After the collapse of the Soviet regime, like other Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan chose democracy as the principal political system according to which people would establish the government and rule the country. Many actions had been done in Uzbekistan on the path to democracy, including accepting foreign investment to establish international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) the main functions of which were to work in human rights promotion, independent mass media, and small and medium size business development. A few years later, the power over government was centered in the hands of the president Islam Karimov and the conception of democracy was reinterpreted.

Today NGOs are under growing pressure from the Uzbekistani government, and cannot conduct any actions independently but only after official permission from government institutions. The Andijan events on May 13, 2005 made the situation even worse. The government authorities claimed that it was a reflection of the so called “colored� revolutions that took place in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. They used this fact as an effective tool to eradicate NGOs, and justified their actions by stating that those revolutions were results of the activities of NGOs that were sponsored by foreign donors who were trying to influence the countries policy for their own profits. In reality, the government was eliminating NGOs in order to prevent information about the real situation in Uzbekistan leave the country as well as to keep “information vacuum� in the country. More than a hundred NGOs were forced to stop operation and were closed down. The government got rid of more than a hundred NGOs, among which were Human Rights Watch, IREX, Open Society Institute, Soros Foundation, Internews, and Radio Freedom.

Today, another NGO, Agricultural Cooperative Development International / Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA), is being pressed by the government of Uzbekistan. The State Tax Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan told to Regnum.ru that:

Investigation showed that during realization if the micro-crediting program in 2004-2005 years, Andijan office of ACDI/VOCA hid the unreasonable expenditure of big amount of cash in total sum of $3 million.

According to the representative of the Tax Committee, ACDI/VOCA has fully accepted its guilt and all required paper were signed. At the moment, government is going to charge the NGO to pay fees for its wrongdoings.

NGOs play a large role in building a democratic state, and civil society taking part in the activities of NGOs helps to make the country able to choose its form of rule. Today’s situation in Uzbekistan is a real challenge for NGOs, as all the time there is a great possibility of being caught by the government for wrongdoing like giving people micro-credit to develop their farms. Most people are risking their freedom by working for such nongovernmental organizations.

Nongovernmental organizations are one of the few tools that can be used by the society as a counterbalance to the government. I again state that the roles of NGOs in building a democratic state and developing civil society are very significant. I will keep my fingers crossed for ACDI/VOCA and other NGOs for their bright future and success in promoting the concept of democracy.

Brookings scholar Fiona Hill and University of Maryland Ph.D. candidate Kevin Jones put out an analysis of the current political situation in Uzbekistan this summer in The Washington Quarterly enitled Fear of Democracy or Revolution: The Reaction to Andijon. Their article serves as the most current general synopsis of the political situation in Central Asia’s most populous country, and also forwards a few policy recommendations.

Their thesis is that Karimov’s grip on power is tenuous because of the abysmal economic situation in Uzbekistan, not because of popular disaffection with the lack of political rights. Because there is no feasible opposition group capable of taking power from the current regime (at least none that offer an improvement on the status quo), Western powers should pursue a policy of limited engagement with Uzbekistan, working in tandem as much as possible with China and Russia.

The article also raises some interesting questions about the scheduled presidential elections in 2007, and demonstrates convincingly through historical example how messy even planned successions often are. For example, even when the successor is chosen by the ruling regime, the regime change is almost always followed by extensive purges. While Karimov may not be likely to appoint someone new in 2007, he can not govern forever, and eventually this question will have to be addressed.

Perhaps most interestingly, Hill and Jones point out that democracy is not necessarily what Uzbekistan needs; more strategic policies might do the trick:

Although the country’s intelligentsia and civil society groups may have clear aspirations for a different political system, they are out of step with the basic concerns and desires of the population. Hardship can just as easily be alleviated by an authoritarian government that emphasizes populist policies, increases pensions as well as minimum wages, and launches employment and education programs as by a democratic government. In states such as Russia and Venezuela, for example, high world oil prices have boosted government revenues, enabling the state to redistribute resources to the population as well as to key elites.

Or how about Kazakhstan? While not populist in the same way as Hugo Chavez, Nazarbayev has kept his political system closed while pursuing smart(er) economic policies than many of its neighbors. Kazakhs are certainly not disaffected with their government the same way Uzbeks are. In a recent W.P. Carey Forum in Washington D.C., the Kazakh Foreign Minister Kassymzhomart Tokaev even said straightforwardly that Kazakhstan would open up its economic system first and expand politics later. Fareed Zakaria recently made this argument very clearly and accessibly in The Future of Freedom.

One complaint I had with the article was its reliance on one particular finding from the World Bank / UNDP / Brookings surveys of 2004. Jones and Hill repeatedly mention the statistic of Uzbeks not being overly concerned with political rights, just the economy. I don’t question the usefulness of these surveys; this figure might very well be correct, and does make good sense (most people care more about having enough to eat than reading a free newspaper). I do, however, wonder how likely the average Uzbek would be to express his or her true feelings about the government to a Western-funded interviewer. It is very easy to be overly critical when nitpicking public opinion polls, but especially in cases like this, the context of the interview must be taken into account. One would also note that the interviews were conducted before Andijon.

