashing people’s sense of autonomy with “inevitability”, but that’s not what’s happening. Some people are already squashed, so why squash them any more? Everyone else is trying to squirm their way to some kind of freedom, as I’m seeing more and more of everyday on the Turkmenet, but also in their private lives, their jobs, their thoughts.

Or, maybe it’s mafia-style bullying somehow. Back when the elections were announced in the summer and Berdimuhammedov invited exiles back home, neweurasia‘s Schwartz felt it was a thinly-veiled ploy to capture and kill opponents of the regime. It’s true that over the subsequent autumn and winter, the Turkmenet has seen a lot of weird hacking incidents, but this has been directed mostly at the general population of Internet users. In terms of arrests, these have been focused on ex-candidates from the 2007 sham election.

What’s really going on? As I reported earlier this week, there are seven candidates running besides the president himself, all of whom support Berdimuhammedov’s policies, and anyway, he’s the only one whose campaign advertisements and speeches are appearing in the media and on the streets. And actually, it seems that at first he did not know how to even stage this sham, initially allowing all and sundry to register as candidates, then suddenly stopping that, only two months before the election, as though he couldn’t make up his mind or was negatively surprised by some people’s enthusiasm. I don’t mean to be rude, but it gives me the feeling of a little boy who’s made up his own game and is ambivalent about letting other people play, because a game without other players is not a game, but a game with players means giving up control.

My God, I’m afraid that there’s no real logic behind this election, sinister or otherwise. I’m afraid that it’s just an exercise in megalomaniac ego re-confirmation. Berdimuhammedov is running on a really creepy campaign slogan: “Dowlet adam ucindir” = “The State is for Man”. It officially means the state is at the service of the people, but in reality it means the opposite: all the people serve one man. Really, that’s how absurd this may all really be, that my people have been reduced to being funhouse mirrors for their “Arkadag” (“Protector”). If I’m right, it’s so, so pitiful.

A voting ballot for the upcoming election. Photograph by Adalat Seeker for neweurasia (CC-usage).

Editor’s note: Turkmenistan’s upcoming presidential poll is truly a strange creature. neweurasia’s Annasoltan reviews how it has evolved in the last few months, including the role of government-organized NGOs (GONGOs). “For a sham election,” she writes, “trying to keep track of [it] has proven really annoying.”

For a sham election, trying to keep track of Turkmenistan’s upcoming presidential poll has proven really annoying. For one, in early January of this year, our country’s “Arkadag” (Protector), Berdimuhamedov, declared his intention to establish a multi-party system. One wonders what exactly he has in mind.

It’s my understanding that in February 2011, several Turkmen citizens submitted party registration documents to the Ministry of Justice. Several of those who applied simply met no response, some of them were subsequently called into the Prosecutor General’s Office, where it was made clear to them that they needed to back off, and according to Deutsche Welle journalist Durdy Nazarov, at least one apparently was given a prison term for commercial fraud!

Also that month, Berdimuhamedov gave a forceful speech in which he boasted that he does not fear the members of the Turkmen opposition in exile, many of whom are former government officials. Incidentally, neweurasia‘s readers may recall how, shortly after the Abadan explosion and the role played by opposition-in-exile media on getting the word out, Berdimuhamedov invited dissenters back into the country so they could run in the election. The few who tried had the door promptly shut in their face — so much for no fear.

Then, in May 2011, Berdimuhamedov floated the idea of a “Peasant Party”, the purpose of which would be to “explain the essence of the agrarian state policy [and] provide ideological support to the ongoing agriculture reform”, in other words, Berdimuhamedov‘s agricultural reform (whatever that actually is). It sounds a bit like some of the pseudo-parties of “liberals” in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are drawn mostly from pre-approved members of business or state bureaucracy.

Meanwhile, in the attempt to conjure up candidates for this election, Berdimuhamedov has turned not to his ministers and deputies, who would be seen as real rivals, but to second-rank officials from the country’s five provinces. What’s proven to be a headache is that the number of these candidates has inflated and deflated; it’s now at seven, not including the president himself. And by the way, they are all loyalists, declaring their support for Berdimuhamedov’s policies. The official online news site has praised their candidacy as the “way leading to democracy”.

