Summer in Kyrgyzstan this year tends to be hot. Especially, in terms of political negotiations. For almost three months Kyrgyz-American relations have been balancing on the edge, full of uncertainty and suspicion about each country’s motivations and intentions. The subject of political bargaining- American military base located near the capital city, Bishkek. It has been there for almost 4,5 years since the US started its military operation in Afganistan. For the time being anyone hardly had any problems with the fact that American military stronghold was residing in the very heart of an “island of democracy”. The authorship of this romantic definition of Kyrgyzstan belongs to the former president of the country Askar Akaev who was notorious for his skillful political maneuvering between the interests of the superpowers eager to claim Kyrgyzstan as the territory of personal influence.

With the new regime emerging in Kyrgyzstan it does not seem to be the case any more. In April 2006, shortly before the meeting of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) in Beijin president Kurmanbek Bakiev came up with an ultimatum demanding American troops to withdraw from the territory of Kyrgyzstan. The clash of interests was more than obvious in this situation – leading political powers of SCO – Russia and China- since the last year have been insisting on drafting the schedule of eliminating American military presence in Central Asia. President Bakiev apparently did a good job in terms of making Big Russian and Chinese brothers happy. Almost no room was left for negotiations with the American side: Kyrgyzstan announced that instead of charging 2 $ million per year as a rent for keeping the base on ground the “fee” would skyrocket as high as 200 $ million. It was crystal clear that almost no calculations were made by the Kyrgyz side to come up with a more or less realistic amount of rent charge. According to a number of analysts, the idea behind was to make negotiations nearly impossible. But surprisingly enough the process of political bargaining was launched. After 2 rounds of discussions, held behind closed doors, the consensus was achieved. Besides additional 18 million per year Kyrgyzstan also won 150 million as an aid and compensation package.

Thus, the status quo of the American military presence in Kyrgyzstan was maintained but lot of questions remained on the surface leaving many stakeholders puzzled.
The main concern for negotiators was the mood and position of Kyrgyz president that were changing rapidly in terms of building alliances with international partners.

There was a general feeling that being eager to stay on good terms with the president of Russia president Bakiev failed to estimate the stake of American influence in Kyrgyzstan.
Since the independence was gained by Kyrgyzstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union the US pledged more than 850 $ million as a financial support to Kyrgyzstan. On the contrary, Russian-Kyrgyz relations since than were mainly based on the memories about “old, good times” with little evidence that Russia can again become interested in “real time” cooperation. Only in the end of 90th, of late, Moskow got alerted on the fact of the growing influence of the West in the Central Asian region. Not being enthusiastic about admitting the failure of own foreign politics in Central Asia Russian authorities made every attempt to counterweight America in Kyrgyzstan. The most visible sign of the primarily hidden competition of the geopolitical egos of Russia and America was the opening of the Russian military base in Kant, in the neighborhood of Bishkek. The next logical step in this fight would be getting rid of American competitors and, we can assume, that Russian diplomacy did its best to push Kyrgyz president to move in this direction. Though, the process, that seemingly contained some promise in the beginning, never approached the point of breaking Kyrgyz-American ties.

The wisest political choice in this situation seems to be obvious but not for the leadership of Kyrgyzstan. Trying to secure own political positions Kurmanbek Bakiev is strongly counting on the personal support of Vladimir Putin since strategy has already proven to be successful for the previous president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, who after being ousted in 2005, was harbored by Russia. Inevitably comparing two Kyrgyz presidents in this situation it’s safe to assume that the doctrine of international politics of Akaev was much better tailored in terms of keeping balance between all international stakeholders. Kurmanbek Bakiev nowadays is more straightforward and much less strategic which hardly adds to his credit as a politician.

Though, for now the dust has settled with politicians on both sides being more or less satisfied. America now can take a deep breath finally being assured that its military presence in Central Asia is secured for the time being. Kyrgyz negotiators from now can count on 150 $ million- the financial settlement that is promised to be pledged by America in the year 2007.

Thus politicians seem to be all set: bilateral relations have not being ruined, America is to stay in the region and Kyrgyzstan is to benefit from that financially and politically, preserving its status of a reliable partner of the West in the fight against terrorism. According to Kadyr Malikov, who serves as an expert to the Institute of the Analyses and Planning in Bishkek: “The result reached through these negotiations is the best case scenario for Kyrgyzstan in all aspects, including the geopolitical one. The US might even want to increase and solidify its military presence here keeping in mind that the Middle East conflict can have a tremendous outreach in terms of current instability in Fergana Valley.”

Though it’s hard to say whether political honeymoon between America and Kyrgyzstan will last. On the first place it may depend on personal ambitions and strategies of the president Bakiev. Keeping in mind how firm he was in the decision to push away Americans so that to “please” Russian partners it’ll be quite logical not to rely on ever lasting friendliness of the Kyrgyz leader.

Though the desire of Kyrgyzstan to be on good terms with the regional leader is explainable.

It’s obvious nowadays that Kurmanbek Bakiev is very susceptible to the influence of the closest, in a geographical sense, partners. The concept of political neighborhood can probably be applied to explain this situation. Current Kyrgyz leadership chooses to rely on neighbors whose political styles and strategies stem from the common Soviet past. They are more predictable and, in a sense, more reliable, not longing for democratic values and mainly concerned about preserving own status quo. That is exactly what Kurmanbek Bakiev needs right now. Amidst political and social instability Kyrgyz leader will inevitably be more willing to exist in the web of allies with similar goals and interests.

But it should be noted, though, that concerns regarding the Kyrgyz-American deal are still in the air. Some of the human rights advocated, for instance, argue that Kyrgyzstan’s dignity and reputation is destroyed because of bargaining and selling out the country. There are also concerns that are much more pragmatic and grounded. During the first round of negotiations one of the Kyrgyz MPs, Melis Eshimkanov, expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that “the bargaining was held behind the closed doors”. In Eshimklanov’s opinion the lack of transparency during the negotiations can result in American money not ending up in the State Budget of Kyrgyzstan. These concerns are shared by independent analysts as well. Almost in one accord experts agree that providing the level of corruption in Kyrgyzstan the financial “assistance” will most probably be deposited in the pockets of certain “privileged” citizens of Kyrgyzstan.