This article is not going to please everybody. For the human rights group types, it seems to advocate the status quo – limited engagement, evolution not revolution, and cooperation with China and Russia. For the Karimov-apologist types, it suggests limiting engagement in the short-term and hints at a future with regime change a possibility.

Either way, it provides an excellent primer on the current state-of-affairs with sober policy recommendations, and is worth a read. Uzbekistan has fundamentally changed course, and the article answers the how, why, and whereto.

In an article for Ferghana.ru, Galima Bukharbayeva (known to those interested in Uzbekistan through her Andijon coverage for the IWPR) voices sharp criticism towards Germany’s Uzbekistan policy.

As this blog has covered the German-Uzbek relations before (here, here, here and here), I thought it was only right to add my two cents to her points. All in all, there is a lot to agree with in her article, but as Bukharbayeva is no expert in German internal politics, she might overestimate certain points.

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Germany’s contingent of troops will stay in Uzbekistan, as Nathan reported some while ago. I held this post back as the German media tends either to overlook Central Asia and the German involvement in the region or comes up with valuable stories rather late.

Marcus Bensmann called the permission to stay an early Christmas present Tashkent gave to Berlin. Friedbert Pflüger, CDU politician in the Foreign Committee, in return promised the Uzbek government to carefully consider Karimov’s stance on events in Andijon earlier this year. What looks like a shady deal at first sight demands some more elaboration. Luckily, Pflüger was quick to respond to allegations that he traded ignorance towards human rights abuses for a military base. As directnews reports (my translation):

The German government was not blackmailed because of Termez, assured Pflüger. About a week ago, he met with the Uzbek government and reached an agreement, according to which Tashkent will not carry out on an earlier threat to withdraw overflight rights for some EU countries. Germany will also be able to further use Termez as a supply base [for its Afghanistan operations]. Pflüger said that he assured Tashkent that the Uzbek view of events in Andijon will be be considered in a fair manner. One could for example, under the chairmanship of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung or the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, set up a “round table”, on which Tashkent could articulate its point of view on the events [in Andijon in March].

Pflüger said, it is important to revive the dialogue [with Uzbekistan]. Germany and the EU have no interest in isolating Uzbekistan in a similar fashion than Belorussia, so that it would have to focus all foreign policy toward Moscow. He told this President Karimov. The German delegation did not depart from the official EU-line in demanding an independent enquiry. “There is no deal along the lines Termes against Interior Minister [referring to the recent visa for Almatow] or departing from the official EU-policy towards Uzbekistan”

On Friday the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, held its annual PONARS conference (Program on New Approaches to Russian Security). One panel of the seminar discussed “A New Great Game in Central Asia.” The panel was hosted by Kimberly Marten (Columbia University), and included Alexander Cooley (Columbia University), Eric McGlinchey (George Mason University), and Nikolai Sokov (Monterey Institute of International Studies). Memos related to this conference are available from CSIS�s website.

The conference touched upon a broad range of themes in the region, including future stability, the “Great Game,” and the evacuation of the K2 airbase in Uzbekistan.
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On Wednesday the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington, DC, think tank, a panel discussion was held on the recent elections in Kazakhstan titled “After the Kazakhstan Elections: U.S. Policy in the Caspian and Central Asia.” The panel consisted of Heritage scholar Dr. Ariel Coen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza, National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia Angela Stent, and Brookings scholar Dr. Fiona Hill.
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The EU’s embargo on certain military-related goods and an official visa ban imposed on twelve members of the Uzbek government and military has already shown its limits.

First, Uzbek interior minister, Col. Gen. Zakirdzhon Almatov is currently in Germany, undergoing cancer treatment (I can’t find a single German source on that). The EU’s response:

European Union officials said Germany had granted the visa in accordance with a European Union practice that allows travel ban exceptions for medical emergencies and other urgent needs.

Well, as Brian, a reader of the Registan remarks, it won’t prove too difficult to forge a doctor’s note saying that Uzbekistan’s elite needs European medical treatment. Does that mean the visa ban is already rendered completely ineffective?

With regards to the embargo on military equipment, a relatively old DW article can tell us quite a lot:

According to the article, there were only three incidents of EU-Uzbek military assistance:
a) 20 German shephards for combatting drug trafficking
b) Ten years ago, France installed night-vision equipment on 10 Uzbek helicopters
c) Five Uzbek snipers were trained at a German military academy

That’s it, says DW. However, one should add that, apparently, UK-manufactured Land Rovers were used by the Uzbek security forces in Andijon and Uzbek troops received advice from the Royal Regiment of Wales back in 2004.

Another point from the DW-article mentioned above lies in the economic hemisphere. Since 1992, the EU lent out $150 million to Uzbekistan in cheap loans (that makes around $12 million a year) and cancelled these in the wake of Andijon. China seems a little more generous – its Eximbank recently lent Uzbekistan $300 million under very favourable terms.

On a final note regarding Mr. Almatov’s cancer treatment; maybe the Uzbek government will take a closer look at Ashgabad, where Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov built a huge private clinic, simply importing the German doctors (who don’t seem to enjoy Germany anyway).