Originally, three candidates from Lebap and Dashoguz provinces were announced. Later on, four more candidates were added from Ahal, Mary and Balkan provinces, thus having candidates form each province. Then, an additional seven candidates were announced, bringing the total to fifteen. Later, it was announced that of the fifteen candidates seven had not been nominated as candidates by the Central Election Commission because five of them had not managed to process their application in time and another two had withdrawn their bid to run in the election. Berdimuhammedov’s nomination came from his Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, the women’s and youth associations and the labor unions whereas the other candidates were selected by “initiative groups”. These groups, by the way, seem like mirages: countrymen with whom I’ve talked say they never knew such groups existed until this election, and they appear to be what’s derisively called “government-organized non-governmental organizations” (GONGOs), which probably means they were created for the sole purpose of manufacturing candidates.

Oddly, these “candidates” have all been announced less than two months before the election. That does not leave them enough time for an election campaign. But then again, the only one really campaigning is Berdimuhamedov. There are no rallies, no speeches, no posters, no advertisements, none of the trappings of a regular democratic election. About the only “pamphleting” going on is the distribution of official voting ballots in the Turkmen language (see: above photograph).

I should also note that all of the “candidates” are male. RFE/RL reports that a female schoolteacher from Ashgabat had her application rejected. It’s hard to say whether it was because she’s a woman or because her candidacy was supported by the Civil Society Movement, an actual NGO (actual in the sense of not being government-organized and government-sanctioned).

And yet, some of my countrymen fall subject to the illusion, or at least pay lip-service to it. I asked one young man from Ashgabat named Ilmyrat what he thought about the election, and he replied:

“When I see all the unfamiliar names of the other candidates, I would like to give my vote to our president because there is a lot of work to do, and in order to do them, he has to be elected one more time. Besides, our country is not ripe yet for open and democratic elections.”

The rather crappy photos above are of Kumtor tractor trailer convoys in the Issyk-Kul region of Kyrgyzstan. The close-up shows one convoy parked outside of Barksayn (Барскаун, a.k.a., Barskoon, Barkaun, etc.), the second shows a full convoy that had been blocked on the road in Barskayn for mechanical reasons (an engine overheated in the lead truck), and the third shows a convoy with a police escort in one of the hamlets that rest along the Lake’s South Shore, which is less populated than the more touristy North Shore. I remember the cops being rather dramatic: sirens wailing, driving way up ahead of the trucks, frantically waving at pedestrians to get out of the way. I was surprised by the frequency with which the convoys came and went. Since I’m not at all an expert on resource issues, I’ve no idea what’s contained in these trucks (if anything; they could have been empty).

I took these photos back in April 2011 but misplaced them in the wilderness of my hard drive. However, today’s report from Bankwatch.org concerning the mining industry in Kyrgyzstan (http://bankwatch.org/sites/default/files/Kumtor-MoranReport-31Jan2012.pdf) has prompted me to dig them up (pun intended). The report explores a lot of the difficulties that exist trying to get a technical and ecological audit on the mine and other related mining ventures. I recommend reading it.

Background: The Kumtor Gold Mine, owned by the Canadian company Centerra Gold, is an open-pit gold mining site in the Issyk-Kul Province about 80 kilometers/50 miles south of the Lake, near the border with China, and something like 4,000 meters/14,000 feetabove sea level(making it the second-highest gold mining operation in the world after the Yanacocha gold mine in Peru). The mine started operation in the second quarter of 1997 and produced more than 5.8 million ounces (180,000 kg) of gold through the end of 2006.

The mine has been linked to a major environmental incident in 1998, when a truck carrying 1,762 kg of sodium cyanide (a chemical used to dissolve gold from granulated ore, the use of which is highly controversial) fell into the Barskayn River on the way to Kumtor. Here is the river, as well as the general Barksayn area:

I found it more than a little tragi-ironic that the entrance into Barskayn is marked by a dilapidated Soviet-era monument of a dump truck:

We’re now a month into 2012, so I thought might be a good time to review what was going on this time of year in 2011. And, uh, yeah, it wasn’t pretty. There were of course the consequences of the June 2010 events, which had “rolled over” into the new year un-investigated. However, the first and serious challenge was of a different breed — an alleged terrorist group eliminated near Bishkek on January 5, 201. An anti-terror operation resulted in the killing of the suspects and three special task force officers.

At first, the operation seemed like a success, and the public hotly debated the place of Islam in society. However, many questions later arose as to the identity of the alleged terrorists. Local human rights activists identified several people among those eliminated and captured as those who had distributed humanitarian assistance in southern Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2010. Toktayim Umetaliyeva led the investigation, which was approved of the then-presidential administration chief. When asked why the government would declare humanitarian aid distributors “terrorists”, she indicated anti-terror funds promised by the United States.

Another event that stirred controversy was the interim government’s handling of so-called “Bakiyev-owned” companies. At the time, neweurasia commented on how government-owned companies, which had been “appropriated” by the Bakiyev clan, had attempted to conceal the profits they made. The parliament had to launch a special investigation into the fraud schemes. And, well, yes, the MPs would certainly be the ones to know of such schemes — since many of them had been part of it or engaged in similar practices themselves.

The year 2011 also experienced a convulsion of symbolizing, and I don’t just mean what happened in the center of Bishkek (here and here). Our new president, Almazbek Atambayev, firmly believes in the sanctity of relations with Russia. After swearing in as president this past December, he made sure to make a bow toward the Kremlin by announcing that he’d kick the American base out of the Manas Airport and not renew the contract. There was a lot of shock about this, especially in the Western press, but actually if you followed him as Prime Minister, you would not have been surprised: this was the guy, after all, who proposed naming an unnamed mountain peak after Russia’s PM Vladimir Putin. neweurasias Malika reviewed the controversy that ensured when MP Omurbek Tekebayev said peaks could be named only after deceased people, and then other MPs jumped in with their own ideas: naming a star after Manas, for instance. Meanwhile, our society was struggling with a harsh winter and devastated state budget, not to mention a miniature Great Depression at one of our most important markets, Dordoi. This and other instances in the legislative body indicate the immaturity of “parliamentarism” in Kyrgyzstan.

The International Crisis Group then issued a report, “Central Asia: Decay and Decline. A rather merciless title, and according to neweurasia‘s Murzaki, the section on Kyrgyzstan is perhaps the saddest part of the report. Can you guess what the title of the Kyrgyzstan section was? “The Great Leap Backward.”  Eighteen months of research showed that all spheres of life have decayed since the break up of the Soviet Union. The quality and quantity of doctors, as well as of teachers, are in decline, transport routes are deteriorating, the energy sector is plagued by corruption and poor management, and so on. Not that our great leaders seemed to notice.

Hmmmm so, what’s the lesson? Well, today we’ve passed through our first-ever peaceful transfer of power at the presidential level. Yes, it’s just the same old elite I suppose, but hey, at least this time there weren’t snipers on the roof. But besides that, I can still feel that slide into deeper crisis. I’m hoping we can crawl out of it, and that by this time next year, I can look back and think, “That was the beginning, when things began to turn around.”

“One of the foremost journalists from Tajikistan, Atovulloev has fearlessly sought to get the news out on his native country, where violence and state authoritarianism have been the norm for years.”

Tajik journalist Dodojon Atovulloev – founder and editor of the Tajik opposition monthly Charogi Ruz (“Daily Light”), was stabbed in the Italian restaurant “Viaggio” in Moscow on January 12th. The attack led Atovulloev to be hospitalized at Moscow’s Sklifosovsky Institute, where he underwent surgery.

On January 14th, on their Facebook page, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty said:

“Police apprehended a man who was found with blood on his hands within hours of the attack but released him after concluding that he was not connected to the attack. There are no other known suspects at this time, police said.”

In their press release on January 13th, in their fight for the journalist’s justice, Reporters Without Borders:

“…calls on the Russian police to do all it can to identify his attacker and those behind the crime.”

“All avenues must be explored, taking account of the professional activities of this noted opposition journalist.”

Atovulloev’s Charogi Ruz, which was founded in 1991, was the first privately-owned newspaper to be recognized after Tajik independence. The journalist was forced out of Tajikistan, for his media work that criticizes President Emomali Rakhmo.

About the outspoken journalist, Central Asian News says:

“56-year-old Atovulloev is a leader of “Vatandor” movement, known for sharp criticism of the policies of Tajik President Emomalii Rahmon. A few years ago the journalist emigrated for political reasons and now is permanently between Germany and Russia.”

This Moscow stabbing was certainly not the first dangerous incident of threat and risk brought upon this fearless journalist. Doro Zabehov, Atovulloev’s brother-in-law, told RFE/RL that Atovulloev had been “under constant threats and pressures” for years:

“”Even since he left Tajikistan, he has been persecuted.””

“”We knew there were constant risks to his life, but he would never talk about them. He wouldn’t tell us who his enemies were, so I won’t speculate.”"

WikiLeaks explains the danger Atovulloev has faced for many years:

“In 1992, the paper’s offices were broken into. Following that incident, Atovulloev fled to Moscow where he continued to publish Charogi Ruz in exile. However, the threats against him did not stop. Informed of an assassination plot against him by Tajik authorities in 2006, Atovulloev and his family fled to Germany in May. In July of 2001, Atovulloev was detained in Moscow as he was on his way to visit family in Uzbekistan.”

And for the charges he has faced, WikiLeaks explains:

“The Tajik government wanted to extradite him to face charges of insulting the president and inciting to overthrow the government — both punishable by death under Tajik laws. Under international pressure, Moscow relented, and Atovulloev was allowed to return to Germany.”

Latest public photo of Dodojon Atovulloev taken during interview on January 19, 2012. Photo courtesy Fergananews.com

On January 19th, in Atovulloev’s latest interview with Fergana news agency, he sounds ready to continue his work, and thanks doctors who saved his life, as well as all friends who were with him during those difficult times.

neweurasia joins the international community in raising awareness to Atovulloev’s case and fighting for the health and justice this respected journalist and opposition figure rightfully deserves.

The National Journalism Prize Oltin Qalam VII (Golden Pen) gathers young talented journalists in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The contest’s aim: to award the best achievements in print, television, radio, Internet and press journalism. Ministries, authorities and mass media partake in the event – even the UN, UNESCO and the World Bank participate and give their own awards.

About the awards, Uzbekistan National News Agency said:

“One of the complimentary awards will go for the best article devoted to 2012, the Year of Family.”

UzDaily says:

“The competition, which was established on initiative of the Uzbek President, is dedicated to the World Press Freedom Day.”

Celebrating press freedom… in Uzbekistan… seriously?

The media in this Central Asian country is very far from anything free, regardless of the image this Oltin Qalam contests portrays. In 2011, the media rights NGO Reporters Without Borders classified Uzbekistan as an “Enemy of The Internet”. On May 3rd, 2011, World Press Freedom Day, the Office of the United States Press Secretary of the Department of State said:

“Countries such as Belarus, Burma, Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan also continue to be notoriously repressive of press freedoms.”

The real media issue at heart is that though the contest claims to be inspired by free media ideals – there is no real press freedom in Uzbekistan.

Is the aim of this Oltin Qalam VII competition to prove that Uzbekistan is truly moving forward with the twised relationship it has with media today, in hopes to become better – to become more accepting of true journalism, to make the environment more free and welcoming to political commentary and opinions that government would find unfavorable? By hosting this competition, are Uzbek officials proposing they can congregate an international press competition with honesty and transparency?

Even thought it’s an idea that grasps positive hope, evidence of the ongoing treatment of media would tell us that no – this likely is not the case.

neweurasia’s Avicenna’s post “Central Asia is a totally free-press-free-zone “ is about last year’s Oltin Qalam competition results. Here’s a bit of what Avicenna had to say on May 3rd, 2011:

“Today is World Press Freedom Day celebrated everywhere but in totalitarian countries. In Uzbekistan journalist community of those affiliated with official and foreign accredited mass-media enjoyed the national Oltin Qalam (Uzbek, Golden pen) award ceremony in Tashkent.”

“While the major award of the event went to a local media-tycoon Firdavs Abdukhalikov, whose affiliation with mass-media limits with owning tabloids and private TV channels and chairing at the National Association of Electronic Mass Media (NAESMI), and has nothing to do with journalism, Freedom House released its Freedom of the Press 2011 report that identifies the greatest threats to independent media in 196 countries and territories.”

“It was released on May 2 as part of the UNESCO World Press Freedom Day celebration in Washington, D.C. According to the website of Freedom House, “the report shows that global media freedom has reached a new low point, contributing to an environment in which only one in every six people live in countries with a Free press.””

About the contest, UzDaily also says:

“It is also open for press services of the state and nongovernmental establishments.”

Really? It would be very interesting to see how many independent media-makers will be involved in the contest, in a fair and just way. Will a nongovernmental media establishment win this year? I guess we’ll just have to wait for the results to be announced on World Press Freedom Day 2012 to find out.

Please, Uzbekistan, don’t ruin a lovely day for journalists who work hard for a free and open press – especially in countries that are far from being free – by awarding one of your undeserving buddies.

See below: VII International National Competition for Journalists, Uzbekistan – 2012

“And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thy own eye?”
Matthew 7:3

Karimov knocks out Rahmon?

Official Uzbek media keep downgrading Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon regime by reprinting online critical articles written by journalists who are, in fact, perfect “Uzbek state enemies.”

Nowadays, apart from finding disadvantages and ‘assisting’ in postponing the construction of the Roghun project in Tajikistan, Uzbek media representatives decided to impose themselves as ready-to-analyze independent online sources on the search for as much information as possible that tells of the Rahmon’s regime’s failures and lies.

One of them, Tashkentskaya Pravda (Tashkent Truth) allowed itself to publish an article from Paruskg.info website, which refers to Wikileaks information, entitled, “Apple Does Not Fall Far From The Tree.”

Shamsullo Gulov, author of the ‘kompromat’ starts with calling Wikileaks a “famous web site” that gives opinions of U.S. State Department employees regarding Rahmon’s family seizing control over main industrial and financial facilities in the counrty. Later on, the author says that the information provided by Wikileaks are “concrete facts.”

Well, first of all, the fact of using Wikileaks as a source of information is something out of reality for Uzbek media since Wikileaks itself, based on American diplomatic cables, called Karimov an “authoritarian leader” and linked his regime with the Uzbek mafia.

Secondly, while condemning the Rahmons social status and its control over main businesses in Tajikistan, the author forgets about one very important detail: Gulnara and Lola Karimov are very much in charge of sharing the same control over businesses in Uzbekistan, which was also rightfully revealed by American diplomats’ cables that were published by Wikileaks. One of the examples is Gulnara’s control over back then one of the most influential and powerful companies, Zeromax.

One by one, with peculiar sarcasm the author ‘discloses’ the facts that “Princess Tahmina,” Rahmon’s daughter, controls companies that are in charge of agricultural equipment import, as well as has her share in construction business.

“All these operations let her renew her motorpool more often than her lingerie collection,” an Uzbek journalist says, with not-well-hidden jealousy.

Here is a perfect moment to recall Gulnara Karimova’s ninth-richest status in the list of the wealthiest individuals of Switzerland.

Tajik No 2 — Rustam Rahmon, President’s son is Macho, President of the Tajik Football Federation and a member of the Asian Olympic Committee. He loves spending his time in brothels and casino’s affected by drugs. To the Uzbek journalist it is absurd to have a President’s child be so irresponsible and public at the same time — Gulnora should speak, right?

Shamsullo Gulov emphasizes that this situation happens in a country that has a 2.7 billion external debt and where 63% of the population (75% in reality, the author claims) is living below the poverty line with an average salary of $100. Probably Mr. Gulov forgot about the 5 billion external debt of Uzbekistan, and the $70-120 salary for average Uzbeks.

The author resumes his ‘masterpiece’ with a claim that while 1.5 million Tajik migrant workers work abroad to keep the population alive, their leader and his family live a posh life. By the way, the statistics are taken from Freedom House, another organization that was kicked out of Uzbekistan after the tragic events in Andijan, and whose reports on Uzbekistan are very critical of the human rights situation and, thus, are always very negatively commented on by the dictatorship regime.

To mention, according to official statistics from Russia’s Interfax Financial Market edition, among 10 million foreigners who migrated to Russia since January 2011, citizens of Uzbekistan make up to 14% of them (1.4 million).

To this I have nothing else to add but: “Why do you look at the speck that is in your brother’s eye, but do not notice the log that is in your own eye?” Actually, Karimov and Rahmon are not ‘brothers’ anymore. Not in this Presidential life.

Below: “Apple Does Not Fall Far From The Tree” by Tashkentskaya Pravda, January 18, 2012.

Musta Kemal striking an Ataturk pose in Turkey's Cankaya Library.

I’m knee-deep in exam season at the moment, studying my level один Russian and writing essays, so I haven’t had the chance to look closely at the Kazakh parliamentary elections. From what I’m hearing, preliminary results are giving Nur Otan party 80.7% of the vote, while two other parties — the business-oriented Ak Zhol and the People’s Communist Party — earned slightly more than 7% each, clearing the threshold to enter parliament. Unsurprisingly, Western press has been mostly negative, but what my inner cynic just finds hilarious is this remark from Miklos Haraszti, head of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ observation mission: “This election took place in a tightly controlled environment, with serious restrictions on citizens’ electoral rights.” Well, OSCE, I guess all you can really say is: whoops.

However, putting my hypocrisy radar aside for a moment, they’re right. Although I am not so quick to condemn Kazakhstan — as there is usually more than meets the eye to this country, both in good and bad ways — nevertheless, this election definitely was shoddy. My colleague from Ghent University, Dr. Bruno De Cordier has brought to my attention an article in the Washington Times with this telling remark:

“‘Even the government doesn’t hide that they have no intention of copying Western democracies,’ said Lilit Gevorgyan, an analyst and IHS Global Insight in London. ‘I think what they are trying to do is to show that they are responding to social discontent.’”

The article also quotes a taxi driver who refers to most of the so-called opposition parties as “pupils” of the main party. As some of you know, I am currently working on an MPhil at the University of Leuven concerning the phenomenon of managed democracy in Russia and Kazakhstan, so these kind of tidbits are right up my alley.

I’ve heard it often said from Kazakh colleagues that Nazarbayev et al appear to be consciously modelling their strategy after Atatürk. I find this a very intriguing line of thought as there are indeed many striking parallels, and not just because they both happened to be the first leaders of post-imperial Turkic countries. These range from the grand, e.g., erecting new capital cities, to the minute, e.g., changing (“modernizing”) the alphabet — and by the way, after having been to Astana (and getting an earful from Kazakh readers about the CyberChaikhana chapter concerning it) and after reading about how the Soviets played some nasty social engineering games with graphemes (cf. Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia, pp. 76-78), my assessment is that it’s neither good nor bad, it’s just part of the identity-building process.

This election, however, calls to mind some negative parallels, particularly Atatürk’s attempt in Turkey to implement top-down political “pluralization” in the form of the Liberal Republican Party during the Great Drepression. The platform of this “party” was ending state monopolies and curtailing state investment, as well as luring in foreign capital. Atatürk supported this, and soon at least one radical Left-winger was proclaiming that he had discovered a “third way” between capitalism and communism. Now, lots of political leaders have been attributed with or have claimed to find a “third way”, including some very nasty individuals like Gaddafi and Karimov. Nazarbayev strikes me as much humbler in his official rhetoric, often talking about the need to learn from other nations, particularly Russia, but the effect is the same: re-legitimizing an already-established political elite.

Ah, and speaking of legitimacy, Kazakhstan also has a law against criticizing or otherwise defaming the person of the Kazakh President (and some say, by extension, his family) that has a striking resemblance to a notorious 1951 Turkish statute. More and more, I really wonder whether Nazarbayev is consciously envisioning himself as, well, a kind of Atakazakh. Of course, he appears much too prudent to have such a title bequeathed to him at the moment, but the golden imprint of his hand in the Baiterek perhaps says all that needs to be said: he has left an indelible mark upon his country.

There are differences, as well, some of which are positive, e.g., Nazarbayev is not hostile toward religion (recent changes to the law code, of course, being an important exception to my claim here), whereas Atatürk left behind a very difficult ideological legacy of staunch (and military-enforced) laïcité. Overall, history may also judge Nazarbayev’s policy toward ethnic minorities, although not great, nonetheless much better than his Turkish prototype.

Secretive oligachical corruption, however, may prove to tarnish Nazarbayev’s reputation down the line, whereas Atatürk, lavish lifestyle notwithstanding, is frequently valorized for his total devotion to his political cause: in his will, he donated all of his possessions to the Republican People’s Party, and a chunk of the resultant interest was willed to the Turkish Language Association and the Turkish Historical Society. However, I should also note that we need to keep in mind some anthropological context, as Nazarbayev may actually be acting out a Turkic-Soviet tradition of the chieftain/kolkhol president “keeping house” for his tribe/farm (again, cf. Roy, pp. 86-96, 184-189) (the egregious amounts of money attributed to him in the Western press doesn’t contradict my point here; rather, it shows how this tradition can and has been abused).

Anyway, that’s my 2.963 tenge for now…

Regarding the title, those of you familiar with political Islam shall understand the reference to طاغوت (taghut), an Arabic Islamic term meaning “to cross the limits, overstep boundaries” or “to rebel” vis-à-vis divine authority. Traditionally a term connoting idolatry, it is mentioned in the politically significant Qur’anic verse 4:76 (which Schwartz and I quote in the final part of the series). During the medieval period, it has was used by Muslims to describe the rampaging Mongol khans and their vassals. Today, in contemporary Islamic political theory, it has come to be used to describe dictatorships, i.e., as violating the will of God.

You can read the piece here: http://www.fairobserver.com/article/life-after-taghut